


7, 2019

ISSN 2284-2918




Thaumàzein

Θαυμάζειν

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA

**PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
IN RELATION TO THE EXISTENCE OF
HUMAN BEING — PART II**



***Thaumàzein* – Rivista di Filosofia**

ISSN: 2284-2918

Thaumàzein is an open-access journal of philosophy and uses **double-blind peer review** in order to ensure and to improve the quality of philosophical discussion. Thaumàzein promotes special issues on topics of particular relevance in the philosophical debates. Founded in 2012, it is an international journal of annual publication.

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Thaumàzein – 7, 2019

**Psychopathology and Philosophy
in Relation to the Existence of Human Being
Part II**

*Edited by
John Cutting & Guido Cusinato*

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10.13136/thau.v7i0



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EXPERIENCES WITHOUT FOR-ME-NESS?
RECONSIDERING ALLEGED COUNTER EXAMPLES
FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PSYCHEDELICS

TABLE OF CONTENTS: *1. Introduction; 2. Selfhood and for-me-ness; 3. Alleged counter examples of for-me-ness; 4. Reconsidering these counter examples; 5. Conclusion.*

1. Introduction

In contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness, a central question concerns whether for-me-ness (or the “minimal self”¹) is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. Over the years, Dan Zahavi has defended a position of “experiential minimalism”, arguing that phenomenal consciousness necessarily entails reflexive self-consciousness in the sense that there is something it is like for me to have or live through experiences, thus considering “for-me-ness” a universal feature of phenomenal consciousness [Zahavi 1999; 2005; 2014; Zahavi & Kriegel 2016]. Several authors have challenged this position by offering counter examples, i.e. by presenting examples of experiences, which, on their interpretation, lack for-me-ness [e.g., Metzinger 2003; Lane 2012; 2015; Billon 2013; Millière 2017].

The purpose of this article is to explore if such examples of experiences really can be said to lack for-me-ness and thereby constitute viable counter evidence, disproving the universality of for-me-ness. First, we introduce the concept of for-me-ness. Then, we present and discuss examples of experiences from the domains of psychopathology and psychedelics that sometimes are claimed to lack for-me-ness.

¹ In this article, we use the concepts of “minimal self” and “for-me-ness” interchangeably and synonymously [cf. Zahavi 2014; 2018].

2. *Selfhood and for-me-ness*

In a famous passage from *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume describes how he tried to discover his own self through acts of introspection. Yet, the self was nowhere to be found, «I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception» [2007, 165]. Unable to find what he was searching for, Hume denied the existence of the self, «I am certain there is no such principle in me» [*ibid.*]. When reading this classic passage, one may be tempted to place Hume in a “no-self camp”, opposing it to a “self camp” where its members assert the existence of the self. However, such contradistinctions can easily be deceptive. Let us for example say that we want to use Hume’s “no-self” argument to challenge the phenomenological claim of the existence of the minimal self. Sooner or later, however, we would face difficulties, realizing that phenomenologists too deny that the self can appear as an object of experience that we can direct our attention towards. According to them, there is no “self-object”, populating consciousness. Eventually, we would have to draw a conclusion that would call into question the viability of our own analysis – the self, whose existence Hume denies, is *not* the same self as that which phenomenologists claim to exist. In other words, Hume and the phenomenologists operate with different concepts of the self. What Hume is arguing is that there is no “substantial” self in the sense of an unchanging, foundational entity that underlies the ever-changing flow of “perceptions”, which, on his account, consist of “impressions” and “ideas” [Hume 2007, 7]. Differently put, the self is not a “*subiectum*” in the metaphysical sense of the term. Phenomenologists agree; the self is not some “thing”, e.g., a hypothetical substrate or synthesizing principle, above or beneath the experiential stream. By contrast, what phenomenologists describe with the notion of minimal self (or for-me-ness) is a very specific feature of experiential life, namely that all experiences manifest first-personally to the subject of experience. Notably, Hume’s introspective search for his own self and his realization of the self-illusion were not experientially given to someone else but to himself in his own first-person perspective. In this regard, Hume’s denial of the existence of something like a substantial self has no bearings for the phenomenological claim of the existence of the minimal self – in fact, Hume’s introspective search presupposes the existence of the minimal self.

Although phenomenologists argue that the minimal self cannot appear as an object, they do not consider it absent, unconscious or as some sort of pervasive “I-qualia”. Rather, they claim that the minimal self manifests itself pre-reflectively as a certain configuration of experience. For example, when I read a book, listen to a melody or taste an orange, I am implicitly (i.e. pre-reflectively) aware that I am the one who reads, listens or tastes. I do not need to reflect upon “who” it might be that is reading, listening or tasting in order to know that it is me. In other words, I am self-aware, not only when I introspect or reflect upon myself, but also simply in virtue of having experiences. Thus, it is not self-reflection that brings about self-awareness. Rather, as already Sartre pointed out, «it is a non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible» [2003, 9].

Now, the claim, rigorously defended in several seminal publications, is that phenomenal consciousness entails pre-reflective self-consciousness in the sense that there is something it is like *for me* to have or live through experiences [Zahavi 1999; 2005; 2014]. As Zahavi and Kriegel [2016] put it, phenomenal consciousness entails a “what-it-is-like-for-me-ness”. Here, “for-me-ness” articulates that experiences are first-personally manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a manner in which they are not given to anyone else. For example, the pain I experience is given to me in a manner that is fundamentally different from how you may experience my pain. Similarly, your experience of pain manifests to you in a way that is distinctly different from how I may experience your pain. The difference is precisely that one’s own experiences are first-personally present, i.e. there is an epistemic asymmetry at work here. Zahavi’s proposal has been to identify this ubiquitous, first-personal or subjective character of experience with *for-me-ness* (or the minimal self), and he has argued that *for-me-ness* is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.

3. Alleged counter examples of for-me-ness

The standard way to challenge universality claims is to come up with suitable counter examples. This strategy has also been applied in discussions on *for-me-ness*. Many authors have presented examples of ex-

periences, which they claim lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary and universal feature of phenomenal consciousness. Some of these examples are found in psychopathology and altered states of consciousness during psychedelic intoxication.

Probably the most widely used example to challenge the universality of for-me-ness is thought insertion. Briefly put, thought insertion is a phenomenon in which patients experience some of their thoughts as not belonging to themselves, thereby ascribing the source of these thoughts to someone or something else. The delusional misattribution of certain thoughts to someone or something else may be vague or concrete, i.e. patients may experience alien thoughts in their own mind without knowing where these thoughts come from or they may believe that specific others or forces are the source of these thoughts [Henriksen *et al.*, in press]. In discussions of self-consciousness, the phenomenon of thought insertion has attracted attention, because it seems to imply that mere awareness of one's thoughts is not enough to secure recognition of these thoughts as one's own.² Many authors have argued that we must distinguish between different forms of experiential ownership, typically dividing it into a "sense of agency" and a "sense of ownership". Sense of agency refers to a sense of being the initiator of, say, a thought or bodily movement, whereas sense of ownership refers to a sense of being the one who experiences, say, a thought or movement. Despite important differences in their accounts, many authors have argued that the sense of agency is lost but the sense of ownership retained in episodes of thought insertion [see, e.g., Stephens & Graham 1994; Gallagher 2004]. Since the sense of ownership is considered preserved on these accounts, the universality of for-me-ness is here not at stake.

Other authors, however, have offered more radical accounts of thought insertion that do in fact draw the universality of for-me-ness into question. Already in *Being No One*, Metzinger argued that patients experiencing thought insertion lack both the sense of agency and ownership [Metzinger 2003, 445]. Since the sense of ownership or the "phenomenal quality of mineness", as he also calls it, is ab-

² For a critical discussion of the use of thought insertion in philosophy of psychiatry, see Henriksen, Parnas, and Zahavi [in press].

sent in thought insertion, ownership cannot be a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness [Metzinger 2003, 334]. Later, Lane [2012; 2015] made similar claims, arguing that thought insertion and other psychopathological phenomena constitute counter examples of for-me-ness. Additionally, Billon has also argued that thought insertion results from a disorder of ownership rather than agency [Billon 2013, 310]. If these accounts of thought insertion are correct, then they demonstrate the fallaciousness of the claim that phenomenal consciousness necessarily entails for-me-ness.

Lane [2012] has also discussed another counter example of for-me-ness that come from the domain of psychopathology. Ordinarily, he claims, self and consciousness seem «tightly interwoven», but some psychopathological cases enable us to see that ownership is in fact attributed to mental states on the basis of a «second step» in which the subject infers that he or she is the subject of that particular state [Lane 2012, 281, 257]. To substantiate his claim about this «second step», Lane refers to a case study by Zahn, Talazko, and Ebert [2008]. They report a story of a patient (D.P.), who after an incident on a long-distance flight, where he experienced an attack of tachycardia and dyspnoea accompanied by the fear of asphyxiation, complained of «double visions». An examination revealed that D.P. did not see doubled objects in a literal sense. He described that he saw everything normally, yet his perception of objects had somehow changed in the sense that «he did not immediately recognize that he was the one who perceives and that he needed a *second step* to become aware that he himself was the one who perceives the object» [Zahn *et al.* 2008, 398; italics added]. This pertained to perception of objects and not to perception of his own body or actions. A psychopathological examination found no other symptoms and a structured interview for DSM-IV-TR found that «the clinical picture did not fit to any specific psychiatric diagnosis» [*ibid.*, 399]. D.P. was diagnosed with cognitive disorder NOS [*ibid.*]. Medical examination demonstrated abnormal functioning (hypometabolism) in inferior temporal, parieto-occipital, and precentral brain regions. Despite not finding other psychopathological symptoms, treatment was initiated with different types of antidepressants and antipsychotics, as well as with memantine and recompression therapy in hyperbaric chamber (D.P. had been diving 10

days before the incidence on the plane). All treatment initiatives proved ineffective. According to Lane, D.P.'s need for a «second step» to make an inference from a perceived object to himself as the perceiver of that object is «sufficient to serve as a counter example to SS – perspective does not determine mineness» [Lane 2012, 258].³ On Lane's account, first-personal givenness of experience does not secure for-me-ness, and he concludes: «Phenomenal consciousness does not entail self-awareness; it is not stamped with a meish quality; and, for-me-ness does not play a determining role in its constitution» [*ibid.*, 281].

Let us finally address another challenge to the universality of for-me-ness. This one comes from recent research in psychedelics – a research domain that has experienced a resurgence of scientific interest in the last decades [e.g., Carhart-Harris *et al.* 2014; 2016; Nichols 2016]. Following psychedelic intake, a manifold of altered states of consciousness has been described, including experiences of ego-dissolution, fusion with the surroundings or even of unity with the universe, unreality, and of being detached from one's own mental processes or body. According to Millière [2017], psychoactive substances such as mescaline, psilocybin, and LSD can induce experiences of ego dissolution that disrupt both narrative and minimal aspects of selfhood.⁴ Though he suggests that more research is needed to settle this issue, he states, «the available data is consistent with the idea that the “sense of self” lost during DIED is not (or not merely) the narrative self, but the minimal self-awareness of ordinary experience rooted in sensorimotor processes» [Millière 2017, 11].⁵ To substantiate his claim, Millière draws attention to subjective reports of ego dissolution, arguing that «drug users are often reluctant to use the first-person pronoun at all when describing DIED» [Millière 2017, 14]. One drug user, which Millière quotes in this context, states: «There existed no one, not even me ... so would it be proper to still speak of “I”, even as the notion of “I” seemed so palpa-

³ Lane uses “SS” as an abbreviation for “self-specificity” theories of consciousness to which group he includes experiential minimalism.

⁴ For a discussion of the distinction between minimal and narrative selfhood and the distinction's applicability to psychopathological research, see Parnas & Henriksen [2019].

⁵ Millière uses the abbreviation “DIED” for “drug-induced ego dissolution”.

bly illusory?» [*ibid.*]. Contrary to episodes of thought insertion, where Millière claims that «it still makes sense to say that *I* am aware of this thought, and indeed that *I* am aware of it as alien», the subjective reports of ego dissolution indicate, on his interpretation, that «they lack this first-personal aspect altogether» [*ibid.*, 15]. In the end, Millière suggests that for-me-ness may be implicitly operative in ordinary conscious experience but it seems to break down in experiences of drug-induced ego dissolution. If this is the case, then experiences of ego dissolution also pose a challenge to the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary, irreducible feature of phenomenal consciousness.

4. *Reconsidering these counter examples*

How to best address these alleged counter examples? One initial reply to the claim by Metzinger, Lane, and Billon that episodes of thought insertion lack ownership or for-me-ness is to insist that patients with thought insertion experience that certain alien thoughts appear in their *own* stream of consciousness and not in somebody else's stream of consciousness [e.g., Zahavi 2014, 39f.]. This is why the experience is so disturbing. By contrast, alien thoughts in alien minds are usually harmless [Zahavi 2005, 144]. Differently put, episodes of thought insertion are still given first-personally to the experiencer, i.e. some sense of ownership or for-me-ness is retained even in these psychopathological experiences. If this was not the case, i.e. if the sense of ownership or for-me-ness had effaced entirely, the experience of thought insertion could simply not articulate itself.

So why do Metzinger, Lane, and Billon insist that episodes of thought insertion lack ownership or for-me-ness? Without going into the details of their individual accounts, a part of the answer seems to be that they all embrace a *literal reading* of patients' descriptions of their experiences. Billon claims that «patient's reports should be taken at face value» [2013, 299] and he formulates what he calls a «phenomenological constraint» that theories of thought insertion must adhere to: «If the patient says that an occurrent thought is not his, then it is not subjective. If the patient says that an occurrent thought feels his, then it is subjective» [*ibid.*]. According to Billon, patients with thought insertion do not state

that the alien thoughts in some way are their own («They explicitly deny this!» [2013, 301]) and thus, following the phenomenological constraint, he concludes that episodes of thought insertion are not subjective and lack ownership. Although Lane offers a different account of thought insertion, he seems to accept the legitimacy of the claim that patients' reports should be taken at face value, when he states that his own account also fulfils this constraint [2015, 116]. Finally, Metzinger argued that philosophical theories of mind should be able to incorporate the «existence denial», which patients with Cotard's Syndrome may exhibit,⁶ considering it an «important phenomenological constraint» [2003, 455]. Here, Metzinger too advocates a literal reading of patients' reports and he even claims that these patients «truthfully» describe their experience of being dead or somehow nonexistent [2003, 456ff.]. In their effort to take the patients' descriptions of their experiences seriously, the authors mistakenly take this to involve taking their descriptions *literally*.

So, why is a literal understanding of patients' reports of psychopathological phenomena problematic? First, mental terms are polysemic and what a patient means with a given term does not necessarily correspond to these terms' specific clinical meaning. Patients may report being “depressed” but when asked to clarify what they mean with the term or when prompted to provide examples of their experiences of being depressed, it may become evident that the experiences in question have nothing to do with clinical meaning of depression. For example, a patient may report longstanding feelings of being depressed. When asked to elaborate, he describes that he constantly struggles to understand why human beings behave the way they do: why do they say “hello” to each other when they meet, why do they shake hands, why do they shake the right hand, etc. All the time, he ponders such basic questions, and this reflective burden exhausts him and leaves him fatigued [cf. Parnas & Henriksen 2014, 254]. Here, the patient's experiences may be indicative of psychopathological phenomena such as problems with common sense and hyper-reflection; the experiences are not, however, suggestive of depression. Thus, clinicians cannot take patients' reports at face value. By contrast, sincerely listening to patients and taking their

⁶ Patients with Cotard's Syndrome may report that they are dead, do not exist or have no internal organs [Berrios & Luque 1995].

experiences seriously requires faithful exploration of the patients' experiences, their structure and quality, in the *context* of the patients' other experiences, behaviour, and life history. This also applies to philosophy of psychiatry. We cannot assume that what a patient meant with a specific statement in specific quote (e.g., that some thoughts are not his own) necessarily corresponds to a loss of certain features of phenomenal consciousness as they are defined in the philosophical literature (e.g., for-me-ness, ownership or agency).

With regard to the example of D.P., who experienced «double visions» in the sense of not immediately being able to recognize himself as the perceiver of objects, we suggest that this example too does not suggest something like an absence of for-me-ness. Rather, the example testifies precisely to the presence of for-me-ness. D.P.'s experience of not immediately being able to recognize himself as the perceiver of objects is still first-personally manifest to him. In fact, this experience is so distressing that he seeks medical help. Instead of lacking for-me-ness, it seems that for-me-ness here is disturbed in the sense that it does not automatically or unproblematically lead to reflective self-ascription of this particular kind of perceptual experience. This interpretation seems to be in line with the one suggested in the original study, where the authors concluded that the case of D.P. demonstrates «selective changes in the quality of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects» [Zahn *et al.* 2008, 401]. In other words, the authors concluded that the sense of ownership or minimal self was affected or impaired but not completely lost in this patient.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lane operates with different concepts of for-me-ness, mineness, and ownership than the authors he is criticizing (e.g., Zahavi). This is evident, when he argues that it is important not to conflate «hosting» a thought with «owning» a thought, and that «hosting» does not imply «ownership» [Lane 2012, 260] or when he states that «perspective does not determine mineness» [Lane 2012, 258]. Here, Albahari's distinction between different kinds of ownership might be helpful. In her book *Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self*, she makes a distinction between “possessive ownership”, “personal ownership”, and “perspectival ownership” [Albahari 2006, 53-54]. “Possessive ownership” concerns objects that are mine by social

conventions (e.g., the books in my bag); “personal ownership” is a matter to being thematically aware of oneself as the owner of an experience; and “perspectival ownership” refers to experiences being given to the subject of experience in a distinctive manner. While D.P. perhaps could be said to experience problems in the domain of “personal ownership” when perceiving objects, there is nothing to suggest that these problems also affects “perspectival ownership”. By contrast, D.P.’s experience of not immediately being able to recognize himself as the perceiver of objects is still given to him first-personally, i.e. in a manner that is different from how this experience can appear to anybody else. In other words, the epistemic asymmetry is here preserved and for-me-ness, as we have defined it, is not absent.

Finally, Millière’s claim that drug-induced altered states of consciousness indicate a loss of minimal self-awareness can be refuted on similar grounds. Despite the remarkable character of these experience, they remain conscious, memorable, to some extent describable, and, most importantly in this particular context, characterized by for-meness. They are first-personally manifest to the subject of experience and not to anybody else. Experiences of drug-induced ego-dissolution are to some degree reminiscent of certain mystical experiences [e.g., Stace 1960] such as the oceanic feeling and the experience of undifferentiated unity (*unio mystica*) with the Absolute (e.g., God, emptiness [*sunyata*] or the universe). In the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, we find the following illuminating description of such an experience: «as a lump of salt thrown into water melts away ... even so, O Maitreyi, the individual soul, dissolved, is the Eternal – pure consciousness, infinite, transcendent» [quoted in Stace 1960, 118]. The experience of the dissolution of the individual, finite self into infinitude is the very heart of the experience of *unio mystica* across mystical traditions [*ibid.*]. However, even these experiences remain characterized by their first-personal givenness, i.e. they also appear to the subject of experience in a way that they do not for anybody else [Zahavi 2011]. In cases of *unio mystica*, we have elsewhere argued that the minimal self is not lost but affected in a specific way [Parnas & Henriksen 2016]. We have also argued that the minimal self is neither intact nor lacking but disturbed in cases of thought insertion [Henriksen *et al.*, in press].

Finally, with regard to Millière’s reference to drug users’ tendency to avoid the first-person pronoun when describing their experiences of ego dissolution, let us just add that patients with schizophrenia also sometimes may be tempted to avoid the first-person pronoun and instead use third-person pronouns, e.g., “one is” or “it thinks” [Minkowski 1927]. However, avoidance of the first-person pronoun or use of third-person pronouns are not evidence of a lost for-me-ness.

5. Conclusion

We have presented an account of for-me-ness, discussed alleged counter examples, and refuted them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable feature of phenomenal consciousness. Using Albahari’s distinction, we can say that perspectival ownership cannot be disowned or, in other words, that for-me-ness cannot lack, but it can be affected [e.g., Parnas & Henriksen 2016; Henriksen *et al.*, in press]. In our view, much of the contemporary debate between advocates of for-me-ness and their opponents rests on how the concept of for-me-ness is defined by the authors using it. Unsurprisingly, different definitions lead to different conclusions about the status and role of for-me-ness in theories of phenomenal consciousness. Crucially, one cannot conclude from the fact that certain authors have used for-me-ness in their own specific way and presented examples of experiences, which apparently lack the kind of for-me-ness that they describe, that the universality of for-me-ness, as we, following Zahavi, define it, has been invalidated. The introductory reference to Hume and the brief discussion of whether or not his “no-self” claim could challenge the phenomenological claim of the existence of the minimal self was meant to illustrate this particular problem in the current scientific debate.

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Keywords

Minimal Self; For-me-ness; Schizophrenia; Thought Insertion; Psychedelics; Consciousness

Abstract

In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the nature of the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness. Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personally manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way in which they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challenged this claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences, which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three alleged counter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology and psychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refute them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable feature of phenomenal consciousness.

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF
COMMON SENSE AND MEDICALIZATION
BLANKENBURG AND KIMURA ON SCHIZOPHRENIA
AND DEPERSONALIZATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Preface; 2. The concept of common sense; 2.1. Kant on common sense; 3. Blankenburg and phenomenological psychopathology of common sense; 4. Kimura's phenomenological psychopathology on depersonalization; 4.1. Nishida on active intuition; 4.2. Kimura on depersonalization; 5. Second person phenomenology: historicization and relationalization of schizophrenia; 6. Concluding remarks: Toward a non-pathologizing theory of common sense.

1. Preface

In the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology, common sense has been focused upon as a key term. Blankenburg characterizes schizophrenia as a lack of common sense that enables an individual to understand a situation and cope with the environment and other people. The Japanese psychopathologist Kimura Bin has adapted the commonsense approach to depersonalization, drawing on Blankenburg's theory and Nishida Kitaro's concept of "active intuition". Phenomenological psychopathology of common sense theory risks medicalizing common sense by focusing overly on fundamental phenomena. In this paper, I would like to rethink the achievements and the disadvantage of phenomenological psychopathology of common sense and envision a non-medicalizing common sense theory.

2. *The concept of common sense*¹

The concept of common sense dates back to Aristotle.¹ Because he did not use this word as a technical term [Gregoric 2007, II, 6], we should struggle to explain consistently what meanings he attached to it. We can at least admit that (1) Aristotle's term "common sense" refers to some ability related to "common objects", which can be sensed beyond specific modalities such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling; and (2) Aristotle [2016, 50-51] rejected the existence of a specific sensory organ for common sense.

Another source of the concept of common sense is the tradition of ancient Roman rhetoric. Cicero's *De Oratore* taught us that «[i]n oratory, the very cardinal sin is to depart from the language of everyday life and the usage approved by common sense (*communis sensus*)» [Cicero 1967, I, 12]. As was the case with Aristotle, we cannot be sure what meaning Cicero attached to the phrase «*communis sensus*». This phrase does not appear in Cicero's other texts [Nakamura 1979/2000, 346], and he did not appear to use this phrase as a technical term. Nevertheless, we could guess that Cicero used the phrase «*communis sensus*» to refer to the normal judgment abilities shared by ordinary people.

Although neither Aristotle nor Cicero used the expression "common sense" as a technical term, it later came to be regarded as such in a certain period that is difficult to date. In the Middle Ages, Avicenna (Ibn Sina) regarded common sense as a faculty of fantasy and included it in the "internal senses". Moreover, Avicenna [Avicenna 1981, 31] localized common sense in the frontal part of the front ventricle of the brain [cf. Afnan 1958/2016, 138]. In the eighteenth century, Vico [1744/1948, 57; 1744/2015, 63] regarded common sense (*senso commune*) as judgment without reflection that is shared by the human race.

2.1. *Kant on common sense*

Kant seems to be the first person who explicitly related the loss of com-

¹ See Ishihara [2018, Ch. 1] for a further explanation of the history of the concept of common sense from Aristotle to Kant.

mon sense and mad people and pathologized the loss of common sense. Although John Locke [1700/1979] had already suggested the relationship between the loss of common sense and madness, he regarded the estrangement from common sense as typical among mankind: According to Locke, all of us are mad to a certain degree. In contrast, Kant insisted that the loss of common sense is the only common feature of different types of madness. That is, madmen are different from all mentally normal persons in that the former lack common sense:

The only universal character of madness is the loss of common sense (*sensus communis*) and its replacement with logical private sense (*sensus privatus*); for example, a human being in broad daylight sees a light burning his table which, however, another person standing nearby does not see, or hears a voice that no one else hears. For it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the understanding of others, instead of isolating ourselves with our own understanding and judging publicly with our private representations, so to speak [Kant 1800/1977, 535;1800/2006, 113].

Some scholars [Böhme & Böhme 1985; Rauer 2007] suggested that the discrimination of madness from reason was an important process for the establishment of Kantian critical philosophy and Enlightenment thought. In the first sentence of the article *The answer to the question: What is the Enlightenment?* Kant says, «The enlightenment is human being's exit from his self-incurred immaturity» [Kant 1784/1977, 53]. Kant repeats this phrase in *Anthropology* and adds that «he ventures to advance, through still shakily, with his own feet on the ground of experience» [Kant 1800/1977, 549; 1800/2006, 124]. On the other hand, Kant [1800/1977, 548-549; 1800/2006, 124] admits that the mode of experience is diverse among persons. Regarding this diversity of modes of experience, the following points are necessary to make a reasonable dialogue possible: (1) thinking by ourselves, (2) thinking through putting ourselves in the position of others, (3) always thinking congruently with ourselves. The ability to discern our own thoughts from those of others

is an indispensable condition of the Enlightenment. According to Kant, Madmen lack this ability and thus common sense.

3. Blankenburg and phenomenological psychopathology of common sense

After Kant, the connection between madness and the loss of common sense was apparently forgotten. It was Blankenburg who clearly rebuilt the connection between the loss of common sense and madness. Not only did Blankenburg rebuild the connection, he also deepened the degree of medicalization by regarding the loss of common sense as specific to schizophrenia rather than mental disorders in general.

Blankenburg characterized the condition of persons with schizophrenia as a lack of common sense that enables an understanding of «the self-evident» and coping with the environment and other people. Blankenburg stated the following:

In turning to schizophrenia, we enter the proper domain for the psychopathology [...]. They lose a sense for what can be understood as a matter of course as determined “by the matter itself.” This is all a matter of common sense. What first emerges for many patients is a being unable to play along with the rules of the game of interpersonal behavior. [...] The judgments, emotions, reactions, and actions, which thereby result, no longer have relationship to social reality [Blankenburg 1969, 148-149; 1969/2001, 305-306].

According to Blankenburg, what persons with schizophrenia lack is the common sense that integrates emotion and the faculty of judgment, allowing us to be in touch with social reality and enter into the common world with others.

Blankenburg was not the first to define the core feature of schizophrenia as the loss of touch with the real world. Bleuler, who invented the word «Schizophrenie», specified that «one of most important symptoms of schizophrenia» is «the predomination of the inner life and active turning away from the outer world», which is «autism» [Bleuler

1912, 1; see also Bleuler 1911/1988]. Drawing on Bleuler, Minkowski characterized this autism as «the loss of vital contact with the reality» [Minkowski 1927/2002, 106]. If not focusing on schizophrenia, we can refer to Pierre Janet and Freud. Janet pointed out that the general feature of neurosis is «the loss of function of the real» [Janet 1909/2004, 299], which Freud [1911, 1] followed. Bleuler's concept of autism is based on the psychodynamic frame. He attributed autism to the effect of the affectivity of patients and their tendency to fulfill their desires that are incompatible with the outer real world [Bleuler 1912, 4].

The novelty of Blankenburg was the emphasis on the sociality of reality with which individuals with schizophrenia lose contact, drawing on the concept of common sense. The advantage of Blankenburg's common sense theory is that it suggests social reality matters for persons with schizophrenia rather than the conflict between inner desire and the outer real world. It also denotes that sensation, emotion, and judgment are involved with the loss of contact with reality. Although Blankenburg did not use the term “embodied mind”, his theory of the loss of common sense could be regarded as having an affinity with the embodied-mind approach to schizophrenia.

The disadvantage of the theory on the loss of common sense is that it medicalized the loss of contact with social reality in the meaning of impairment.² Although social reality depends on social context, the *theory of the loss of common sense* could attribute responsibility to individual impairment and individualize it. If it is the case that some impairments related to schizophrenia contribute to the loss of contact with social reality, we should struggle to discern the contribution of each impairment.

Recent scholars in phenomenological psychopathology tend to emphasize sensual and emotional disturbances as the bases of schizophrenia and other mental disorders [Fuchs 2010; Ratcliffe 2008; Sass & Parnas 2003]. According to Thomas Fuchs, such disturbances «in the dimensions of both perception and action» result in the disturbance of «the prereflective, embodied and practical immersion of the self in the world» [Fuchs 2010, 552].

² Ayaya [2016] insists that disorders in sociality and communication of persons with ASD should be regarded a disability rather than an impairment. As for the necessity to distinguish between disability and impairment see Shakespeare [2017].

Stanghellini pointed out that the phenomenological tradition brings to light «the intuitive and non-propositional nature of common sense, moving the emphasis away from an above-all cognitive-mentalistic conceptualization towards one focused on the emotional-affective life and corporeality» [Stanghellini 2004, 89]. Following such a phenomenological tradition, Stanghellini reconstructed and finalized common sense theory on schizophrenia. He distinguished two aspects of «common sense deficit»: lack of intuitive attunement (impaired capacity to accurately typify the mental states of other persons) and damaged social knowledge network, as well as three dimensions of «schizophrenic vulnerability»: the sensory, conceptualization, and attitudinal dimensions [Stanghellini 2000].

The advantage of Stanghellini's theory of common sense deficit is that (1) it can call attention to the problem of embodiment, that is, sensual and emotional disorders based on the grounds of the problems concerning social relations of individuals with schizophrenia, and (2) it can call attention to the problem of social relations consisting of multiple dimensions. Thanks to Stanghellini, we can clarify that the term “common sense” includes multiple dimensions and rich aspects.

However, Stanghellini's theory of common sense still risks medicalizing the problem of social relations, as we have already seen with Blankenburg. Stanghellini said that «we could also metaphorically represent common sense as a sort of sensory organ oriented towards the world of social relationships» [Stanghellini 2004, 88]. He posited the hypothesis that «the relational deficit in schizophrenia is not a consequence of acute symptoms and course but instead is a fundamental aspect of schizophrenic vulnerability» [Stanghellini 2000]. By fundamentalizing the problem of common sense, Stanghellini seemed to internalize the problem of social relations in persons with schizophrenia.

4. Kimura's phenomenological psychopathology on depersonalization

Bin Kimura is one of the most famous psychopathologists in Japan. Some of his articles on psychopathology are well known in the Western psychopathological circle. However, his works written in Japanese on common sense are little known in the West, as exemplified by a

Stanghellini work. Although Stanghellini [2004] thematized the «psychopathology of common sense», he did not refer to Kimura in relation to common sense but only to his theory of the disturbance of selfhood [Stanghellini 2004, 149].

Kimura noted in his book *Phenomenology of Schizophrenia* [1975/2012c] that he had been deeply impressed by Blankenburg's inaugural lecture at Heidelberg University in 1969 (which would later be published as Blankenburg [1969]). Inspired by Blankenburg's theory on common sense, Kimura developed his thought on the same topic. The novelty of Kimura was that (1) he applied the loss of common sense theory to depersonalization, and (2) he connected Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro's concept of intuitive action with the concept of common sense and suggested the embodiment of the latter.

From an early stage, Kimura has been interested in depersonalization, and his phenomenological psychopathology on depersonalization has been influenced by Nishida's philosophy. Before we discuss Kimura, allow me to introduce Nishida's concept of "active intuition".

4.1. Nishida on active intuition

Kitaro Nishida is one of the most popular Japanese philosophers, and "active intuition" is one of the key terms in his philosophy. In his paper, *The Standpoint of Active Intuition* [1935/2012], Nishida developed the theory of active intuition. He tried to show the integrity of seeing and action as based on the body and to connect active intuition to the historical and commonsensical world from whence we conceive «the infinite boundary of space and time». In another paper, Nishida referred to medieval Japanese Zen master Dogen's concept of *shinjin-datsuraku* («dropping off of body and mind»):

Our body is seeing as well as working. To become seeing is to become creative: to become a creative component in the creative world. However, this does not mean that the body or the self disappears as one thought, but rather that true life will be full in the self. The dropping off of body and mind does not mean that we simply become empty. The world turns to be expressive to me, as

I see it corporeally as a creative component. Things appear as the expression of life. In this sense, we can say that the expression moves me [Nishida 1937/1988, 251].

The concept of active intuition, which was developed through interpreting Dogen's concept of dropping off of body and mind, is similar to current theories of the embodied-mind approach or enactivism in that they are about trying to find an indispensable connection between perception, body, and the environment.³ Via this concept, Nishida [1935/2012] tried to show the integrity of seeing and action as based on the body. In an article, Nishida related this concept of active intuition to that of common sense [Nishida 1950, 244; cf. Kimura 1988/2005, 68].

4.2. Kimura on depersonalization

In his first academic paper, *Zur Phänomenologie der Depersonalization* [1963] (written in German), Kimura pointed out three aspects of depersonalization: (1) the feeling of the loss of the self (*Ich*), (2) the feeling of distance of the objects (including her/his own body), and (3) the feeling of discontinuity of the self and the time. He insisted that the task of phenomenological psychopathology is to elucidate the fundamental phenomenon of depersonalization underlying these aspects. According to Kimura, the feeling of the existence of the self comes from the recognition of outer objects; as Dogen says, «I do not testify all things, but all things come to testify me» [Kimura 1963, 393]. Kimura said, «when one sees something, one adds to it something individual, which corresponds to one's attitude, interest, and inner movement. In the perception, the inner movement is always expressed» [*ibid.*]. Moreover, Kimura claimed that such a perception is not passive reception of sensual contents, but a «*Tatsache*» ([active]-fact), using Nishida's term. In concluding, Kimura said that «the fundamental phenomenon of depersonalization proves to be incapability of making the [active]-fact (*Tatsache*) during the meet-

³ For enactivism and embodied approaches, see, for example, Hutto [2013] and Shapiro [2014]. Hashi [2015] tried to show the similarity between Dogen's thought and enactivism.

ing with the world as the disorder of self-actualization of the authentic self [*Ich*] in the intentional act of consciousness» [Kimura 1963, 397].

In his later paper on depersonalization, Kimura [1976/2006] proposed a hypothesis that painted depersonalization as lack of common sense. Although Blankenburg [1971] tried to regard the loss of common sense as the specific and fundamental disturbance (*Grundstörung*) in schizophrenia, which is not found in depersonalization, Kimura [1976/2006] tried to relate the loss of common sense to depersonalization. According to Kimura [1976/2006, 122], depersonalization should not be regarded as a disorder but as a phenomenon that can be seen among disorders such as obsessive-compulsive neurosis, schizophrenia, depression, and organic brain disease. Human vital function is nothing but the human function of total commitment to the world and needs a kind of «sensual ability», which is common sense [Kimura 1976/2006, 164-168]. Kimura insisted that the loss of common sense is characteristic of depersonalization.

He also insisted that common sense is the fundamental sensibility that has the function of making “the world” appear for human beings. Later Kimura [1989/2007] connected explicitly the concept of common sense with Nishida’s concept of «active intuition». Interpreting common sense as a «fundamental sense of practical involvement with the world», Kimura claimed that the dysfunction of common sense is responsible for the failure of active intuition:

This case [of depersonalization] tells us eloquently that what Nishida calls “active intuition” is the indispensable condition of the possibility for us to see the reality as the reality. The person with depersonalization complained of the loss of the extension of “now” or “here” which makes possible the self, others, space, the reality, not the loss of the abstract concept of those. Such “extension” can be experienced only when our perception includes active and practical moments and thus “seeing” becomes “acting” through our seeing the world with the interest in the life [Kimura 1989/2007, 395].

5. *Second person phenomenology: historicization and relationalization of schizophrenia*

As explained in the previous section, the novelty of Kimura's theory of common sense was that he adapted the common sense theory to depersonalization. In his paper written in the early 1970s under Blankenburg's influence, he also characterized schizophrenia as pathology of common sense [Kimura 1973; 1975/2012c]. However, he acknowledged the difference in his standpoint from that of Binswanger. The main point of difference is that while Binswanger tends to regard schizophrenia as a «disease»,⁴ Kimura [1975/2012c, 26] would like to regard schizophrenia as distorted «ways of life» in relation to others.

As Kimura himself suggested, this attitude appears to be influenced by R. D. Laing's so-called "anti-psychiatry" approach. (He reported that, while Blankenburg distanced himself from Laing, he had a feeling of closeness to this author, although he was not an advocate of anti-psychiatry.) Kimura sought to find an approach that would not involve treating schizophrenia as a disease.

This non-disease-treating attitude is related to Kimura's thinking of "etiological phenomenology". In contrast to Blankenburg, who avoided collating phenomenological pathology with etiological issues, Kimura insisted that phenomenological pathology cannot help but take into account etiology. In considering etiological issues, Kimura intended to, so to speak, historicize schizophrenia. Instead of regarding the symptoms of schizophrenia statically, Kimura tried to grasp them as results of patients' failure to develop appropriate relations with others. Kimura thought the fundamental disturbance of schizophrenia is the problem of "between".

As for the disorder of "between" in schizophrenia, it is not the inner process of the patients but the phenomenon that occurs between the patients and others (including psychiatrists). Kimura even characterized schizophrenia as the «pathology of between» or «clinical condition of between», which is experienced not only by patients but also by psychiatrists [Kimura 1988/2005, 161-168; 1975/2012c, 246]. He named the phenomenological method used to elucidate schizophrenia based

⁴ However, Blankenburg did not use the term "disease (*Krankheit*)".

on the experience of psychiatrists as «self-conscious phenomenology». «Self-consciousness» refers to the humanistic impression that Kimura himself (psychiatrists themselves) had when he met patients face-to-face. Self-conscious phenomenology refers to the method of intuition on the inner state of patients based on self-consciousness of psychiatrists [Kimura 1975/2012c, 20]. Kimura also called this phenomenological approach «second-person phenomenology»:

Here phenomenology makes an issue of the structure of consciousness and being of the “questioned” (patients), not of questioners (psychiatrists and psychopathologists). [...] What psychiatric phenomenology tries to elucidate is not first-person or impersonal structure of consciousness and being, but second-person structure of consciousness and being from the start to the end. [...] How is it possible that the phenomena which show themselves directly in the front of the “questioned” become direct phenomena for the “questioners” too [...]? Is there a phenomenon which shows itself before both of the “questioned” and the “questioners” directly? This question, which should be asked first, is related to the condition of possibility of second-person phenomenology [Kimura 1972/2012b, 316-317].

6. Concluding remarks: Toward a non-pathologizing theory of common sense

As shown above, compared to Blankenburg, Kimura’s phenomenological psychopathology on common sense can be regarded as historicizing and relationalizing schizophrenia and disorder of common sense. Nevertheless, Kimura shares with Blankenburg the tendency to pathologize common sense in so far as they advocate the psychopathology of common sense. Phenomenological psychopathology, in general, risks fundamentalizing and stabilizing the problems that come from social relations. Kimura’s works on common sense and schizophrenia suggest a non-medicalizing and relationalizing way to treat schizophrenia and depersonalization. However, if phenomenological investigation is conducted only from the perspective of psychopathologists, it risks

internalizing and attributing the problem to the patients. To avoid internalizing and to relationalize and socialize the problem concerning common sense, phenomenological investigation should not be conducted only by psychopathologists but with the participation of patients. Recent trends of user-involved or user-led research in medical studies, and the movement of *Tojisha-kenkyu* (study by patients themselves) in Japan [Ishihara 2015], suggest an opening of phenomenological investigation to patients. The only way to avoid medicalizing and pathologizing the problem concerning common sense seems to be that phenomenological investigation must be conducted by a «phenomenological community» consisting of scholars, patients, and persons involved with the problem [Ishihara 2013].

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Keywords

Common Sense; Schizophrenia; Depersonalization; Medicalization; B. Kimura; W. Blankenburg; K. Nishida; I. Kant

Abstract

In the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology, common sense has been focused upon as a key term. Blankenburg characterizes schizophrenia as a lack of common sense that enables an individual to understand a situation and cope with

the environment and other people. The Japanese psychopathologist Kimura Bin has adapted the common sense approach to depersonalization, drawing on Blankenburg's theory and Nishida Kitaro's concept of "active intuition". Phenomenological psychopathology of common sense theory risks medicalizing common sense by focusing overly on fundamental phenomena. In this paper, I rethought the achievements and the disadvantage of phenomenological psychopathology of common sense and envision a non-medicalizing common sense theory.

Notes

The early versions of this paper were read at the *6th International Conference on Comparative Studies of Mind*, August 20-21, 2015, Chung-Ang University, Seoul, Korea, *Embodiment. Phenomenology East/West*, May 4-7, 2016, Freie Universität Berlin, and the 8th International conference of *PEACE (Phenomenology in East Asian Circle)*, November 30-December 2, 2018, Seoul National University. This study was supported by JSPS and MEXT KAKENHI (24119006, 25284002, 24300293, 16H03091). Citation from Japanese texts was translated into English by the author. I appreciate Editage and Wordvice for English proofreading of the manuscript.

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FLIGHT OF IDEAS OR FLIGHT FROM IDEAS?
 A SCHELERIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE
 SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF “FLIGHT OF IDEAS”

Public transport is an environment for condensed social interaction. Ever so often, one might encounter unexpected behavior from which to repel in disconcertment when being in a natural attitude. For psychological scientists, however, who engage with their environment in a different attitude, these encounters may serve as a field for observations unlike the clinical institutions. Some symptoms seem to require circumstances that are not standardized by psychological investigation in order to display the whole range of their expression.

What has been called “flight of ideas” might be one of these symptoms. In public transport, it is conspicuous because of its connection with another symptom, called “pressured speech”. Whenever somebody is talking out loud without any apparent occasion, for example, in grammatically coherent phrases of desultory content, it can be described as “pressured speech” or “pressure of speech”. Busses or trains that impose social exposure are a place where the oppressiveness of thoughts that expresses itself in speech becomes visible. In ICD-10, both symptoms are mentioned in the description of F30, Manic episodes. Symptomatically, however, this classification is quite controversial [see Jeyasingam 2013]. Therefore, it is necessary to ask: What, precisely, is “flight of ideas”?

In the late 19th century, influential psychiatrists like Emil Kraepelin and his scholar Gustav Aschaffenburg argued that the disorder underlying the “flight of ideas” was psychomotor. Kraepelin’s conception of “flight of ideas”, as of the 1899 edition of his popular «Compendium of Psychiatry: For the Use of Students and Physicians» [Kraepelin 1899],¹ distinguished “outward” from “inward flight of ideas”. While

¹ Translations from German or Italian to English throughout the manuscript were made by the author.

the former manifests itself in the association of words by similarity of their sound, such as rhymes, the latter relates to the contentual parts of imagination. The “outward flight of ideas” depends on an «increase of motor irritability» [*ibid.*, 154] and the “inward flight of ideas” is a result of a «lack of the consistent control over the connection of ideas» [*ibid.*, 152]. Yet, Kraepelin separated the notion of “inward flight of ideas” from the hebephrenic symptoms (*Zerfahrenheit*²) of dementia praecox where, «unlike flight of thoughts, the train of thought does not show Ariadne’s thread [in the sense of a breadcrumb trail; the author] but the most different imaginations being aimlessly and abruptly stringed together» [*ibid.*, 155]. With that said, patients who showed the tendency to be talkative, had an accelerated articulation, or expressed themselves incoherently were either seen as lacking the ability to suppress their thoughts or having an increased speed of thought, but they were not diagnosed as schizophrenic.

In both cases, however, so retorted Hugo Liepmann, a scholar of the opposing school following Carl Wernicke, in his seminal article «On Flight of Ideas» from 1904 [Liepmann 1904], there would be no difference between the thoughts of a sane person and of a person with “flight of ideas” in regard to their nature. In other words, the psychomotor conception of “flight of ideas” led to a conflation with the symptom of “pressured speech”: A patient would suffer “flight of ideas” if they were pressured to tell everything they thought despite normal cognition or if their – generally normal – train of thought required hastened expression. Ultimately, “flight of ideas” could be reduced to a verbal association in the sense of logorrhea.

As a conceptual alternative, Liepmann proposed that “flight of ideas” was not a psychomotor disorder but an intra-psychic disorder. Already his teacher Wernicke had proposed to understand “flight of ideas” as an «intra-psychic hyperfunction» [Wernicke 1900, 398] in which «the distinctions between different association pathways are drastically blurred» [*ibid.*, 397]. This approach allowed him to establish a classification of the symptom that contains three degrees of severity:

² In Kraepelin, the relation between incoherence (*Zerfahrenheit*) and derailment (*Entgleisung*) resembles the relation between “flight of ideas” and “pressured speech” [see Sass 1992].

orderly, unordered, and incoherent³ “flight of ideas” that could be aetiologically distinguished by the frailty of cognitive associations. Nevertheless, just like Kraepelin’s taxonomy, the criterium for assessing a degree of “flight of ideas” was formal, not contentual. Essentially, this explanation of the symptom remained faithful to the principles of associationism that allowed Wernicke to claim that «all mental illnesses are illnesses of the brain» [Jaspers 1923/1973, 382].

In the light of barely emerging psychology of thought, which had received major attention in the German scientific community throughout the first decade of the 20th century, Liepmann could not adopt the unhesitant associationism of his teacher Wernicke. Thus, he rejected both the psychomotor and the associationist understanding of the phenomenon. Even the expansion of associationist explanations by the concept of constellations, as it had been proposed by Theodor Ziehen, which overcame the classical associationist assumption of one-by-one associations, did not satisfy Liepmann. In view of the apparent structure of expression that is maintained even in cases of incoherent “flight of ideas”, he contended that it was not a deficiency of the singular associative pathways but of the «general continuity [*Zusammenhang*]» [Liepmann 1904, 22] of the thoughts. If, for example, a patient was asked about their day, they successfully produced a chain of one-by-one associations, leading them from the weather to the sky, from the sky to birds, from the birds to the animal kingdom, and so forth.

Liepmann concluded that “flight of ideas” could not be explained as a dysfunction of association but of the «superordinate imagination [*Obervorstellung*]» – or “superordinate idea”, since he did not terminologically make a distinction between “imagination” and “ideas”. Consequently, he rejects the associationist assumption that “flight of ideas” was a formal disorder: «it is not the rule of a certain formal principle of association or the absence of others, only the consideration of a material principle allows to distinguish the orderly sequence of thought from

³ There is a terminological difficulty in discerning incoherent “flight of ideas” from incoherence as a symptom of schizophrenia. It seems as though Wernicke’s terminology would include incoherence in “flight of ideas”. Yet, this is the result of translation since incoherence (*Zerfahrenheit*) is strictly different from incoherent “flight of ideas” (*inkohärente Ideenflucht*).

flight of ideas» [*ibid.*, 33]. The material principle Liepmann proposes is the order of thought that is established by a superordinate imagination which may be the imagination of a real or ideal context which bestows meaning upon the single imaginations. The rule of this principle, however, depends on attention, making “flight of ideas” a “disorder of attention”:

When I say that all ideas which occur throughout the flight of ideas were equivalent, while in orderly thought, imaginations of higher valence, as it were, hover over the singular imaginations, then, this higher valence essentially depends on attention. It is not a permanent superordination of certain imaginations during the entire life or even periods of life, but it changes over the development of the train of thought. The valence of such a superordinate imagination is but another expression for what the psychologist has in mind when he says: attention stays turned towards the object of this imagination [*ibid.*, 45].

Drawing on Liepmann, Max Isserlin described the attentional quality of “flight of ideas” as «turning the direction of imagination» [Isserlin 1907, 520]. In his experimental comparison between patients that suffered from “flight of ideas” and regular participants, he observed an increased frequency of such turns towards a new topic. What is lacking, thus, is not general directedness of thought but a persistent goal which could preserve a specific direction. Liepmann conceives the *differentia specifica* between “flight of ideas” and orderly thought as the anticipation of a goal-state. Since it is absent for the “flight of ideas”, there is no occasion for persistent attention. However, this principal explanation reveals that Liepmann did only overcome the associationist formalism by establishing a cognitivist one.

From Liepmann onwards, two lines of further development came into being. First, Eugen Bleuler agreed with him on the defectiveness of associationist explanations that claimed an increased velocity of thought. He also concurred with the contention that “flight of ideas” could be characterized as a change of direction.⁴ Nevertheless, he re-

⁴ To be precise, he literally wrote that it was a change of goals, not of directions but

jected the explanation of the symptom as a deficit of attention: «It does not help much, especially since one may inversely explain the deficit of attention by “flight of ideas”» [Bleuler 1916, 52]. Instead, he proposed the explanation that “flight of ideas” was a lack of «inhibition of ideas that do not relate to the topic at hand by virtue of the hierarchy of goals» [*ibid.*]. Briefly speaking, Bleuler explained the symptom by a different cognitive function.⁵ This partly adjusted version of Liepmann’s explanation has been most influential for the psychiatric understanding of “flight of ideas” throughout the 20th century [e.g., Andreasen 1979] – particularly in the context of Bleuler’s taxonomy of formal thought disorders.

The second line of development is less known but more important for a phenomenological understanding of the symptom. Its departure is a critical appraisal of Liepmann’s contribution by Oswald Külpe, the father of psychology of thought, as a part of his 1912 article «Psychology and Medicine» [Külpe 1912]. Despite acknowledging the progress made by Liepmann, Külpe goes as far as saying that the term “flight of ideas” was «unsuitable» since the empirical data obtained by Isserlin would show that essential different types of “flight of ideas” were possible.

More importantly, however, Külpe challenges the notion of the “superordinate imaginations” as the very core of Liepmann’s concept: «what is lacking in Liepmann’s explanation is the consideration of the difference between thoughts and imaginations» [Külpe 1912, 24]. This difference had been the most important subject matter of psychology of thought, especially in the work of Karl Bühler who – on the basis of Husserlian phenomenology – had distinguished intuitive “imaginations”, i.e., states of mind that have sensual content, and “thoughts” that do not have an image or sensual content [Bühler 1907]. Furthermore, Külpe highlights «the necessity to distinguish thoughts and acts of thought» [Külpe 1912, 11], for example:

this deviation can likely be explained with his ignorance about the peculiar distinction of the terms in psychology of thought.

⁵ Lately, the concept of “inhibition” as one of the three “executive functions” has received greatest attention within cognitive psychology thanks to the theoretical framework by Friedman and Miyake [2000].

If a woman says she had thoughts about the whole world, and a different time, the thought would be here and in the next moment over there, if a second patient says: I have a great many thoughts and still not a single one, and a third: the fewer thoughts one has, and the slower one thinks, the more thoughts one has, actually; when I was the emptiest of thoughts, I was thinking the most vividly –, then, these utterances may only be understood in so far as the objective side of the process of thought, the thought in the sense of Bühler, on the one hand was given in great manifold and plethora but on the other a statement of the subject about them, i.e. the activity of thought was missing [*ibid.*].

In other words, Külpe criticises Liepmann for not reaching the actual modification of meaning that occurs during the “flight of ideas”. The explanation by “superordinate ideas” may give a «formal and regulatory meaning» [*ibid.*, 23] but it cannot account for the singular “subordinate ideas”. Giving expression to the pivotal insight of psychology of thought, Külpe contends that only the «content of the superordinate imaginations» [*ibid.*, 26] and, thus, the nature of thought may determine the “flight of ideas”.

Moreover, Külpe rejected Liepmann’s explanation of the symptom as a disorder of attention, giving right to Bleuler’s witty remark that explaining “flight of ideas” by attention invoked its inversion. Külpe adds that circumlocution of attention as an inscrutable preference of certain contents could not suffice since other mental phenomena, such as valuation or selection, could equally serve this purpose. To Liepmann’s assumption that the attention would hold on to a certain content, Külpe replies that the instability of attention in the case of “flight of ideas” must have a different cause which determines whether the attention lets go or holds on. Therefore, Külpe reverses Liepmann’s explanation: «superordinate imaginations do not arise by virtue of attention which is directed at an arbitrary content, but the direction and the permanence of attention depend on a superordinate imagination which guides them» [*ibid.*, 29]. Ultimately, this amounts to a difference in the meaning of the experiences which distinguishes “flight of ideas” from orderly thought. Now, from the standpoint of psychology of thought, “meaning” primarily is a matter of task-consciousness, whereby “task” does not mean

an instruction, such as experimental instructions, but the motivational experience that underlies the goal-directedness of problem-solving.

Despite of his critical advance beyond Liepmann, Külpe did not succeed to propose an own explanation of the phenomenon. In the second generation of psychology of thought, for example, in the case of Otto Selz [1913], “flight of ideas” was only a peripheral topic. Ultimately, psychology of thought did not establish a new approach apart from cursory remarks by Richard Höningwald who did not pertain to the movement in a strict sense. Its methodological restrictions to introspection prevented the next step which was undertaken by Ludwig Binswanger as a phenomenological psychiatrist.

Explicitly continuing the spadework of Külpe and Höningwald, Binswanger dedicates himself to an anthropological point of view. He adopts the psychological insight that, «in the phenomenon of flight of ideas, there is no lack of determinant order [*Ordnungsbestimmtheit*] but it is levelled, i.e., its organisation dwindles» [Höningwald 1925, 68], so that he may ask: «How must the anthropological structure be constituted in which something like a levelling of determinant order becomes possible» [Binswanger 1933/1992, 22]? Put in the context of psychology of thought, Binswanger’s approach amounts to the agreement with Külpe and Höningwald that “flight of ideas” is a disorder of the organisation of tasks. Affected patients are easily distractible because they lack a clear organisation within the order of their thoughts, an organisation that distinguishes substantial from accidental thoughts. His particular interest, on the other hand, is the form of being-in-the-world under these circumstances. Analysing one case for each, orderly, unordered, and incoherent “flight of ideas”, Binswanger tries to reveal the existential condition of the symptom. For the orderly “flight of ideas” of a patient who had written a letter to the chef of the clinic’s kitchen, he states:

The task of thought in our example is not externally given to the person but given from herself to herself. More specifically, it is not the expression which is the task, but every written or verbal expression essentially entails such tasks. By making herself known as the complaining person to the chef, the task to verbally and mentally express the content, reason, and purpose of the complaint emerges. As we have seen, she prioritized to make herself known

as the complaining person over clearly formulating the objective content of the complaint [Binswanger 1933/1992, 26].

What brings forth the “flight of ideas” is not a lack of order but an impractical order that is in danger of losing social comprehensibility. This danger, however, is only the superficial consequence of the “flight of ideas”. On a more profound level, the way in which a person selects the tasks with which they are occupied is the expression of their existential foundation. Drawing on Paul Häberlin, Binswanger describes the existential conflict which prefigures which tasks somebody will realise as «being-in-the-world [*Dasein*] and the problematic nature [*Problematik*] which are the two “sides” of reality» [*ibid.*, 46]. While, in the philosophy of Häberlin, reality itself is problematic, being-in-the-world is unproblematic. Experiencing “flight of ideas”, thus, originates from dominance of the latter side. The patients dwell in a certain existential attitude, namely the «festive joy of being-in-the-world» [*ibid.*, 49].

This condition explains both why the persons do not notice the incoherence of their expressions and why they are easily provoked to express themselves: «what might appear to us as an “ordinary event” that is issued from an “entirely harmless” person tears the manic person from their festive attitude» [*ibid.*]. The trigger for the “flight of ideas” is the confrontation with the problematic nature of reality, but the patients do not adopt a corresponding attitude but remain in the “festive joy of being-in-the-world”. Hence, the patient who had written the inappropriate letter of complaint dealt with the intrusion of a problem into her sphere of untroubled being-in-the-world. However, she was not able to adopt an actual problem-solving attitude since she was existentially bound to her joyful attitude that could only employ the inadequately playful measures incorporated in “flight of ideas”.

Seen from this point of view, “pressured speech” becomes a «toy for the joy of being-in-the-world» [*ibid.*, 130]. The resulting “confusion” that is characteristic for the “flight of ideas” contrasts with “sobriety” as the regular attitude that is not bound to the “joy of being-in-the-world”. This confusion is not unintelligible to psychiatry but connected with playfulness as an anthropological structure. It is the «ecstasy of playfulness, irresponsibility, being without problems» [*ibid.*, 142]. The most

fundamental characteristic of this existential attitude is being “saltatory” [*Sprunghaftigkeit*] that manifests itself in the patients’ experiential relation to various domains of existence, such as space, where patients tend to show sweeping gestures, or time, since patients are restless or hasty and tend to be repetitive. Yet, whoever suffers from “flight of ideas” does not socially isolate but rather embodies an «immanent dependence on actual utterance of thoughts, precisely speaking, of expectation» [*ibid.*, 225].

Külpe’s argument against Liepmann had been that superordination of a thought alone could not account for the meaning of what patients who demonstrate “flight of idea” actually express. Binswanger’s solution regards the existentially “saltatory” character of the symptom that shapes its sense making. In other words, there still is a certain but dysfunctional order which is peculiar to “flight of ideas”. In contrast to the sobriety of a sane attitude, however, it is levelled since being “saltatory” does not maintain a stable preference. Instead, the affected patients behave playfully in inadequate occasions.

Despite of Binswanger’s seminal contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon, there remains an important difficulty of explaining the reason that prevents patients from the return to an adequate attitude towards the problems that excite their “flight of ideas”. Why are the patients so prone to the penetration of their “festive joy of being-in-the-world” by arbitrary problems? Is it an existential lability? Looking at it the other way around, one may ask what constitutes the relevance of apparently “harmless” occurrences so that they cause the “saltatory” reaction. Just as Bleuler and Külpe emphasized, the answer requires an experiential entity that precedes attention and, likewise, the “saltatory” nature of the “flight of ideas”. More specifically, having a saltatory attitude cannot be a sufficient description of the symptom since there are more existential conditions that can be characterised as “saltatory”, such as creative insight [Graumann 1955] or mind-wandering.

What kept the approaches that describe “flight of ideas” from a deeper understanding about its constitutional structure is intellectualism. Even though psychology of thought had made pathbreaking contributions to the field of motivational [Ach 1905; Lindworsky 1923] and emotional psychology [Orth 1903], the fundamental epistemological approach of investigation considered the psychological phenomena as ver-

balizable entities that belong to a rational sphere. The more open-minded researchers from the school, such as Karl Marbe, August Messer, and Karl Bühler, reached as far as Husserlian phenomenology which is fairly rationalistic in its own fashion. A subtler characterization of “flight of ideas” as an existential attitude requires the consideration of the pre-reflective conditions of thought, in particular for the investigation of the “saltatory” order of experience.

Külpe and Binswanger highlighted that being “saltatory” was reflected in a playful change of preference in the present situation, making the stream of thought difficult to follow when judged from the less instable attitude of sobriety. The critical aspect of this difference is the preference of ever-changing thoughts over an earnest form of facing the present problems. In other words, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the patients were lacking the cognitive capacity to concentrate on a single matter – “flight of ideas” might concern attention but not in the sense of a general attention deficit. On the contrary, Binswanger described how the incoherent “flight of ideas” of one of his patients clearly expressed his continuous emotional involvement with the suicide of his father. Further cases demonstrate that the symptom does not depend on “pressure of speech” or its acceleration, such as the example of a patient with thought retardation described by Schroeder [1910].

The apparent deficits of attention and cognition trace back to a more fundamental condition which alternates the order of preference in the patients. This crucial role of preference is why the Schelerian psychopathology, which has recently been advanced by Cusinato [2018], may help to understand the symptom. It proposes a framework for the functionality of emotional acts underlying motivational or cognitive acts, such as acts of thought and, consequently, “flight of ideas”. The fundamental contention of Schelerian psychopathology is that mental disorders express an aberration of the so-called *ordo amoris*, i.e., the personal order of preferences for values which guides all emotional acts, namely intentional feelings, and, as a consequence, directs all further acts. In Scheler’s words:

The origin of all intellectual acts and the corresponding imaginative or meaningful contents depends not only on the existence of external entities and respective stimuli, but also essentially

and necessarily on acts of taking interest and on attention, which is guided by these acts, ultimately, however, on acts of love and hate [Scheler 1915, 143].

The critical revision of the notion of thought by Külpe was only the first step. In order to comprehend the constitution of intellectual acts, it is necessary to consider the emotional acts which give rise to a sense of order, in the first place. Although it might seem as though, for example, dreaming had a comparable – saltatory – functionality as “flight of ideas”,⁶ the underlying order is essentially different. Most importantly, however, the explanation by differences in the *ordo amoris* can account for the particular nature and content of the subordinate thoughts.

Recognizing that there is a “saltatory” order in the “flight of ideas”, the leading question about the nature of the symptom should be transposed. Instead of asking about what might be lacking, psychiatry can ask about what is failing in the conduct of the patients. Binswanger’s solution was to say that they do not have an adequate attitude towards problems, thereby continuing the consideration about the “task” as it had been proposed by psychology of thought. But what does it mean to have a problem – in the emphatical sense of the word – if not attending the relevance of the subject matter, viz. feeling its value [Wendt 2018]? Giving a spontaneous and arbitrary answer is not “having” a problem but solving it prematurely. This is the core of the “flight of ideas” and its expression by “pressured speech” becomes necessary in order to intersubjectively remove the semblance of a problem. But why does the patient feel the urge to abdicate all problems?

Binswanger’s rather poetic reply is the existential attitude called “festive joy of being-in-the-world”. Yet, this remains an unsatisfying answer without an explanation of its meaning. Schelerian psychopathology can fill the gap: Despite undertaking obvious effort to speak, even feeling pressure to do so, the resulting situations are nothing less than dialogical. This holds true especially for so-called small talk, i.e., communication for the mere sake of social interaction. Drawing on Blankenburg, Cusinato depicts this aspect as a «loss of natural evidence and

⁶In his article, Külpe endorsed this comparison, as it had been undertaken by Hacker [1911].

of the consciousness of the “rules of the game”» [Cusinato 2018, 248]. Even in small-talk, it is necessary to contribute to the participatory sense making. Although it is not required to explicitly understand it, the situation must incorporate a sensible encounter of openness towards a shared situation – and eventually a problem – that is vulnerable to violations, such as inappropriate deviations and, thus, “flight of ideas”.

The root of the disorder, consequently, can be found in a withdrawal from the inter-subjective sphere of sense-making. The “festive joy of being-in-the-world” is a seclusion from the original openness towards fellow human beings: The patients do not feel the value of having a problem because they fail to overcome their «egocentrism» [Cusinato 1999]. Paradoxically, this seclusion is not an omission of communication but an interception of its meaning. A playful paronomasia may be witty, but in an intersubjective encounter it is destructive during the sensible phase of participatory sense-making which establishes a mutually shared problem.

Accordingly, “flight of ideas” does not indulge in the transgression of rules, the free play of creativity. This would be the case if the affected persons actually participated in a pertinent problem. On the contrary, the repudiation of authentic interaction is the expression of a retraction from intersubjective anthropogenesis:

Love and hate, beatitude and desperation, remorse, shame, and the feeling of respect do not only serve the interaction with the environment or the struggle for social recognition, but strive, in first place, to share the hunger to be born completely,⁷ which is the reconciliation with the singularity of the other on a trans-subjective level [Cusinato 2018, 244].

Socially highly regulated situations, such as conduct in public transport, are a challenge and the habitual setting for “flight of ideas”. It is not irrelevant whether or not the patients are by themselves, the cause for their experience is not autism. Yet, other human beings cannot be fellow players in the saltatory play of ideas but must remain referees who monitor the compliance with social rules. Unlike schizophrenia, where

⁷Cusinato takes up Zambrano’s term «hambre de nacer del todo» [Zambrano 1989, 94].

other human beings are perceived as robots [*ibid.*, 223], patients who suffer from “flight of ideas” live on the fringe of intersubjectivity, not in neglect of it. Their “pressured speech” imitates the form of genuine dialogue and employs expressions that might be relevant if uttered in the right context. Yet, they ultimately withdraw. Thus, it is fair to say that it is not only a matter of fugitive ideas but of the patients escaping from ideas, viz. problems, a “flight *from* ideas”.

Overall, the history of psychiatry has revealed that “flight of ideas” results from an aberration of order. The notion of order, however, is not self-evident. It requires a certain experiential structure which bestows order upon the subject. Schelerian philosophy has demonstrated that this order-bestowal is emotional, ultimately founded on acts of love and hate. The aberration, consequently, can be traced back to a certain inter-subjective attitude that corresponds with the “festive joy of being-in-the-world”. However, fellow human beings are a source of problems and life offers a plethora of problems. From the standpoint of sobriety, this is no reason for withdrawal since problems can be valuable, nurturing growth of personality: the growth of the *ordo amoris*. Since «all joy wants eternity», and the patients cannot enjoy problems, they must prematurely solve any problem that might intrude their being-in-the-world by straying from its meaning.

What does this mean for the symptomatology of “flight of ideas”? The formal contention that it pertained to mania should not be mistaken for irrelevance of the symptom itself. Commonly, symptoms are framed to be mere indicators for the disorder which ostensibly carries the entire complexity. Schelerian psychopathology cannot agree. Drawing on Dilthey, Cusinato highlights that expressions are essentially united with vivid experience [«unità di *Erlebnis e Ausdruck*»; *ibid.*, 103]. Thus, the complexity of “flight of ideas” shapes the meaning of any disorder which it might express – commonly mania, but not exclusively. This complexity should not be reduced to a formal distortion of language or association. On the contrary, the inability to engage in orderly communication despite considerable effort of articulation is a remarkable phenomenon. When investigating the nature of “flight of ideas”, the absence of what is normally functional confronts psychiatry with a unique gateway to the nature of human inter-subjectivity.

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Keywords

Flight of Ideas; Thought Disorder; Psychology of Thought; Phenomenology; Phenomenological Psychopathology

Abstract

In psychiatric symptomatology, “flight of ideas” is commonly understood as a symptom of a formal thought disorder which is typical for bipolar illnesses. Notwithstanding, there is a historical controversy that preceded this classification. Neither the nature nor the meaning of the symptom is self-explanatory. Psychology of thought, especially in the works of Hugo Liepmann and Oswald Külpe, has tried to grasp its actual complexity. Yet, they could not advance beyond the presuppositions of their own psychological paradigm. The recently proposed Schelerian psychopathology, however, may help to solve these long-lived problems. Instead of investigating thought as a monolithic phenomenon, Schelerian philosophy reveals its pre-reflective constitution. This investigation amounts to the emotional phenomenology of the *ordo amoris* as a structure of primordial affectivity. It plays a decisive role in the formation of the order which underlies thought and, consequently, of the disorder of “flight of ideas”.

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THE LEVELS OF EMPATHY.
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION TO
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. *Empathy as a separation of experiences: Husserl*; 2. *The stratified theory of empathy and psychopathology*; 3. *The theory of stratification*; 4. *The therapeutic potential of empathic stratification: the case of incomprehensible experiences.*

Translated from the German *Einfühlung*, which basically means «feeling» (*fühlen*) «in» or «inside» (*ein*) the other, with a calque from the Greek,¹ the contemporary concept of «empathy» has a complex history. On the one hand, it derives from the eighteenth-century reflections on sympathy and on the centrality of the latter concept in David Hume's and Adam Smith's ethics [Hunt 2007, 64-65; Lecaldano 2013, 13]. On the other hand, it is also the result of a story that began in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century, originating from an aesthetic elaboration of Kantianism. The hero of this second family line was the Munich-born psychologist and philosopher Theodor Lipps, who considered the *Einfühlung* to be a source of knowledge, or better, our way of being in the world. It is on this second way of understanding empathy that I will focus in the following pages. In fact, it is precisely in dealing with Lipps and his concept of *Einfühlung* that Edmund Husserl, Moritz Geiger, Edith Stein, Max Scheler, Karl Jaspers and other authors who can be brought back to the realm of phenomenological reflection have elaborated their reflections on empathy. The aim of this paper is to outline some peculiar characteristics of Husserl's concept of «empathy», in order to articulate a stratified theory of empathy in the wake of Jaspers and

¹ It was the psychologist Edward Titchener who, in 1909, translated «*Einfühlung*» into English by coining the neologism «empathy». Cf. Titchener 1909; Jahoda 2005, 151-163; Matravers 2017, 77-85.

Scheler. Finally, I will highlight the therapeutic potential present in a similar stratified conception of empathic experiences.

1. Empathy as a separation of experiences: Husserl

Husserl began to work on the concept of *Einfühlung* in 1905.² In this first phase of Husserl's reflection «on the experience of the other», a crucial role was played by «Lipps' theory on the *Einfühlung*»³: a theory that – as shown by the research manuscripts – Husserl knew well and with which he repeatedly dealt over the years. Husserl's fundamental criticism of Lipps was that, starting from the latter's conception of empathy as mimesis and projection, it was impossible to see empathy as what allows us to have an experience of the other as such. According to Husserl, in fact, the concept of empathy proposed by Lipps failed to talk about the other [Husserl 1973a, 21]. In interpersonal *Einfühlung* – this is the Lippsian hypothesis – the observing subject, based on the movements of the person in front of them, immediately experiences what the observed subject is experiencing or, better, unconsciously projects on the other the experiences activated by observing the other's behavior and movement.

Lipps strongly emphasizes the instinctive and immediate character of the empathic relationship, explicitly rejecting an «analog» conception: in the act of empathy I do not need – this is Lipps' idea – to think and build an analogy in which I imagine how I would feel if I were in the other's place. To illustrate this, Lipps makes a well-known example [Lipps 1903, 122]⁴: a viewer who sees an acrobat perform a dangerous performance experiences the acrobat's suspension on their own skin; they reproduce

² Indeed, it is in the so-called Seefeld manuscripts, written in the summer of 1905, that Husserl began to outline the method of phenomenological reduction. Within this theoretical horizon, there is the problem of how it is possible, on the basis of a «method that leads to pure and absolute consciousness, to found multiplicity and difference» [Husserl 1973a, XXV].

³ Indeed, in 1905 Husserl read and copied almost the entirety of Lipps' essay *Weiteres zur «Einfühlung»* and he constantly referred to Lipps also in the following years. Husserl 1973a, 21 ff.; 70 ff.

⁴ This example can be found in A. Smith [1767/2009].

within themselves the same movements, they «mimic» the observed actions and, in this way, they identify completely, becoming «at one» with their object and, at the same time, objectifying themselves in the acrobat. According to Lipps, in true empathy there is no distinction between my own self and that of others: there is rather an ideal self. Similarly, the space in which the empathic relationship takes place is also ideal: when we feel like we are up there with the acrobat we are not in a real place, but rather in an ideal place that is neither the tightrope on which the acrobat is walking, nor the armchair on which we are comfortably seated.⁵ Only when we leave full empathy and reflect on our own reality, do we realize that we are separate: the ideal self turns into two real selves.

Lipps' concept of empathy highlights a fundamental theoretical problem to which it is necessary to give a preliminary answer: what makes I's (*Iche*) different from one another? If empathy is mimesis, do I run the risk of confusing myself and not being able to differentiate my experience from that of the other? Do I risk considering the other's fear, sadness or anger as my own? Or, on the contrary, do I risk projecting onto others experiences that do not belong to them, thus ending up misunderstanding their intentions and moods? After all, the acrobat could only pretend to be afraid or unsteady. The question that Husserl addresses in his reconsideration of Lipps is not how separate subjects can communicate, but rather how we can be certain of being separate from others and how we can recognize otherness as such. It is interesting to note that the first problem that Husserl finds in talking about intersubjectivity is not the relation, but the separation: in order to talk about the other, the first result to achieve is to avoid confusion and distinguish what *originated* within one's experience from what is only *derived* from someone else's experience.

⁵ In this sense, Lipps can be considered a supporter of the so-called «actuality principle» [*Aktualitätsansicht*]. The empathetic experiences, according to the supporters of this theoretical framework, become «actual» for those who experience them: so, by empathizing with the acrobat, I become at one with his experience. On the contrary, supporters of the «principle of representation» [*Vorstellungsansicht*] like Meinong's pupil, Stephan Witasek, argue that in empathizing with another's experience I tend to represent it: when seeing the other sad I represent their sadness. Cf. Geiger 1911, 33-35; Witasek 1904.

In fact, during the lectures held in Göttingen between 1910 and 1911, Husserl already addressed the theme of empathy and, as he would later write, outlined its «chief points» [Husserl 1969, 243]. These lessons are particularly important because it is here that Husserl introduces for the first time the possibility of a phenomenological reduction as an intersubjective reduction, which constitutes an alternative path to the Cartesian one, already followed in *The Idea of Phenomenology*. In these lessons, Husserl seems to be well aware of the risk of transcendental solipsism which can result from a reduction of the world to the subject's consciousness and its stream. What remains after the phenomenological reduction is clarified in these pages: the phenomenologically reduced world cannot be traced exclusively to my stream of consciousness: «Then every phenomenological being is reduced, on the one hand, to one (to “my”) *phenomenological I* that is characterised as a perceiving, remembering, and empathizing I, [...] and, on the other hand, to other *I's*, posited in empathy, and posited as looking, remembering, and perhaps empathizing *I's*» [Husserl 2006b, 86]. Thus, the presence of the other becomes fundamental to be able to phenomenologically delineate the surrounding world and its normativity: «In the phenomenological reduction, everything is also an index for the *empathized I*» and that is why «nature is an index for an all-inclusive normativity, encompassing all streams of consciousness that stand in an experiential relation to one another through empathy» [Husserl 2006b, 86].

In these lectures we also find significant reference to Lipps, which helps us understand the development and difficulties that characterize Husserl's concept of empathy. Empathy, notes Husserl, cannot be understood as «an analogizing consciousness, rendering the other consciousness by means of one's own, similar and simultaneous consciousness». And Lipps was insofar «on the right path» [Husserl 2006b, 83]. Empathy, indeed, must rather be thought of as «an act of the largest group of *presentifications*». According to Husserl, though, the empathic relationship often presupposes a sort of fictional image, through which we *imagine* what is going on in the mind of others: in these cases, we are enacting a form of analogy. However, «to interpret *every* feeling of empathy in this way is problematic: For we intuitively ascribe to (*ein-schauen*) the

other person his lived experiencing, and we do this completely without mediation and without consciousness of any impressional or imaginative picturing» [Husserl 2006b, 84].

The theme of empathy, for Husserl, remains problematically suspended in this duplicity: on the one hand, he recognizes an immediate dimension, on the other hand, the immediacy risks opening the door to the possible confusion of experiences found in Lipps' theory. In the second book of *Ideas*, Husserl's position did not change much with respect to the previous research manuscripts. Here Husserl still focuses on an analysis of perception by referring to an «originary perception», which is related to the «personal selfhood» of objects. Obviously, this presence does not imply the originary givenness of all the determinations of the object. However, the observing subject has the possibility of establishing a perceptive continuum. And here Husserl introduces an important difference: perception in presence differs from «appresence (*Appräsenz*)», i.e. a «derived presence».

In the final part of the second section dedicated to the constitution of psychic reality, appresence is described above all with respect to the solipsistic subject and its self-investigation: for example, if I press my hands on the surface of my body where my heart is, «I 'feel my heart'» and if I press strongly I also feel «my bones or inner organs». Along with the tactile impression «then particular new sensations, which are attributed to the relevant felt-through bodily parts, join to the general sensation of pressure and touch» [Husserl 1989, 174]. All these elements are appresented, in that they accompany what is originally presented thanks to touch. The passage from self-reflection to reflection on the other follows immediately: in the case of the «other person», besides these elements that exceed – so to speak – perception in presence, there is also psychic life.

Psychic life is given in the expression and movement of the living body of others: «Since here this manifold expression appresents psychic *existence* in corporeality, an objectivity is constituted which is precisely double and unitary: man – without 'introjection'» [Husserl 1989, 175]. Both animals and humans are understood as «dual units», units that can be distinguished into two layers: thinghood and psychic life. In the case of humans, the possibility of communication and mutual relations is

also given. The point is to distinguish what is present in human unitary apperception. The first layer is that of the material somatic body that I «originally perceive» [Husserl 1989, 170]. The realities that cannot be given in originary presence are animal beings that have a subjectivity. The subjects are given as units of living body and psyche, so I experience the living bodies that stand before me in their originary presence.

In the 1923-24 lectures on *First Philosophy* we find another interesting indication of Husserl's incessant work on empathy: «*the perception of another lived-body is, in keeping with its distinctive essence, perception through originary interpretation*» [Husserl 2019, 267].⁶ We can call this perception «originary» because it is founded on a reference that is essential to and inseparable from my bodiliness. In my bodiliness I have «the primordial experiencing of an incorporation of the subjective in something appearing in thingly form». Husserl speaks of our body as a «*primordial lived-body (Urleib)*» [Husserl 2019, 267-268]: for me, I am the originary human being. The similarity between my body and that of the other leads me to recognize that «that thing» is something in which «a subjective element is embodied [...]. This spatio-thingly seeing and *originary interpreting viewing*, which binds itself together in the apprehending of another's lived-bodiliness, this understanding as expression, is, as against the simple external and the already founded perception of my own lived-body, a distinctive basic form of experience, which is still, according to its nature, to be designated perception» [Husserl 2019, 268]. This peculiar type of perception, adds Husserl, which «quite inadequately, [...] has commonly come to be called 'empathy'» is a second-level perception because it presupposes «in its own sense, perception of one's own lived-body and constantly takes its cue from this perception» [Husserl 2019, 268]. Therefore, although this is a perceptive process, Husserl feels the need to insert an interpreting activity of the I that presupposes the experience of their own living body. In this sense, it is confirmed that empathy is an activity that involves a non-instinctive and immediate dimension.

The *Cartesian Meditations* are probably the most important non-posthumous text that Husserl dedicated to the subject of the rela-

⁶In the manuscripts we often find the idea of an "interpretation", or *Deutung*, in relation to the empathic experience. On the topic, see: Yamaguchi 1982.

tionship with the other. In order to talk about intersubjectivity, in the fifth meditation, Husserl chooses to begin with the «reduction to the sphere of ownness». [Husserl 1960, 92] This move may appear unsettling: Husserl implements an epoché to let emerge what belongs to the single subject and would belong to them even if everything that constitutes them as intersubjective were to vanish [Costa 2010, 80]. Although Husserl is well aware of the fact that «the ego gains personal self-awareness in the I-you relationship» [Husserl 1973a, 171] the reduction to the sphere of ownness or «primordial world» is a fictitious operation that helps us shed light on the minimal self that «does not depend on history and intersubjectivity» [Costa 2010, 83]. On the other hand, it also helps bring out all that is originally intersubjective in subjectivity. This abstract process – which after all is somewhat forced and complicated – leads me to recognize the relevance of the body of the other, which I grasp as a body similar to mine.

Husserl's starting point is clear: the body of the other is given to me in the primordial sphere, while its subjectivity is given to me only in the mediated way of appresentation. However, this appresentation that we find as characterizing the process of «pairing» (*Paarung*) by similitude must not be thought of as an active synthesis, but as a passive synthesis, which determines the very existence of this layer of subjectivity. Here Husserl clarifies the experience of the other precisely through passive syntheses, that is, with the pairing appresentation of the other's body [Yamaguchi 1982, 76]. In the 1920s, Husserl began to attribute greater importance to the passive dimension and the *Paarung* process became an associative and non-reproductive unity between me and the other: it was a co-belonging (*Zusammengehörigkeit*). Thanks to this idea of the associative unity there was no longer any need for an empty indication of the exteriority referring to the interiority that must then be filled. It was a process more similar to the passivity of retention (which, together with protention constitutes the way in which we perceive) than to memory [Yamaguchi 1982, 76], understood as an act of presentation that involves an activity of the I. A passive synthesis means that I do not need to look at the other's body, then associate it with mine and draw from it the inferential conclusion that if the other has a body similar to mine, then they will

also have a psyche and a spirit. Passive synthesis implies that similarity leads me to grasp my body and that of the other immediately as a unitary phenomenon (*Pairing*), through a synthesis.

This unitary phenomenon, however, appears immediately with the awareness that there are two different consciousnesses, with different temporal flows and different points of view on things. The ordinary pairing synthesis presents difference as a central element: the other has a here and now that is different from mine. Thus, there is no risk of falling into a sort of fusion of experiences – a risk that, according to Husserl, was present in Lipps' theory. For an intersubjective relationship and an encounter with the other to be possible, one must recognize the mediated character of empathy. The experience of the other belongs to my stream of consciousness, but the other's experience doesn't. The other is similar to me, but is still other than me. Empathy in Husserl remains suspended between being an activity of understanding the other and a constitutive and transcendental element of subjectivity. If we think of it as a passive synthesis and retention, it takes the direction of this second hypothesis. However, at least in the works he published in life, Husserl has given greater importance to the first path.

2. The stratified theory of empathy and psychopathology

In 1912, with the essay *The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology*, Karl Jaspers inaugurated phenomenological psychopathology. At the heart of the phenomenological method we find precisely the empathic capacity: the only tool to understand the experiences of others. Jaspers does not refer to much secondary literature on the subject; he cites, though, the important lecture that Moritz Geiger gave in 1910 at the International Congress of Experimental Psychology. The essay, entitled *On the Essence and Meaning of Empathy*, was a sort of punctual and analytical overview of the topic, and had already been positively reviewed by Husserl [Husserl 1911/1987, 40]. It was therefore an excellent tool to take a look at the various theories of «empathy». Yet, Jaspers does not dwell too long on the problem posed by Geiger's essay. The reflection on the role of empathy in psychopathology must be limited to establishing a sort of «implementation of a knowledge» linked to these

experiences and – above all – to posing the problem of its «validity». For Jaspers it is not relevant – at least in this context – to try to investigate the essential characteristics or the genetic origin of the empathic experience: it is something given that allows us to enter into relationship with the other. Instead, the understanding of the theoretical status of the experience of empathy is hastily assigned to a comparison: «if we presentify our own psychic experiences of the past or those of other people it is roughly the same» [Jaspers 1912/1963, 319].⁷

In this way Jaspers refers directly to the Husserlian theory which, as we have seen, considered empathy an act of the large group of presentifications. Unlike perception, whose object is «originally» right there in front of the subject, all the acts that presuppose that something (which is not given in the flesh) should become present to the subject's consciousness are presentifications⁸: memories, expectations, hopes, and above all empathic acts [Husserl 1982, 79]. The pain of the other becomes part of my experience, but it is not my pain. If empathy is understood as an experience in which the empathiser becomes «one with the empathized» it is impossible to describe the intersubjective relationship and, *a fortiori*, the therapeutic relationship; in this sense, Jaspers also distances himself from the Lippsian theoretical framework. Jaspers' choice is to give some «guidelines» for the use of empathy in the therapeutic relationship, which allow each psychopathologist to learn how to use this «organ» that we all have, in order to restore relevance and citizenship to the subjective symptom. The relationship is structured by three means or three forms of empathy, thanks to which the doctor tries to access the subjective symptom and the experience of the patient:

⁷ There is an English translation available of the text *Die phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie* (1912): *The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology*, in: *British Journal of Psychiatry* 114 (1968), 1313-1323. However, I have chosen not to use it because it can be somewhat misleading, especially in relation to empathy.

⁸ It is no coincidence that in this case Husserl does not use the term «representation»: his conception of empathy cannot be associated either with theories of actuality (like Lipps'), or with those that reduce empathy to a representation, thus eliminating the reference to the pathic dimension. On the differences between Husserl and the Graz School (in particular Meinong and his students, such as Witasek) see Rollinger 1999.

1. first of all the therapist must «immerse themselves (*Versenkung*) in the patient's behavior, conduct, expressive gestures»;
2. then ask questions that allow «the patient to explore themselves», thus listening to the patient's point of view on their condition;
3. finally, the therapist can refer to the written self-descriptions that the patient is able to give of their pathology, and that «can be used even without the author's personal knowledge» [Jaspers 1912/1963, 320].

The first of the means involves a relationship as immediate as possible with the other and has to do with what today is called «emotional empathy» [Smith 2009]: I feel the anger of the other, their pain or joy. It is an immediate feeling that is not very structured. But the other means indicated by Jaspers are connected to narratives and to the possibility they offer of sharing the experience of the other, learning to put ourselves in their place. This is a different level of empathy, one that refers to a more cognitive dimension. This empathic level forces us to abandon the dimension of immediacy and to reflect on the words of the other that make the feeling progressively more or less understandable. At this level it is therefore the narrative that makes it possible to put ourselves in the other's shoes; today we speak of «cognitive empathy». Finally, as already mentioned, there is a level that presupposes a further imaginative and hermeneutical effort on the part of the therapist: the one linked to written self-descriptions. Here the other is not present in the flesh (or at least not necessarily) and the therapist can only understand their experiences thanks to a knowledge integrated by the imagination. The therapist will have to make an effort to empathize with someone who is far in space and, in some cases, even in time.

Jaspers does not devote much space to these three levels of the empathic relationship, nor does he outline a real theory of empathy. However, it is very important – for the purposes of the present reflection – to recognize that these three ways of describing the empathic relationship can be thought of as a sort of stratification (I will return later on this point). Now, after making the empathic effort and collecting the phenomenologically ordered material, the therapist will face three different types of phenomena: 1. phenomena that are very common and with which it is easy to empathize (even the therapist, like anyone else,

has felt fear, anxiety or jealousy); 2. phenomena that can be understood with an extra effort on the part of the therapist: these are those experiences that are essentially «an increase, a decrease or a mix» [Jaspers 1912/1963, 321] of normal experiences; in this case, however, practice is very useful. Over time, the therapist learns to empathize with this type of experience, understanding its characteristics. Just think of some delusional forms of jealousy [see Jaspers 1910], which, in some cases, are an exaggerated and inadequate reaction, but manifest a feeling that we can all understand.

However – and this is the most interesting point – in the context of psychic pathology there are also 3. some incomprehensible phenomena, which can only be approached «through analogies and images. And we notice them in individual cases not through a positive understanding, but through the impact against this incomprehensible element that our understanding is experiencing» [Jaspers 1912/1963, 321]. An example of such inaccessibility is for example language, when it hinders the sharing of a common plan between patient and psychiatrist: Jaspers describes patients who complain about the impossibility of communicating their feelings due to the inadequacy of language, others that create new words, up to the case of the patient's total silence. So there are phenomena that cannot be understood, and in front of which subjective psychology must stop. Recognizing that some phenomena are «incomprehensible» helps us – in a methodological key – to refrain from attributing meaning to experiences we do not understand, but to acknowledge our difficulty instead [Donise 2015].

So, in our path of reflection on the validity of empathy as a tool to relate to the experience of others, we have encountered a limit: the experience of others cannot always be understood. The fact that there is a limit to the relationship means that empathy can be seen as an ability to get in contact with the other also in their difference. A theoretical model that understands empathy as a projection of one's own experiences on the other, on the contrary, would leave no room for the incomprehensible. At this point, one may wonder what the consequences are of this fact in terms of the therapeutic relationship. There are many possible readings of this collision against something incomprehensible: the «incomprehensibility» can also be interpreted in the sense of a rup-

ture of intersubjectivity, which may lead to consider Jaspers' system incapable of an adequate investigation of pathological subjectivity.⁹ Or it is possible to consider it the sign of a strong limit of the phenomenological method, which «already presupposes what it strives to achieve: the acquisition of a sufficiently developed degree of consciousness of the *Erlebnisse* and of critical self-awareness on the part of the patient» [Meo 1979, 37].

Faced with the difficulty of understanding the other, which may arise from different cases, Jaspers' attitude is not a reaffirmation of understanding at all costs, but the admission of a limit, a limit that becomes a mark of the intersubjective relationship and of human nature itself.¹⁰ In this limit of the empathic attitude, there is room for a different approach to illness and, from a theoretical point of view, for the rejection of every methodological absolutism. Jaspers' reflection on incomprehensible phenomena constitutes a further piece of his methodological pluralism, which seeks to grasp the human being as a whole. But for us it constitutes the benchmark to understand the relevance of a stratified conception of empathy.

3. *The theory of stratification*

As emerges from the manuscripts, Husserl was working on a stratified conception of empathy (*Stufen der Einfühlung*) already in 1910 [Husserl 1973a, 62-76]. However, in the works destined for publication, the theme is only hinted at. In the investigation of empathy that we find in the second volume of *Ideas*, the difference between the passive dimen-

⁹ As Ballerini notes, this concept of «incomprehensibility» of some forms of delirium even caused Jaspers to be accused of racism «in the age of anti-psychiatry». Cf. Ballerini 2000-2001, 7.

¹⁰ But this experience of the impossibility of understanding the situation experienced by the pathological subject can be considered a concrete clinical example of what Jaspers would have theorized a few years later with the concept of «borderline situation». These «borderline situations» are moments in which we find ourselves experiencing situations «that do not offer [...] a fixed point, an absolute indubitable element, some support that gives firmness and stability to every experience and every thought». Cf. Jaspers 1919, 229. On this topic, see: Cantillo 2017.

sion and the active dimension of the *Einfühlung* is very marked and clear. The first type of empathy is dealt with in the section dedicated to the constitution of psychic nature, which lies outside of the spiritual dimension and in which nature is dominated by the law of association, understood as a law of nature that implies a passive adaptation to an alien subjectivity [Husserl 1973a, 455]. The second one concerns «the field of subjectivity, which no longer is nature» [Husserl 1989, 180], the personal I «posited as subject of its personal and thingly surroundings, as related to other persons by means of understanding, and mutual understanding, as member of a social nexus to which corresponds a unitary social surrounding world» [Husserl 1989, 240].

In this dichotomy, the authentic empathy is the spiritual one, so much so that Husserl, in a text written probably around 1920 [Husserl 1973a, 455; 438;],¹¹ distinguishes between authentic [*eigentlich*] and non-authentic [*uneigentlich*] empathy: «Inauthentic empathy is the passive associative indexing of foreign subjectivity, authentic empathy is letting oneself be motivated by an active co-suffering and co-operating with others» [Husserl 1973a, 455]. What in some cases is presented as a dichotomy (naturalistic empathy versus personalistic empathy) can be actually read as a stratification. Several clues support this interpretation: first of all, the very structure of the second book of *Ideas*, which presents the stratified constitution of subjectivity. Moreover, in a text dated 1931-32 Husserl discusses precisely the different levels of empathy: the first is that of the appresentation of the living body of the other as perception. The second level is that of apperceiving the other's body as it moves and is capable of «pushing or carrying something»; the third level captures the intentionality of the actions of others [Husserl 1973c, 434-435; Zahavi 2014, 138]. In some cases, Husserl goes even further and introduces another level in which empathy is connected to the ability to understand cultures and traditions far from one's own [Husserl 1973c, 436; cf. Husserl 2006a, 272-273; Zahavi 2014, 138].

However, the irrefutable fact remains that Husserl has not published a work dedicated to a stratified theory of empathy, nor can we find in his published texts a structured reflection on empathy and its levels. On the

¹¹ Instead, see Husserl 1973a, 410 for the distinction between direct and oblique empathy.

contrary, it is clear that, while recognizing the importance of an originary and passive level of empathy, Husserl's attention is focused on empathy with reference to the active dimension of the person [Yamaguchi 1982, 89]. Husserl will always be opposed to interpretations of empathy that give too much space to the instinctive and immediate level of the relationship, which seems to him to be a prelude to a failed recognition of otherness. Rather, he will think of empathy as an encounter between people within a shared world. In an important passage of the manuscripts, Husserl writes:

Leibniz claims that monads have no windows. But I think that every psychic monad has infinite windows, that is, every authentic perception comprising the living alien body is like a window. And every time I say «please, dear friend» and my friend answers me with understanding [...] a mutual understanding has established a real unity between us [Husserl 1973a, 473].

Instead, in the 1923 second edition of the *Sympathienbuch*, Max Scheler explicitly declared the intention «to give an account of the development phases (*Stufen*) of the forms of sympathy» connected to the founding laws that regulate such forms. In Scheler's perspective, at the most primal level there is «emotional identification», an indispensable precondition to develop the empathic capacity. Emotional identification implies a fusion and a confusion between different selves, and has been an essential condition in our past, both ontogenetic and phylogenetic. It is precisely this identification that allows us to understand the peculiar characteristics of the relationship between mother and newborn, but also the various forms of totemic identification in primitive peoples. The adult contemporary person experiences emotional identification much more rarely, but this instinctive and primitive form is still present in «truly loving sexual intercourse» [Scheler 1923/2017, 173] or in certain forms of fusion that characterize mass events or hypnosis. Emotional identification is generally involuntary, automatic and unconscious. Only because man has experienced this identification in the past is it possible for him to experience «vicarious feeling» (*nach-fühlen*): «if such a (detached) reproduction of feeling is to be possible, I must at some time have gathered the quality of the emotional state thus vicariously felt» through emotional identification [Scheler 1923/2017, 340-341].

For Scheler, vicarious feeling is what today we could call empathy: the ability to feel and understand the experiences of others, without necessarily participating sympathetically in them. Finally, the last level of sympathetic experiences is that of fellow-feeling (*Mit-fühlen*),¹² the properly sympathetic act, in which we experience a sharing of the experience of others. These three levels, although founded one on the other, have very different characteristics and must not be confused.

4. The therapeutic potential of empathic stratification: the case of incomprehensible experiences

After mentioning, albeit briefly, the way in which Husserl and Scheler delineate a possible stratified theory of empathy, let us return to Jaspers and the therapeutic relationship. In Jaspers the theme of stratification, as we have seen, is only sketched. However, guided by the concrete reference to psychic pathology and to suffering, he captures a very relevant point for the construction of a stratified theory of empathic experiences. In fact, Jaspers differentiates the more immediate and emotional dimension («immersing oneself in the expressive gestures» of the other) from the more structured and cognitive one (asking questions and «guiding» the other in their self-investigation). This type of difference is very much present in the contemporary reflection on empathy and allows us to look at the theme of incomprehensible experiences starting from the theory of phenomenological stratification.

Indeed, Jaspers' phenomenological psychology offers a different theoretical path from what is traditionally considered the legacy of phenomenology in the psychological field. Sartre – to refer to an author who clearly theorised on this point – has argued that madness is only a «quantitative increase» of what he calls «emotional conduct» [Sartre 2004, 42].¹³ In this perspective, every psychotic or delusional world is

¹² In reality in Scheler we find two more levels of stratification: that of *Menschenliebe* and that of the *akosmische Person- und Gottesliebe*. These two levels, on which it would take too long to dwell here, have to do with Scheler's anthropological ethics and not directly with the theme of *Einfühlung*. On this topic, see Cusinato 2008.

¹³ Sartre maintains that the world of madness must be placed in continuity with the world of emotion and with the world of dreams. See Sartre 2004, 52.

«a possible world» like any other. For the *Daseinanalyse*, which tries to study the world of those affected by a psychic pathology, being mentally ill can simply mean *being in a different way*. One of the fundamental references here is Heidegger with his «existential analytic» [Heidegger 1927/1962] understood as a search for the constitutive ontological structures of Dasein. The anthropoanalyst considers «the worlds of the mentally ill on par with those of the ‘healthy’, as revelations of the man that may be» [Cargnello 2010, 140].

This is not the case according to Jaspers. He also wonders if it is possible to identify «*psychopathological* transformations of the world, or the ‘*specific worlds*’ of psychoses or psychopaths» [Jaspers 1913, 236].¹⁴ In other words, the question is: is it possible for the psychopath to share his world with others? Can we hypothesize a constant that enables psychotic people to communicate their world and share it? Jaspers finds the attempt to identify psychotic constants very problematic, and seeks another way, trying to work on the issue of incomprehensibility. Speaking of incomprehensibility seems to confine the pathological subject to a dimension far from the shared one, but the stratification that Jaspers attributes to empathy can be useful to clarify what is here in question.

Let’s briefly recap the issue: based on Weber’s point of view, according to which one must abandon immediacy to achieve scientific knowledge, Jaspers considers some pathological experiences as «incomprehensible» and admits that there is a limit to the attempt to establish understanding relationships, thus excluding certain diseases from any therapeutic relationship or leaving them exclusively to an organicist explanation – to pharmacology, as we might say today. Jaspers, however, never spoke about experiences that cannot be «empathized with» but always of experiences that cannot be «understood», underlining the difficulty or impossibility of tracing those specific experiences back to classical cognitive categories, or within the conceptualization referred

¹⁴ A few years later, in 1919, Jaspers published a large work on the psychology of worldviews (*Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*). In particular, the concept of «worldview» elaborates in a theoretical key the conception of the psychic structure that emerged in his psychopathological works [Jaspers 1919]. On this topic, see Cantillo 2017. Moreover the first volume of *Philosophy* [Jaspers 1932/1969-1971] is dedicated to the Philosophical World Orientation.

to by Weber. In therapeutic practice it is fundamental to acquire full awareness of the differentiation of experience, but this differentiation comes from different paths, exists on different levels and also leads us to different levels of awareness and «understanding».

When we recognize that the experience of the other could be our own, we might be lingering in the immediate feeling and on the first of the «means» of empathy: the emotional and not very structured immersion in the other. A delirium or a psychotic crisis do not make it difficult to feel the experience of the other, but rather they tend to undermine the next level, the most cognitive of the empathic relationship: it is difficult to understand the world of a psychotic person, while it is not difficult to feel their emotions. In this perspective, the stratified conception of empathy that comes from the phenomenological horizon can be integrated into contemporary research. The unipathic and fusional dimension proposed by Scheler can be further investigated, starting from the recognition of a common dimension of feeling that precedes the distinction between selves. The relevance that Husserlian reflection attributes to the body in the intersubjective relationship and in the constitution of subjectivity can help us recognize one important thing: feeling the other also through our common body movement in space can allow us to come into contact with parts of ourselves and of the other, parts which are common but differentiated. Moreover, with Jaspers, distinguishing between a purely emotional capacity, which leads us to feel the other, and a more cognitive one in which we start from our knowledge about the other to enter into relationship with them, is useful to establish different relationship channels.

The therapist does not intend to deny the incomprehensibility of the delusional experience from the point of view of normal understandable connections. However, starting from the patient's strictly emotional experience, they will be able to learn to treasure this feeling and use it to pass directly to a more «imaginative» level of the empathic relationship, being willing to follow the patient in their own world, striving to get out of reality and following – through imagination – the patient's narrative, even if delusional. In so doing, the therapist follows Husserl, who already in his lessons on «The natural concept of the world» [*natürlicher Weltbegriff*] noted that «not every empathy» can be understood as a ca-

capacity for which we «picture to ourselves the other person's mood», but «fantasy-pictures» must also take place in our relationship with the other.¹⁵ Jaspers himself, in delineating the third of the empathic «means», the one linked to self-descriptions in written form, highlights the possibility for the therapist to imagine the experience of the other even without having them there in person. The goal of such a therapeutic practice, which works on different levels of empathy, is to enter the world of the suffering subject.¹⁶

This theme is thus limited to the therapeutic relationship, but it is evident that it also tells us something about the intersubjective relationship in general. The incomprehensibility theorem obliges us to recognize that the other can never be grasped and understood in their entirety. We can feel the other's emotions, but we cannot expect to always understand their meaning or motives. We can imagine their perspective on things, but we can also be radically wrong. The founding nucleus of the human intersubjective relationship – and therefore of culture, institutions, art and ethics – is right here in this incomprehensible nucleus, which must be taken as an essential and non-contingent datum. This essential opacity of the other is a theme that characterizes all phenomenological reflection on empathy: for authentic communication to take place, it is necessary to accept that one may not be able to grasp the other in their totality, assuming this difference as a central element.

In conclusion, empathy turns out to be a significant source of knowledge. Just like the senses, it can lead us into error, but this does not invalidate its value. To the question of the validity of the knowledge we obtain through empathy, Jaspers responds by identifying the *limits* of the empathic relationship, emphasizing the possibility of error and

¹⁵ Husserl clarifies that «Empathy is no more a consciousness of genuine picturedness than it is a re-remembering and a pre-remembering or any other kind of remembering. Rather, I hold that whereas empathy is akin to these acts, it is an act belonging to the largest group of presentifications» [Husserl 2006b, 83].

¹⁶ This is not an easy leap to make, however it is made possible by the awareness of the therapist, who learns to know the stratification and its characteristics in depth. Stanghellini's proposal of a «second-order empathy» can be read in this sense. Though I share Stanghellini's general view, it seems to me that Jaspers' insistence on the emotional, bodily and immediate dimension of the empathic relationship is not sufficiently taken into account in his perspective. Cf. Stanghellini 2013, 166-181.

above all the need to recognize that some emotional experiences cannot immediately become «valid scientific concepts». However, starting from this feeling and through the help of the imagination it is possible to try to enter in relation with the other,¹⁷ thus avoiding loneliness and closure, without fear of crossing large areas of incomprehensibility. After all, this approach falls within the «phenomenological method», which is preliminary to real understanding (genetic and psychological). For essential and non-contingent reasons, this preliminary method – characterized by the limit – is open to the need to look for other paths in the therapeutic relationship, and consequently wishes to avoid the methodological absolutism that Jaspers considered very risky in the psychopathological field. Phenomenology is thus a preliminary method which nevertheless remains unavoidable if we want to recover the therapeutic relevance of the subjective symptom and restore dignity to the psychiatric patient.

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¹⁷ An example of this empathic modality can be found in therapeutic relationships in which the psychologist chooses to «go with» the patient's delirium. Seconding the other can avoid forms of closure that are otherwise not easily reversible. Obviously these are experiences that must be managed through a sound therapeutic practice: see, for example, the systemic school that is identified with the second generation of Palo Alto researchers. One of the strategies used is that of paradoxical interventions, which consist in prescribing tasks or communicating ideas that are far from the common system, but in line with the *framework* of the system. In other words, the psychologist has to speak the «language of the patient». Cf. Watzlawick *et al.* 1974; Fisch *et al.* 1982.

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Keywords

Empathy; Husserl; Stratification; Phenomenology; Psychopathology

Abstract

The first aim of this paper is to outline some peculiar characteristics of Husserl's concept of «empathy», that is developed over the years through critical confrontation with Theodor Lipps. Husserl will always be opposed to interpretations of empathy that give too much space to the instinctive and immediate level of the relationship, which seems to him to be a prelude to a failed recognition of otherness. Rather, he will think of empathy as an encounter between people within a shared world. What in some cases is presented as a dichotomy (naturalistic and immediate empathy versus personalistic empathy) can be actually read as a stratification.

The second objective of this work will therefore be to outline a stratified theory of empathy, not only in comparison with Husserl, but also with Max Scheler. Surprisingly, however, we already find a first form of stratification, starting in 1912, in the writings of the young doctor Karl Jaspers on phenomenological psychopathology.

In the final part of the paper, I will highlight the therapeutic potential present in a similar stratified conception of empathic experiences, by using the Jaspersian theme of “incomprehensible phenomena”.

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ANTHROPOGENESIS AND TECHNOPATHY¹

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. *Introduction to anthropogenesis*; 2. *Introduction to technopathy*; 3. *Anthropogenesis*; 4. *Technopathy*.

Life is no argument

F. Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, 121

1. Introduction to anthropogenesis

The first part of this paper looks at the genesis of the human, *anthropogenesis*, with the human understood as the unique expression of life possessing “higher-order consciousness”. Anthropogenesis begins with the emergence of the vital and the development of its different modes, from the primary affective processes and psychological drives to fully-formed feelings – the central argument here being that the affective is the very foundation of life. It is, then, the affective spectrum that awakes matter from its silence, by giving rise to the self-relationship within the relation-to, i.e. by giving rise to the self. The self is thus generated in the passage from inert to living matter, from the crystal to the cell, the cell having been brought into being through the constitution of the cellular membrane, defined by biologist Bruce Lipton as «a crystal semiconductor with gates and channels» [Lipton 2005, 90]. In this way, the cellular membrane is defined as the boundary, albeit permeable, between the internal and the external. It is then this cellular development which forms the basis of the complex homeostatic activity that is fundamental to life, described for the first time by the

¹ Translation by Bethan Bowett.

North American physiologist W. B. Cannon [1932]. The phenomenon of homeostatic activity has since been conceptually integrated into the term “homeostatic imperative” by Antonio Damasio. The homeostatic imperative represents the original and functional thread within the bond that links the different levels of affectivity existing in elementary life to fully-formed feelings. Indeed, it is from this elementary affectivity that feelings draw their power at the mental/cerebral level [Damasio 2018, 269-73] and build – over the course of evolution and by means of progressive and innumerable instances of the breaking through of “thresholds” – the various gradations of what was defined by Max Scheler as the coincidence between the psychic and the living, at the start of the 20th century [Scheler 1927; 2008].

The establishment of this coincidence allows us to form a conception of the “psychicity (*Psychizität*) of life”, i.e. to form a provisional definition of consciousness as manifest expression that both has its roots and extends its highest branches in the evolutive dimension of “the affective”,² coming eventually to assume the form and mode particular to «higher-order consciousness» [Edelman 1992]. This higher-order consciousness likely represents the highest – the most complex and interconnected – level of the totality of existing manifestations of the vital, understood as the totality of the vital as affectivity, and is today the subject of empirical investigation in the field of the philosophy of neuroscience, a line of inquiry that was anticipated in particular (though not exclusively) by the late 19th and early 20th century philosophical anthropologies of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler, and Viktor von Weizsäcker.

The framework put forward here firmly rejects any recourse to “vitalistic” arguments, preferring instead an engagement with the theory of «biocentrism» [Lanza & Berman 2009; 2016].

At the same time, in opposition to methodological determinism, the article proposes an understanding of the “internal” (not only cerebral) biological structures as in a constant circular, thus reciprocal, relation

² The term *affective* expresses, in a very general sense, the basic emotional character of all vital phenomena. It therefore encompasses within it a broad spectrum of differing degrees, intensities and qualities, each with their own labels, e.g.: *impulses, drives, sensations, passions, affects, emotions, sentiments*, etc.

with “external” (natural environment) biological structures, each conditioning the other in a continual redefinition of vital expression and of the behavioural forms arising from the process.

2. *Introduction to technopathy*

The second part of this paper, *Technopathy*, looks at the modern-day pathological “neo-development” of the self, viewed as a progressive distancing of the self from its vital plane, i.e. from the affective. This distancing is generated by an insatiable craving for cognitive consciousness (calculating/quantitative), “animated” by the only passion that it seems to have retained: the passion for technology. Such distancing is pathological in the sense that it results in the regression and erosion of the “animal” passions and affects expressed by the living body, leading potentially to their total eradication. In the age of technology, this passion called “technopathy” which is monocratic and endowed with a rigidly «unipathic» structure [Scheler 1913-1923, 29-47] in its regressive counter-movement tends to become a psychopathological “death drive”, that is, a drive to eliminate the affective and hence to eliminate the origin. At stake is therefore the original self; the self that was generated by the affective and became human. Guided now by the “technological imperative”, it is drawn towards becoming “purely” cognitive consciousness. In such basic terms the danger is perhaps not immediately apparent, but when we take into account the fact that all affective dimensions are in decay we see clearly that the idea of a purely cognitive consciousness is a senseless paradox. Consciousness is necessarily “affective/emotional”, precisely because it is cognitive activity. Indeed, this is the central argument of the first part of this paper. Without emotions, without affect, without feelings, everything becomes calculable but *nothing* can be experienced and so *nothing* is knowable.

3. *Antropogenesis*

The argument advanced in this paper rests on the assumption that the origin of life culminating in the “expression” of consciousness is rep-

resented by the passage from the *ontic* (the plane of being of inanimate things) to the *pathic* (the plane of being of living things).³ This assumption rests on the related postulate of an “affective” origin of the living whereby living beings evolve along a non-linear path of “affective gradualism”. According to this thesis, even consciousness itself – as with all manifestations of the living, though this varies greatly in form and degree – is defined by the progressive emergence of a manifestation characterised from the outset as “expressivity” with a predominantly, though not exclusively, “affective/emotional” structure.

Hence anthropogenesis represents here the idea that affects and feelings – developed according to a sequential order which can summarily be laid out as: drives → passions → affects → emotions → reflective emotions → feelings → consciousness, and where the category of consciousness can in turn be broken down into the “primary,” “secondary” and “tertiary” consciousness applicable to the animal kingdom, corresponding respectively to the degrees of “consciousness” defined by the experimental psycho-neurobiologist Jaak Panksepp as *anoetic*, *noetic* and *autonoetic consciousness* [Panksepp *et al.* 2012] – shows the evolutionary origin of the gradual passage away from the “animal”, i.e. from “elementary affective states”, which develop and evolve into ever more complex neural neo-structures through gradual build up or successive breaking down of “thresholds”, until they reach the point where new *cerebral* structures appear and where they can be described as approximating the “apical” affective state due to their constant interconnection and according to ascendant and descendant components. It is this apical affective state that exhibits the emergence of the truly human, provisionally definable as a «higher-order consciousness» [Edelman 1992, 193-212]. This state of consciousness does not eclipse what has come before but rather encompasses each of the previous levels in the manner of a “bio-*Aufhebung*”. This elevated state (rigorously fluctuating and procedural) is therefore characterised by the entire affective spectrum evolved thus far, and predominantly by highly re-reflective, *noetic* and *auto-noetic* emotions and feelings (*sensus-mentis*), though *anoetic* affective states also remain present.

³ On the fundamental difference in the meaning of these terms adopted here, see: Weizsäcker 1946/1987, 41-89. See it. trans., Weizsäcker 1990, 175-215. In addition see: Masullo 2014.

The human cerebral structure, which manifests “higher-order consciousness”, can therefore also be defined as a structure expressing a “higher-order affective state”. However, it may be useful to reiterate that this condition preserves all of the structures and all of the levels of affectivity from which it has “originated” by means of successive evolutionary integrations, conserving them in a unitarily operating interconnection between the “interior” and “exterior” world, i.e. between the interior world of the brain-as-organ and the external environment; affects – from the simplest to the most complex ones – “serve” thereby as the connection. Thus, to use Northoff’s words, «no emotional feelings [means] no connection to the world» [Northoff 2016, 116]. “Affective states” therefore represent the primary expression of life and as such they allow access to the original dimension, that is to say to the affective drives that belong to all living beings on differing levels, traditionally termed “animal passions” (the various “affective states” of living beings).

These “animal passions” evolved to become true affects (emotions) and then feelings, understood as “reflective affective states”, that is, those experiential conditions which in their *reflectivity* generate the dynamic, self-related flux which we usually call consciousness, or rather a “higher-order affective state” defined by its “reflective” character, possible even in an *anoetic* state but overt in both *noetic* and, above all, *autonoetic* states [Panksepp *et al.* 2012].

“Affective states” thus emerge and develop, stratifying and structuring their functional articulation in ever more complex ways, eventually becoming fully and specifically “reflective” and arriving at the point of being an expression of *extended* consciousness. This indicates that these are more than merely biochemical states; they are also, if only in a certain sense and within the explicative limits of a semiological model,⁴ representational and are thus describable as «biosemiotic» [Barbieri 2008; Cusinato 2018].

Such processes present themselves gradually, basing themselves on the structure of the genetic code (which can also be interpreted in a “symbolic-discursive” manner), and represent the highest point of the

⁴ On the biological critique of the “biosemiotics” model, see: Gazzaniga 2018, chapter 7.

expression of consciousness. This is the highest level, or at least a fully complex level, and is entirely particular to the current state of affective organisation achieved by the life system, understood as expressive affective activity, having emerged over the course of time, extending from its first appearance across all of its gradual historical evolution. Being as they are an *aposteriori* evolutionary potential, these states thus form the base and in a certain sense coincide with “higher-order consciousness”, i.e. with the expressive affective form of the human lifeform’s “highest” and most full life.

For this reason, in reference to the human, we call here this consciousness the “higher-order affective state”. It is a state that has emerged out of certain conditions, developing, after having already reached a certain evolutive level, from a «fluctuating central state» [Vincent 1986], i.e. from the original condition attributable certainly to the emergence of the nervous system and potentially to the formation of systems prior to that, protected by the level reached by the doubly significant form of the “homeostatic *apriori*”.⁵ At the first level, this form, the homeostatic *apriori*, represents the condition necessary to guarantee the basic biochemical expressive functions and processes that work alongside all of the affects up to fully-formed feelings which then, at the second level, represent the modulating function within the plane of psychic functions [Damasio 2018]. These modes exist at all levels, including the highest levels of organisation, being as they are “modes” proper to living material processes. It is then these “modes” that become the most complex form of living material – the human brain – in its characteristic and necessary “intentional” relation (maximally reflective), or, in other words, in what is probably the highest form of “agreement” with the external environment that intrinsically represents the constitutive moment of the *relational* pole of every living organism from the most simplistic upwards [Northoff 2016].

As this speculative argument cannot be fully developed here and is

⁵ The term *homeostatic apriori* is intended to mean the necessary precondition, though not in and of itself sufficient, for living structures to create operative arrangements allowing for the constant maintenance of an individual organic unity, a unity that nevertheless remains in flux, in “relative” relation to the processes of change – within certain limits – in the environmental conditions.

laid out in only summary fashion, this paper will begin with an outline of the genesis of the human, the anthropogenesis – whereby the term *human* is understood to mean the starting point and development of what has been termed “higher-order consciousness” or “higher-order affective state”, a concept – still today difficult to explain in precise terms – which represents the most advanced knowledge of our anthropological condition.

In accordance with the presuppositions and the objective outlined above, the theoretical grounding of the argument presented here is therefore constituted by a philosophical and anthropological horizon attributed to three “decisive” thinkers of fundamental importance who not only metaphorically but also literally represent the pathfinders of an epistemic, of scientific-philosophic origins, of the developments that are the subject of this essay. All these three thinkers proposed the theory of anthropogenesis from which was generated the mature theoretical proposal of the affective constitution of all life forms and of human consciousness.

The first of these decisive thinkers is Friedrich Nietzsche, who developed a “philosophy of affects” in the last part of the 19th century. The philosophy of affects, in brief terms, can be ascribed to the ethics of the *Übermensch*.

From the perspective of this paper, the theory/metaphor of the *Übermensch* (Overman or Superman) elaborated by Nietzsche in 1883 represents the earnest, urgent and “tragic” proposal for the foundation of a realist, empirical anthropology. In his anthropology, Nietzsche starts from the idea of a development of a “philosophy of affects” understood as effort – in the necessary transformative destiny of the entity that is man – to bring to “evolutionary” maturity a new conceivable condition and expression of the *human*. A central theme in Nietzsche was thus the “enhancement of the affects”, which he defined as the moment corresponding to a hoped-for «phase where the conscious becomes modest» (FP 1884, 24 [16]) [Nietzsche 1881-1887/2006]. Within the Nietzschean world view, the modern subject’s “Reason” has an egoistic and presumptuous character in relation to its affective means, and most of all to its pretences to domination over the living totality of the body. According to Nietzsche, consciousness – as an expression of rationali-

ty, and being only «the last and latest development of the organic, and consequently also the most unfinished and least powerful of these developments» (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* 1882/1886, aph. 11) [Nietzsche 1964-] – must retreat from its pretences to exclusive “government” in the face of the complexity of the unperceived processes of bodily cerebral physiology, processes which, when put in motion, propel our living activities through the analysis and integration of the organic-corporal totality, first and foremost in relation to the cerebral stratification, which is currently the subject of important breakthroughs in scientific knowledge. This integration is essentially based on the affective modality of total vital strengthening, allowing for provisory conservation while at the same time necessary transformation. «Könnten wir uns aber mit der Mücke verständigen, so würden wir vernehmen, daß auch sie mit diesem Pathos durch die Luft schwimmt und in sich das fliegende Zentrum dieser Welt fühlt»⁶ [Nietzsche 1873/2007, 141]. Nietzsche is therefore thinking of a human liberated from the nihilist presumptuous, pretentious and self-explanatory idealisation belonging to European “modernity” and which he understands as a historical pathological arc running through the development of Western philosophy [Nietzsche 1881-1887/2006]. In his view, Western philosophy’s anti-vital hypertrophy consigns it to a destiny of inexorable and premature decline. The nihilist model of Western thought has conceived and developed the idea of “Reason” as something idealistically separate from the biological-material body, a truly isolated and “anti-corporal” development which has its basis in conventional modernity, i.e. from the 17th century onwards and its primary matrix in the dualistic and mechanistic anthropological thought of René Descartes. This disembodiment, dualistic and separative shift in thinking about the body then finds its highest expression, *on the one hand*, in the powerful and innovative Kantian attempt to establish an impossible theory of “pure reason” – a theory in which, albeit concurrently to an attempt to discern its limits, “Reason” as the organ of consciousness is represented as an object whose structure can be conceived of in isolation and only from a logical perspective – and, *on the*

⁶ «But if we could communicate with the mosquito, we would learn that he floats through the air with this same *pathos*, feeling within himself the flying centre of the world».

other, in the claim to have reduced the complexity of the biological process, irreducible to mere causal chain, to a simple mechanic-machinic functioning in accordance with the naturalist model of “skin-and-bones causality” that is typical of 18th century European positivism and its mechanistic Cartesian-Newtonian matrix. Nietzsche, however, strives for an “enhancement of the affects”, shifting the centre of his anthropological-philosophical and epistemological interests in an anti-reductionist direction towards the material dimension of the vital-corporal by means of von Helmholtz’s “law of conservation of energy”, Virchow’s “cell theory”, Roux’s “principle of self-regulation” (*Selbstregulierung*), Pflüger’s theory of “sensory system decentralisation”, and Haeckel’s theory of “organic memory”. From a philosophic-anthropologic basis, Nietzsche thus paved the way for profound paradigmatic shifts away from the old models drawn from modern conceptions of the meanings of life, organism and man, definitively reintegrating the human within the natural dimension, in opposition to the prevailing *physicalist naturalism*.⁷ Physicalist naturalism, as Nietzsche wrote in his reflections on Western thought, «is a *secret fury* against the conditions of life» [Nietzsche 1881-1887/2006, 309]. This conviction lead Nietzsche, at the precocious age of 34 when he wrote *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* (1878-79), to declare that from that point on he had «done literally nothing else than study physiology, medicine, and natural science» [*Ecce homo*, 1888/2015, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*, Chapter 3].

The second thinker decisive to our argument is the German philosopher Max Scheler, who was most active between the 1920s-1930s. Scheler deployed an “onto-phenomenological” methodological perspective in his last unfinished work of 1927, *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (The Human Place in the Cosmos), the inaugural work of a new discipline called philosophical anthropology (*Philosophische Anthropologie*), which proposes the idea of a *psychicity* of the living entity in general, since «Was die Grenze des Psychischen betrifft, so fällt sie mit der Grenze des Lebendigen überhaupt zusammen»⁸ [Scheler 1927, 12].

⁷ See: Rosciglione 2005; Stiegler 2001. One the “philosophy of the affects” in Nietzsche see also: Voza 2006.

⁸ «The boundaries of the psychic come to coincide exactly with the boundaries of the living».

As such, Scheler proposes an idea of man that is entirely reintegrative in relation to living nature, against all previous dualism. It is a way of understanding man that conceives consciousness as coinciding with the realm of the living *tout court*, though varying qualitatively according to levels of functionality and on the bases of differing levels of organisation, taking as its starting point – and moving within the unbridgeable discrepancy between the inanimate and the animate – the original «primordial impulse of vital affection» (*Gefühlsdrang*). This impulse articulates and informs the entire vital process in different degrees, gradually dissolving itself as a “primary power”, destined to realise *ordo amoris*. This idea allows for the formulation of a necessarily relational conception, encompassing the relation between consciousness and life, which finally reunites the reality of “human-consciousness” and “life” and which at the same time sustains the basic idea of emotional life as having «eine metaphysisch kognitive Funktion» [Scheler 1926, 141 and n.1], further reinforcing the idea of a natural totality which, as organic affective *psychicity*, can be defined as “living thought, thinking life”. To conclude, building on Nietzsche’s reflections, Scheler’s thinking works through the “insertion of biology *in* the subject”.

The third decisive thinker is Viktor von Weizsäcker, doctor, neurophysiologist and philosophical anthropologist, who developed his thinking for the most part between the 1920s-1950s. Weizsäcker elaborates a systematic conception of the living being founded on the explicit idea of an obscured (*Verborgen*) “fundamental relation” (*Grund-Verhältnis*). This conception which encompasses all living entities and as such includes the living-man who has always been in the flux of life – a conception which incidentally allows for the ancient life/death opposition to be surpassed and transformed into “life *and* death” – is articulated as the relation between a plane of things and a plane of living life with its mobile and transformative equilibriums or, as Weizsäcker put it, between the ontic (*Ontisch*) and the pathic (*Pathisch*). This fundamental distinction allows for the construction of a theory of the living-man defined as a «medical anthropology» (*medizinische Anthropologie*) or as «pathosophy» [Weizsäcker 1956/2005]. Weizsäcker’s theory essentially represents the elaboration of a psychopathology of the affects which, in the living in general and in the living man in particular, is

metaphorically constructed from the five modal verbs (*Dürfen, Müssen, Wollen, Sollen, Können*) that characterise the active expression of the affective dimension defined as the «pathic pentagramme» (*pathisches Pentagramm*) [Weizsäcker 1956/2005, 67-97]. This “pathosophy” is developed as a systematic study of psychic-physical disturbance seen as being regulated by the harmonic or disharmonic relationship between the five modal verbs that serve as a “measure” of the psycho-physical organism’s state of equilibrium and wellbeing, for they are indicators both of the precarious equilibrium understood as a natural homeostatic oscillation of life’s living conditions and of the affective expression of the health or illness status of every living man. It is an equilibrium that is always at risk of being lost, of being disturbed by some serious fracture in the fundamental relationship between the living-man and its “world-environment” (*Umwelt*). As such, in Weizsäcker’s worldview, it is the affective, the “pathic”, which “decides” primarily what action will be taken, guiding action toward the functioning of a harmonious or disharmonious relationship (*Verhältnis*) that forms between the different levels of its categories in the “text” of the pentagramme through the relation *with* and *between* its conditions of possibility for success in the world.

As such, in Weizsäcker’s words «Sie [Die Psychologie der Triebe] zeigt, daß (wie schon Nietzsche entdeckt hatte) der Trieb nicht das Sinnlose schlechthin ist gegenüber unseren Vorstellungen, Handlungen und Gedanken, sondern daß umgekehrt der Sinn dieser Vorstellungen, Handlungen und Gedanken gerade der Trieb sei: *er* hat sie determiniert» [Weizsäcker 1926/1987, 73].⁹ With Weizsäcker, therefore, the framework for the recomposition of the unity of life/thought is brought to completion through «the insertion of the subject *into* biology» (*die Einführung des Subjektes in die Biologie*) [Weizsäcker 1940/1997, 83-85].

The “lesson” we take from these three “decisive” thinkers, whose ideas have been summarised here only very broadly and only in rela-

⁹ «we see that (as Nietzsche had already showed) [and Scheler confirmed] the [affective] impulse is not simply the absence of sense in the face of our representations and actions, and of our thoughts, but on the contrary that the sense of these representations and actions, and of these thoughts, is the impulse itself: it is the impulse that determines them».

tion to the basic elements relevant to our argument, appears today to be perfectly in line with the direction of neurofunctional sciences and with the experimental neuro-philosophies that could in many senses be considered the heirs of the theoretical approach to empirical inquiry held by Nietzsche, Scheler and Weizsäcker, among others, in terms of anthropological-epistemological research. Their theoretical-empirical approach has been taken up by scholars we would now define as “new humanists”. New humanism represents a “third culture” which has left behind the dichotomic vision – outlined in Snow’s celebrated essay on the two separate cultures of humanism and science – and which sees the need for “humanist” research and thus for a possible philosophy of the human based on the empirical method and reasoned scientific evidence and on the philosophical-anthropological principles and concepts that can be drawn from such research.

This “third culture” is incarnated by «those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, have taken the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are» [Brockman 2003, 1-2].

If, therefore, a great part of the 20th century can be defined as the century that confronted – with renewed determination – the anthropological question from a philosophical perspective, starting from the assumption of the vital-affective dimension as the “root” of our being, ushering in a gradual phenomenological epistemic shift away from the ideal to the empirical dimension, then the new (third) millennium conversely saw an explosion in knowledge, following the enormous developments in integrated scientific research in the fields of psychology, neurology, endocrinology and immunology (PNEI) and additionally favoured by significant developments in technologies of visual analysis (CAT, PET, MRI) that have revealed evidence of continual mutations in the cerebral-functional state over the course of every affective experience, mutations that model or govern our actions and understanding. The conceptual orientations derived from this new knowledge, taking their lead from the ever clearer determination of the *decisive* role of biochemical processes and of the cerebral layers they travel through, processes which can be imagined as little combs with teeth that become

finer and finer, refining from the bottom upwards and deciding the final expression of animal or human action and behaviour in accordance with the level of complexity. The establishment of the existence of these processes would seem to confirm, and indeed build on, the intuitions of the classical authors mentioned here. They would also seem to uniformly lend credit to the thesis supported in this paper, which holds that the human “modality” (as is also the case with the animal modality) is prevalently, if not exclusively, derived from a plane of original affective expression, evolving from this origin up to the level in which consciousness is present. This plane develops – from its first stages up to the last level at which consciousness exists, currently represented by the complex insular system of activities, understood as functional multiplicities, that are predominantly affective, highly integrated and definable as an affective and signifying unity – over an affective-emotional evolutionary path. The discovery of this “system” leads us to a conclusion, albeit provisory, that living life should be defined as affective expression *tout court*.

This argument has reinforced itself over time thanks to the constant developments in the fields of neuroscience, of psychology and of neuro-philosophy, carried forward by respected scientists and researchers. We refer in particular to the research produced by three contemporary scholars working within the field of empirical, cerebral and psycho-neuro-scientific philosophy that seems to attest the thematic or conceptual strands that run through the three “anthropologist-philosophers” – Nietzsche, Scheler, and von Weizsäcker – here posited as “decisive” in guiding the speculative line of thought of the 20th century that sought to confirm the argument that all vital expression has an affective origin, from its elementary forms up to the highest stages of its development represented by consciousness. These are the psycho-biologist and neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp, the neuro-philosopher and psychiatrist Georg Northoff, and the celebrated neuroscientist, psychologist and philosopher Antonio Damasio.

That these three researchers reached similar conclusions in line with the presuppositions of the philosophers mentioned above and supported by the argument made in this paper is of great significance. At the same time, there are important differences in their approaches and

methodologies.

Jaak Panksepp and his team set out to investigate animal affects and emotions, looking at mammals in particular in order to draw conclusions about the higher stages of human emotions, from a basis of anatomical and physiological study of both the cerebral organ and its procedural and reticular functioning, described by Panksepp as an organ constituted by seven affective systems forming the core of emotive expression. Panksepp conducts his inquiry from a perspective strongly influenced by psychobiology.

The “organs” identified by Panksepp exist in the archaic subcortical regions of the brains of mammals. They contain at least seven basic affective systems: *research* (anticipation, desire), *fear* (anxiety), *anger* (rage), *sexual desire* (sexual arousal), *caring* (nurturing), *panic/suffering* (sadness), *play* (social joy). The study of these seven constitutive emotive/affective systems demonstrates that the evolutionary anthropo-genetic process is founded in affects and that their regulated and highly interconnected functional expression is strongly implicated in the pathologies of connection that manifest themselves in psychiatric disturbances.

Georg Northoff, on the other hand, along with other important contributors such as Eric Kandel [Kandel 2018] uses a neuro-philosophical methodological approach and takes his cue from an understanding of the psychiatric pathologies as manifestations of cerebral pathologies that alter the articulation of the arc of fundamental relations – specific-self → related-self → self-environment – in their interceptive/exteroceptive significance. As with Panksepp, Northoff’s work demonstrates the essential character of the affective dimension as an indispensable interface between the body and its environment in the neural elaboration of the brain [Northoff 2016].

Lastly, Antonio Damasio, who adopts the empirical-hermeneutic research methodology of the “classical philosophy” of the neurosciences, focuses on a philosophical hermeneutic of the cultural event, described and analysed in its principle forms, with the objective of demonstrating the elements of decisive biocultural continuity between transformative processes and bioregulatory affective cerebral processes. These processes form the foundation of the *homeostatic imperative* [Damasio,

2018] and appear to evolve in the direction of, or at least be strongly guided by, the symbolic cultural dimension and the construction of the cultural mind precisely from this affective basis.

The critical importance of these inquiries, aimed at demonstrating the determining character of the empirical existence of affects in the vital plane, comes from the criticism of the “philosophy of the mind” tradition’s interpretation of the emotions. Jaak Panksepp, through his systematic empirical study of the psychobiology of animal emotions, demonstrates that affects are not classifiable as cognitive re-readings of the bodily organism’s physiological modifications and that, to the contrary, they originate in the deepest “non-cognitive”, i.e. non-cortical, layers of the cerebral structures. These are cerebral structures that do not in fact require any cognitive, so cortical, feedback to be turned into “experiences”.

For this reason, affects are present in many animals, certainly in all mammals and many birds, and it can indeed be hypothesised that they are present in all animals, though it is difficult to empirically study their manifestations [Panksepp *et al.* 2012]. The numerousness of the different complex biochemical responses that take place in different deep- (third-level) and middling- (second-level) level subcortical areas in comparison with those that take place in first-level or superficial areas show that affective activity is present, even in the case of “lived experiences”, for example, with cognitive or learning content in animals (rats) that have been decorticated (for the purposes of experimental investigation). Even in such cases the test animals’ behaviour shows a capacity to learn, according to the logic of preference or avoidance, and displays unequivocal progressive cognition and a tendency towards acting in response to the environment, even in the absence of the cerebral cortex. As such, this behaviour can be defined as both affective behaviour (from the Latin *affectus* which comes from *afficere*, “to be touched or impressed”, or from *ad ficere*, “to do something for/toward someone”) and, at the same time, cognitive behaviour. Indeed, such behaviour expresses a new “tendency” in the test-animals, consequential to having “been impressed”, thus modified, and as such to having been “set in motion towards” something (emotion = *ex moveo* in Latin) that has not previously been “experienced” and which is successively either

repeated, looked-for, shunned or avoided.

In sum, all affective states as original expressions of the vital possess a certain level, even if minimal, of reflectivity, without which they could not be cognitive.

Affective experiences therefore have a depth and an autonomy, as well as a level of reflectivity, that means that in a certain sense they function regardless of cortical ability to represent them. This proposition thus marks a departure from the position of many authoritative philosophers of the mind, who still today assert that it is only via cortical feedback that this reflectivity renders affective experiences aware and cognitive, and so fundamental for understanding the nature of the mind.

Taking it further, we could even say that cognitive science is not necessary for knowledge based on affect. In short, against all the traditional schools of thought, it seems possible to assert that there is no difference between “having an emotion” and “feeling an emotion” [Panksepp 1998] – a correction to the position maintained up until very recently even by Damasio, who nevertheless remains a pioneer of the rehabilitation of the emotions. Damasio had believed that there was a difference between the two emotional dimensions and that as such there was a necessity to mediate, *through feedback*, between “having had” an emotion (subcortical level) and “feeling” the emotion (cognitive cortical level). In his recent *The Strange Order of Things* [Damasio 2018], however, where he argued the existence of a “continuity” in the construction of the cultural mind between the biological affective homeostatic plane and the affective plane, this equivalence is finally acknowledged through a further valorisation of the essential and cognitive significance of the affective dimension, even at the pre-cortical level – and even in the absence of cortical feedback – «because basic homeostasis remains aligned to some extent, with negative or positive affect» [Damasio 2018, 106] and, above all, «[t]he complete absence of feelings would spell a suspension of being, but even a less radical removal of feeling would compromise human nature» [Damasio 2018, 101]. Therefore, in their original, constitutive and procedural being, much more than being considered “states” of the “body/brain/mind/environment”, affects and *emotional feelings* are *relations* and «can be characterized neither as the domain of the body nor of the environment» [Northoff 2016, 135-136].

On the contrary, emotional feelings «reflect the balance and continuous adjustment between the brain's neural activity (as the insula) in relation to body and environment [...]. [...] emotional feelings can be located neither in the brain nor in body and environment». They are therefore «our experience of this balance» [Northoff 2016, 135-136].

As far as the anthropological-philosophical implications are concerned, it seems then that within the empirical scientific debate it is becoming ever more reasonable to think of the original nature of life as affective and of consciousness as an original *relational* process with the character of «a subjective feeling about something». As such we should consider «emotions to be a foundational component of consciousness», for which cortication is not indispensable if they are to manifest themselves and be experienced [Gazzaniga 2018, 146].

The hypothesis can be taken further: «If these feelings existed before cortical tissues, then the special wiring of these subcortical networks alone must possess what is necessary to produce the feelings that accompany conscious experience» [Gazzaniga 2018, 146]. If the connection between neural, corporal (interceptive) and environmental (exteroceptive) stimuli is property of the cerebral material, «the construction of this threefold interrelation between brain, body, and environment is directly associated with emotional feelings. Emotional feelings are consequently relational» [Northoff 2016, 139].

As such, «emotional feelings provide access to the world and our existence as part of that very same world». Thus, «they ground our existence [...] emotional feelings are existential» [Northoff 2016, 139].

The fracture in the relationship between the world and the brain, between the world and the mind, between the world and consciousness empirically demonstrates the failure of these equilibriums with the consequent appearance of the great psycho-neuro-cerebral-functional pathologies, such as the depressive pathologies or schizophrenia. There is, in other words, a kind of interruption or “tearing” of the homeostatic function, at all levels be that biochemical or biopsychic, paving the way for psychiatric disturbances of greater or lesser degree.

It therefore seems possible to assert that Nietzsche's “enhancement of affects”; Scheler's original “affective impulse” (*Gefühlsdrang*) that animates the *psychicity* of life; and Weizsäcker's relational anthropology

of the *Pathosophie* as the original constitutive “fundamental relation” (*Grund-Verhältnis*) of the living and as regulative activity understood as equilibrium or disequilibrium between the potentialities of the “modal verbs” or the *pathischen Kategorien* constituting *pathisches Pentagramm*, were all theories aimed at critically restoring the unity of late-19th century and early-20th century anthropological-philosophical thought, in line with a conception of humanity as essentially founded “within” the vital process, understood as expression of the affects. These strands of thought are brought together in the current empirical research on the cerebral and neuro-functional structures of the brain aimed at establishing the constitutive nature of the affective processes of the vital as a dimension coincident to the psychic. The ideas of these three thinkers thus anticipated the “anthropological turn” of the 20th century, a turning point in the history of our understanding of the nature of the human.

The anthropological turn is geared towards granting new significance to the living and to the “living-man”. Through empirical investigation it aims to provide understanding of the vital processes that, despite identification with the organic world of concrete affects, still have ideal worth, and so there is value in the theoretical effort to philosophically represent them in the specific character and uniqueness of their significant expression.

4. *Technopathy*

Starting from this premise of the affective origins of life and of “affective consciousness” as the human’s apical performance, the second part of this paper on *Technopathy* will briefly consider the frequent and historically recurrent fears of an “anthropological break” represented by the triumph of technology¹⁰ and understood as the risk or threat of

¹⁰ It is useful to clarify the substantial difference between the terms “technique” and “technology”. The term “technique” (*techné*) should be understood as that which concerns man’s behaviour in regard to nature aimed at producing material goods that improve the conditions of life, something that has accompanied man since the very beginning of his existence. Technique therefore concerns the “art of producing instruments” or manufactured goods capable of bettering man’s living conditions and his living environment. Technology (*techné* and *logos*), meanwhile, should be under-

“evolutionary derailment”. These ideas made an early appearance in Scheler’s reflections on the image of the *homo dyonisiacus* [Scheler 1926, 120-144] but were epitomised in the works of Günther Anders [Anders 1956/2002].

Technological hypertrophy – which in its “counter-affective” or “anaffective” paradigm of pure additive functional enhancement is based on the reduction of the vital to algorithmic measurability and thus renders the vital functional purely to indifferent performative data, even to the point of working towards the design of a world governed by a «definitive algorithm» [Domingos 2015] – represents the beginning of an “empty” evolutionary development and seems to give rise to a distancing of the self (understood as the original affective expression of life) through a hypertrophied “consciousness” which is conceived as purely cognitive (measuring/calculating) and paradoxically becomes saturated in an inexpressive “technopathy” destructive of passion and affects. The “technological imperative” which now counter-poses itself to the

stood as the *logos*, the human *ratio*, or the “cosmic order”, which transforms itself into the *techné*. This should be understood as that epochal passage where, rather than “reason” creating technical instruments to expand and consolidate its presence in the world by achieving greater “habitability” for man (according to the ancient definition of the term *Ethos*), disincarnating abstraction that quantitatively formalises the world, expelling any kind of quality from the world. *Techno-logy* should be therefore understood as the process by which, according to Nietzsche’s definition, “reason” is no longer “a system of relations between passions and desires” of the body, but rather, as *technology*, has become the same ordering principle of the world, the *techno-cosmos*, from which bodily passions are consequently excluded: take away passion and the body disappears; once the body has disappeared “reason” also disappears. Consequently, once the body and its reasons have disappeared, man disappears. What remains is a *techno-logos*, a *logos* as technology or a *logos* that should be understood as a progressive disembodiment and de-pathicisation of the world; a negation of the origin, hence an anti-biological, anti-vital and anti-affective *logos* hypostatized as *techno-logical* and logical-formal conceptualisations – an algorithmic metaphysic. As such, the *techno-logy* should always be thought of in conjunction with the *bios* as *bio-techno-logy*, where the addition of *bios*, aside from referring to life as such, refers to life’s *procedural* and *transformational* character, hence its *dynamic* and *affective* character. On the technicization of science and, in particular, on the systematic use of the term “technoscience” see the works of G. Hottois, in particular, Hottois 1990, and also Broers 2005.

aforementioned “homeostatic imperative” seems intent on superseding the affective-reflective aspects of life and thus – if we are looking at it within the theoretical framework of the “higher-order (affective) consciousness” – on tending towards becoming a psychopathological “death drive”, set on the annihilation of that affective and evolutive cerebral self that became human consciousness through the obsessive pursuit of the exponential development of an exclusively cognitive consciousness, in other words, set on the pursuit of a logico-quantitative consciousness, something which seems to be a contradiction. The risk is, then, that consciousness, and so life, are condemned to death. The central argument of this paper is that consciousness as cognitive activity is necessarily “emotive” and affective. Without emotions and feelings, without the “affective-reflective state”, everything is calculable but nothing can be experienced, so nothing is knowable.

Before we sit back and watch this emotional annihilation carried out to completion, it is worth recounting the regression of the affective dimension generated by the technological imperative: the transformation of *technomania* into *technopathy*. «As we rave through the all-night honeymoon party that is technological progress, it’s salutary to think about the hangover – the price to be paid tomorrow, and forever» [Leonhard 2016, iv]. Cognitive engineering enhances human performance, yet the question is never posed as to the effects of the resulting affective uprooting.

Indeed, this pathological cognitive enhancement by means of technology (technopathy) seems to be becoming ever less sustainable in affective-emotional terms due to what we could describe as a growing emotional impasse, a phenomenon that as early as the 1950s was being described as “Promethean disparity”. This “Promethean disparity” is so-called because it refers not only to Anders’ assertion: «daß also nicht nur das Volumen dessen, was wir herstellen, tun oder denken können, grösser ist als das Volumen dessen, was unsere Vorstellung oder gar unser Fühlen leisten kann; sondern daß das Volumen des Machens und Denkens *ad libitum* ausdehnbar ist, während die Ausdehnbarkeit des Vorstellens ungleich geringer bleibt; und die des Fühlens im Vergleich

damit geradezu starr zu bleiben scheint»¹¹ [Anders 1956/2002, 270-71]. The burden of such a radical change risks *less* endangering the presumptuous idea of the domination of “classical-modern” rationality, fixated on incessant *doing* (*homo faber*) and justified by the urgency of knowledge – indeed, the Promethean disparity is merely a further form of its realisation –, and *more* the irrevocable hollowing out of the patriarchy of the *cogito*. This is a *cogito* that, as argued above, is radically immersed in the affects, in *feeling* “sensitive”; it is evolved *affective reason* that promotes and orders the affects, passions and feelings original to life. If, as with Nietzsche, «every passion [possesses] its quantum of reason» and reason itself is «a state of relationship between all the various passions and desires» [Nietzsche 1881-1889/2015, chapter 387] then it is precisely that *feeling* that makes of us inter-active *people*, subjects of de-cision, lovers, de-sirers, aware and “free” erotic subjectivities.

The development over the course of the last thirty years of information technology and the internet driven by impetuous technological “progress” has quickly revealed its true face, becoming the last strategic invention of power which marks the birth of those «attitudes of thought generated by technology» [Lorenz 1983, 8]. These new technologies exist, moreover, as part of literal *psychopolitics*, as even more efficient forms of subjugation and “submission”. Indeed, the human subject, «[a] s a project deeming itself free of external and alien limitations [...] is now subjugating itself to internal limitations and self-constraints, which are taking the form of compulsive achievement and optimization [...] [i] n so far as it willingly exploits itself without a master, it is an *absolute slave*» [Han 2014/2017, 2].

Contemporary man thus comes to be transformed into the neoliberal servant and gradually stripped of all forms of sovereignty. The “technological imperative” in its virtual and informatic nature becomes a genuine “psychopolitics” which – annihilating the affective or at least

¹¹ «the volume of that which we can produce, do or think [calculate] is not only superior to the volume of that which our imagination is capable of containing or, even less, of that which our feeling is capable of containing; but the volume of doing and thinking [calculating] can be expanded *ad libitum*, while the expandability of the imagination is incomparably less; the expandability of feeling, moreover, seems to even be inexistent»

reducing it to an elementary drive through the gradual replacement of the “homeostatic imperative” – has already taken over from the biopolitical model the traditional form of the exercise of power in the industrial age that operates through the systems of governance of physical-material bodies: the prison, the hospital, the school, the army, etc.

In this way, the metaphorical *material panopticon* represented by Bentham’s prison design is substituted by the similarly effective, yet invisible *digital panopticon*, whereby man is “used” and reduced to pure drive-driven impetuses, starting from his very intentions and emotions. Hidden behind its digital infrastructure, technology acts upon him, “re-hierarchising” his affective systems and reconstructing a new emotional order stripped down to its most basic level – do for the sake of doing, do to repeat the doing, do to depend on doing, in an insatiable obsessive-compulsive repetition that results in *functioning* rather than *existing* [Benasayag 2019]. From a social perspective, the “technopathic” man operates and works “happily” for the exploitation of himself, offering himself, through his denudation and through the “transparentisation” of all of his interiorities, to the algorithmic architectures that *re-constitute* him in a different place, profiling his identity and – in a game of feedback between the subject’s virtually expressed desires and the tailored possibilities that are offered by the *pre-disposed* algorithm – *re-structuring* his affective identity according to the algorithm’s objectives. At this point, the technological system reduces itself to whatever form necessary to fulfil those desires. Man for his part is progressively reduced to his unique-form, as willed by power as technical system, «under the banner of ‘tolerance’, with the simply liberalisation of pleasure» [Revelli 2012, 79] – a primitive pleasure, occasional and ephemeral, designed to make lived life coincide with an obsessive simulation of a non-experienced life.

Thus we arrive at a situation where human rationality is reduced to «a relation between things», starting from «the most ‘vital’ of relations, the erotic relation between bodies» [Revelli 2012, 84], by means of which an unusual and lethal “subterranean region” is uncovered: that of the destructive and an-affective «techno-environment», as «technology is completely nihilist when it comes to the things that are meaningful to us humans» [Leonhard 2016, 18].

Technopathy acts as the driving force of exteriorising change through a technological prothesis characterised by a profiling algorithmic manipulation that reduces creative biological “sense-neuro-production” – based on overabundance and “waste”, or rather, “redundancy” – to mere numerical and functional datum. This triumphant and threatening *dataism* then conceives of and puts into action the idea according to which «exactly the same mathematical laws apply to both biochemical and electronic algorithms. Dataism thereby collapses the barrier between animals and machines, and expects electronic algorithms to eventually decipher and outperform biochemical algorithms» [Harari 2015, 367]. It seems ever more difficult, then, to bridge the gap opened up between a biotic interiority – ever more in danger of being reduced to an emotional desert or, in the best case scenario, of being exposed to the risk of a purely drive-driven and mostly pharmacologically modulated technopathic involution – and the outside world “reduced” to techno-environment. In the current anthropological model saturated by techno-scientific “governmental power” based on big data and algorithms, we see a truly *nihilist ideology* which «gives up on any and all meaning. Data and numbers are not narrative; they are additive. Meaning, on the other hand, is based on narration» [Han 2014/2017, 59]. This marks the growing disproportion between the affects which, being evolutive, are narrative or historical, and their meanings which in their digitality are reduced to their merely additive conclusion. The dynamic effects of this dataism are exercised through silent and hidden induction and orientation – albeit with the full collaboration of the user, the internet navigator that, simply by navigating, hands over his complex affective self (his motivational and decisional deep-level dimensions) with his typed communications to a server that reduces them to a unique result, constructed, as with all algorithms, from the bare elements, on atomicity, non-ambiguity, finiteness, termination and effectiveness. As such the user/server relationship is turned on its head and becomes server/user: the user becomes servant and the server becomes utiliser. This means that, in order to be effective, the systematic applications of algorithms to the hidden world of affects have to provide *apriori* the result with its uniqueness. Far more than the algorithm’s «virtually despotic character» [Zellini 2018, 13], what this reveals is the definitive coloni-

sation and reduction “to one” of man’s complex psychophysical unity, with data power’s total possession over, once-free, bio-psycho-affective privacy and autonomy.

Here we are lead back to the decisive argument concerning affects, passions and *feelings*. As much as they may be neglected or even opposed in the philosophical tradition, or exclusively *utilised* in the contemporary *dataist* culture as a commodity, affects, passions and feelings remain essential for being who we are. «The idea, in essence, is that cultural activity began and remains deeply embedded in feeling» [Damasio 2018, 5]. If we understand life as having as originating in the dimension of affective expression – a supposition currently in the process of greater clarification through empirical studies in the field of bio-neuro-psyche pathology [Northoff 2016; Kandel 2018] – then we can also put forward a theory of an affective root of “higher-order consciousness” in its cognitive expression and of the consequent development of human culture. Hence we can also think of technopathy as the development of pathological, or at least regressive, affective processes that associate it, e.g., with the range of “unipathic” modalities that the phenomenologist Scheler used to describe the anthropological differences between “co-feeling” (*mit-fühlen*) as a principle of an ethics of the affects, based on the recognition of the “*other than the self*”, and the different variants of the “genuine unipathy” (*echte Einsfühlung*) that all display the pathological trait of confusing, either actively or passively and in various modalities, the “self” with the “*other than the self*” in an illogical identificatory and fusional pathological dimension pervaded by uniformity and indifferent indistinction [Scheler 1913-1923, 29-38].

Without falling back on now obsolete technophobic and technophilic attitudes, we must nevertheless ask ourselves whether the monocratic «technological system» [Ellul 1977/1980; 1988] – whose possible consequences also force other equally relevant questions from both political and ethical perspectives – may represent a real threat to man and life, understood as having a unique and original affective root, as it could trigger a process of affective regression with the potential to culminate in a radical regression, if not the complete annihilation, of not just the human but all living expression. While discussion of technological aggression of the environment has become a frequent theme, we in fact

need only look at the human level to see signs of danger. If studies carried out on bio-neuro-psychical pathologies show clearly the key role of the affects in such pathologies and the indissoluble links between emotional drives and elementary affects, as they have also demonstrated the affective origins of life and of consciousness, these pathologies can equally be typical manifestations of technopathy. Internet Addiction Disorder (IAD), the spread of young *hikikomori*, the proliferation of cases of Internet Fatigue Syndrome (IFS), as well as ADHD, borderline personality disorder¹² and burnout syndrome (BD) [Han 2010/2015] are the principal pathologies that have materialised alongside the arrival and growth of technological interaction. Added to these are the numerically increasing manifestations of the strictly psychiatric disorders such as depression and schizophrenia which have begun to exist in intermediate as well as full-blown forms [Kandel 2018].

As such, it would be wise to question the extent to which it is possible to consider “technological mediation” as an effectively *trans*-formative synthesis, necessarily implying that it is also a means of *con*-serving the human. Does technology, in other words, permit man the conservation of himself that would be necessary to render him capable of transforming himself? Indeed, if this transformation or surpassing of oneself is intended as a *pro-ceeding*, or an *over*-taking, this necessarily implies man’s conservation of himself. Were this surpassing to take place without conservation, a fracture would be opened, a glitch, a void – it would,

¹² «Borderline personality disorder is a mental illness marked by an ongoing pattern of varying moods, self-image, and behavior. These symptoms often result in impulsive actions and problems in relationships. People with borderline personality disorder may experience intense episodes of anger, depression, and anxiety that can last from a few hours to days. People with borderline personality disorder may experience mood swings and display uncertainty about how they see themselves and their role in the world. As a result, their interests and values can change quickly. People with borderline personality disorder also tend to view things in extremes, such as all good or all bad. Their opinions of other people can also change quickly. An individual who is seen as a friend one day may be considered an enemy or traitor the next. These shifting feelings can lead to intense and unstable relationships. Signs and symptoms include [...] a pattern of intense and unstable relationships with family, friends, and loved ones, often swinging from extreme closeness and love (idealization) to extreme dislike or anger (devaluation) [...]» [National Institute of Mental Health *n.d.*].

in short, generate a radical *other* – and what would appear within this void would be “*other-than-human*”.

It is for this reason that it has become necessary to open a philosophical-anthropological investigation of ethical-critical scope into the *homo bio-technoinformaticus*. In order to conserve himself as *homo* – albeit now liberated from the “humanistic” framework, historically comprehensible but latterly revealed as presumptuous and fallacious, hence unjustifiable – man “must” *over-take* himself by means of technological science. At the same time, however, he must not “betray” himself; he must not negate himself. The “technological system” that has become *technopathic*, in that it seeks the negation of man through the progressive “dis-qualification” of his innumerable capacities through their replacement by *technology*, seems set on reducing the human to definitive *irrelevance* [Harari 2018] by leading him to the condition of functional indifference proper to the datum by means of the progressive elimination of the creative and cognitive affective horizon of the sentiments. To avoid this fate, man must be-tra-y himself, transport himself, trans-late himself, take himself *beyond*, to the point of becoming “*other-than-human*” (“even more human”) and therefore no longer an anthropocentric, self-referred entity, nor an entity reduced to the inert and *sense-less* “thingness” of the datum, but a pluri-centric and other-referential affective living being, capable of constructing relationships with every *other* alterity through the enhancement of its “affective system” which is also its consciousness, or rather, living affective *psychicity*. Only thus can he become “ultra-human”, *beyond-human*, and so, perhaps only in this sense *posthuman* [Masullo 2008, 41]. To preserve and transform himself, in arriving at the new condition of bio-techno-entity [Masullo 2011], the man that *is to come* needs to cultivate affects and feelings, avoiding his reduction to the “sea of data”, a dead ocean where he would inevitably lose himself. Cultivating the *ocean-sea* as a total *sum* of the affective expression of the living and *feeling* his belonging to the totality of affects, he must rather continue to project himself not as a dead entity – an indifferent, executing *techno-entity* – but as a *bio-techno-entity*, a performative, sensitive and sentient being, a *living actor*, liberated from technological unipathic tyranny, once again open to multiple affects, that is, to the destiny of a “multi-pathic” self whose

encounter with technology represents a further prospective opening, an affectively motivated (*e-motivated*) occasion within the trajectory of its completely human necessity of *trans-formation*.

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Keywords

Anthropogenesis; Technopathy; Affects; Feelings; Pathic; Consciousness; Self; Life; Psychicity; Algorithm

Abstract

The first part of this paper takes as its starting premise the existence of what was defined by Max Scheler at the start of the 20th century as the coincidence between the psychic and the living (*The Human Place in the Cosmos*, 1927). The establishment of this coincidence allows us to form a conception of the “psychicity (*Psychizität*) of life,” i.e. to form a provisional definition of consciousness as manifest expression that both has its roots and extends its highest branches in the evolutive dimension of “the affective”, coming eventually to assume the form and mode particular to “higher-order consciousness”. This higher-order consciousness likely represents the highest level, or the most complex and interconnected level, of the totality of existing manifestations of the vital, understood as the totality of the vital as affectivity, and is today the subject of empirical investigation in the field of the philosophy of neuroscience, a line of inquiry that was anticipated in particular (though not exclusively) by the late 19th and early 20th century philosophical anthropologies of Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Scheler and Viktor von Weizsäcker.

The second part of this article, *Technopathy*, looks at the modern-day pathological “neo-development” of the self, viewed as a progressive distancing of the self from its vital plane, i.e. from the affective. This distancing is generated by an insatiable craving for cognitive consciousness (calculating/quantitative), “animated” by the only passion that it seems to have retained: the passion for technology. Such distancing is pathological in the sense that it results in the regression and erosion of the “animal” passions and affects expressed by the living body, leading potentially to their total eradication. This trend poses a serious threat to the future of humanity.

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GUIDO CUSINATO

DIE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES *ORDO AMORIS*
IN DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS
UND BIN KIMURAS¹

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS: 1. Einleitung; 2. Scheler und die phänomenologische Psychopathologie; 3. Minimal self und Grundverhältnis; 4. In-der-Welt-Seins und In-die-Welt-sich-Positionieren; 5. Emotionen: Metabolisierung der Stimmungen in Gefühle; 6. Störungen des *ordo amoris*; 7. Pathologie des *ordo amoris*; 8. Woher kommt die „Ordnung“ des Fühlens?; 9. Scheler und die Begriffe des *Aidagara* (Watsuji); 10. Sympathetisches Grundverhältnis mit der Welt und Störungen des *Aida*; 11. Drei Stufen der Positionierung; 12. Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit; 13. Geburt der Subjektivität als Fest (*festum*); 14. Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit und Störungen des *ordo amoris*.

1. Einleitung

In diesem Aufsatz möchte ich die Frage nach dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie aus der Perspektive des deutschen Phänomenologen Max Scheler und der des japanischen Psychiaters Bin Kimura neu überdenken. Bisher wurde kein Vergleich zwischen diesen beiden Autoren

¹ Dieser Beitrag ist die leicht veränderte Version eines am 26. März 2017 an der 20. *Hitotsubashi International Conference* in Tokyo gehaltenen Vortrags. Ich bedanke mich herzlich bei Professor Yasushi Kato für die Einladung nach Japan, beim *Merleau-Ponty Circle of Japan* sowie bei den Herausgebern der japanischen Zeitschrift *Les études merleau-pontiennes* für die Aufnahme der japanischen Version dieser Arbeit in ihre Zeitschrift [Cusinato 2020], bei Professor Takashi Kakuni für die Vermittlung zum *Merleau-Ponty Circle of Japan* und bei Dr. Riku Yokoyama und Herrn Shunsuke Kudomi für ihre präzise und anregende Arbeit bei der Übersetzung ins Japanische der ursprünglichen Fassung. Mein Dank gilt auch Dr. Rie Shibuya für ihre Unterstützung bei der Übersetzung aus dem Italienischen ins Deutsche sowie bei der Überarbeitung des deutschen und japanischen Übersetzungstextes. Die in diesem Beitrag dargestellten Gedanken wurden weiter entfaltet in: Cusinato 2018a.

angestellt, obwohl es mehrere Übereinstimmungen und Belege für einen indirekten Einfluss Schelers auf Bin Kimura durch Viktor von Weizsäcker gibt.

In den letzten Jahren haben Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass und Josef Parnas den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie in Bezug auf eine Störung auf der Ebene des *minimal self* ausgelegt. In der Folge hat die Diskussion die Bedeutung hervorgehoben, die die Störungen auf der Ebene der «Zwischenleiblichkeit» und «Intersubjektivität» (Thomas Fuchs) und auf der Ebene der «existentiellen Gefühle» (Matthew Ratcliffe) für den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie haben.

In Schelers Perspektive ist der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie das Ergebnis einer axiologischen Störung auf der Ebene der *Wertnehmung* (*valueception*), die den Kontakt mit dem Lebensdrang der Natur beeinträchtigt. Als Folge davon ist eine Person unfähig, Formen der emotionalen Mit-Teilung (*emotional sharing*) zu erleben, und dazu gezwungen, sich in eine solipsistische Welt zurückzuziehen. In eine ähnliche Richtung bewegt sich Bin Kimura, der die Welt von Personen mit Schizophrenie als Ergebnis einer Störung des *Aida* – eines der zentralen Konzepte der japanischen Kultur, das den Raum des „Zwischen“ anzeigt – interpretiert. Die Störung des *Aida* beeinträchtigt das Grundverhältnis im Sinne von Viktor von Weizsäcker und verhindert das, was Bin Kimura als *festum* bezeichnet, d.h. die Geburt der Subjektivität, so dass sie von Personen mit Schizophrenie nur als *ante festum* erlebt wird.

Ausgehend von diesen beiden Perspektiven, argumentiere ich, dass es eine axiologische und anthropogenetische Dimension der Psychopathologie gibt. Ich fange mit einer Untersuchung über die historische Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Entstehung der phänomenologischen Psychopathologie an. Daraufhin gehe ich der Frage über das Verhältnis von Zahavis Begriff des «*minimal self*» zum *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie nach und versuche, auch im Bezug auf Matthew Ratcliffes These der «existentiellen Gefühle» eine Theorie der drei Arten der Positionierung in die Realität zu entfalten. Anschließend führe ich die Begriffe «Störung des *Aida*» (Bin Kimura) und «Störung des *ordo amoris*» (Max Scheler) ein. Abschließend entwickle ich das Konzept einer «Psychopathologie des *ordo amoris*» im Sinne einer Psychopathologie der Störungen der Positionierung in die Welt.

2. Scheler und die phänomenologische Psychopathologie

Scheler war zusammen mit Husserl einer der wichtigsten Exponenten der deutschen Phänomenologie. Als er 1906 seine Lehrtätigkeit in München anfang, begann er auch, in einem Psychiaterkreis zu verkehren, der sich damals in München um Wilhelm Specht (1874-1945) gebildet hatte. Er veröffentlichte 1911 und 1912 zwei von seinen ersten Aufsätzen in der von Specht herausgegebenen Zeitschrift für Pathopsychologie, unter deren Verfassern sich auch Karl Jaspers befand. Diese Aufsätze sind jeweils die ursprüngliche Fassung von zwei der wichtigsten Arbeiten Schelers: Die Abhandlung *Über Selbsttäuschungen* [Scheler 1912], die darauffolgend überarbeitet wurde und 1915 unter dem Titel *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis* [Scheler GW III, 213-292] erschien, und die erste Version der Abhandlung über *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*, die ursprünglich einen richtungsweisenden Untertitel hatte: *Ein Beitrag zur Pathopsychologie der Kultur* [Scheler GW III, 33-147]. Bekannt wurde Scheler in diesem Gebiet vor allem für seine Analysen über die Melancholie und für seine Idee, dass es an der Basis der Melancholie eine besonders schwere Störung des Fühlens gibt, die als an-affektive Apathie oder «Fühllosigkeit» verstanden werden und den Kontakt mit der expressiven Dimension des Lebensdrangs gefährden kann.²

Den Kern der Analyse Schelers zur Psychopathologie bildet die 1912 erschienene Abhandlung *Über Selbsttäuschungen*, die dann in leicht veränderter Fassung unter dem Titel *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis* (1915) erneut veröffentlicht wurde. Es handelt sich um Seiten von außergewöhnlicher Relevanz für die phänomenologische Psychopathologie, die aber bis jetzt in der Forschung unberücksichtigt geblieben sind. Die Intensität, mit der sich Scheler dem Thema der Psychopathologie widmet, wird in seinen darauffolgenden Arbeiten nie wieder erreicht. Es ist, als ob der Kern dieser in einem Zug verfassten Untersuchungen für Scheler wie ein Dietrich dazu diente, eine Tür zu öffnen, die Husserls Phänomenologie noch für lange Zeit verschlossen bleiben

² Zum Begriff der Melancholie und zum Zusammenhang zwischen Melancholie und *Fühllosigkeit* vgl. Scheler GW I, 140; III, 264; IV, 186; VII, 25; VII, 27. Zum Thema «Scheler und die Psychopathologie» vgl. Cutting 2009.

wird, die Tür nämlich, die zu der Thematisierung der Werte sowie der affektiven Sphäre führt.³

Bereits in der Fassung von 1912 werden bestimmte psychopathologische Symptome mit Störungen sowohl auf der Ebene der Bewegungsmotivation des Leibs als auch auf der sprachlichen Ebene wie Stottern und Aphasie in Verbindung gebracht. Schelers Interesse liegt vor allem darin, die psychopathologische Natur der Störungen der Wertnehmung im Zusammenhang mit der präreflexiven Intentionalität des Leibes zu betrachten. Scheler stellt die Hypothese auf, dass im pathologischen Phänomen eine Umkehr der vorherrschenden Perspektive stattfindet [vgl. Scheler *GW* III, 258-259], die den Patienten dazu bringt, die Aufmerksamkeit vom Ziel oder Sinn der Handlung auf eine einzelne Bewegung zu verlagern. In einer Situation der ›Normalität‹ ist der Leib eines Individuums automatisch in der Lage, sich zu bewegen und zu handeln, ohne dass es darüber nachdenken muss, was es tut. Im Falle bestimmter psychopathologischer Störungsbilder versucht das Individuum hingegen, das fehlende Funktionieren der präreflexiven Intentionalität des Leibs mit einer Hyperreflexivität zu kompensieren, die sich auf einzelne Bewegungen konzentriert, die es vollziehen muss, um z.B. einen Gegenstand zu greifen: «Der Kranke, der das Zimmer verlassen „will“, verweilt bei dem Inhalt „zur Türe gehen“ und dann „die Klinke drücken“ usw.» [Scheler 1912, 124; vgl. auch *GW* 3, 258, 303]. Im *Formalismus* nimmt Scheler dieses Thema wieder auf und beobachtet, dass «es doch geradezu ein Gesetz zu nennen [ist], dass automatische Lebenstätigkeiten (auch psychische) in dem Maße *gestört* werden und erkranken, als sie bewußt vollgezogen und von bewußter Wahl und Aufmerksamkeit begleitet werden» [Scheler *GW* II, 290; Scheler 1927/2014, 356]. Die Handlung des Raumverlassens wird in viele einzelne, durch Zwischenziele markierte Bewegungen zerteilt. Die grundlegende Hypothese, die aus diesen Seiten hervorgeht, ist, dass im *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie ein Prozess des *disembodiment* stattfindet, bei dem die Fähigkeit beeinträchtigt wird, Bewegungen automatisch auszuführen, sodass es notwendig wird, diesen Mangel durch eine hyperreflexive Haltung auszugleichen: Das Sich-Konzentrieren darauf, wie man

³ Hierzu ausführlicher vgl. Cusinato 2018a, 173-176.

eine bestimmte Bewegung durchführt, um die Türklinke zu greifen, kommt daher, dass man sich ohne jenes implizite Schema vorfindet, das die präreflexive Intentionalität des Leibes unter normalen Bedingungen automatisch bildet. Es ist, als ob in all diesen Pathologien die präreflexive Intentionalität des Leibes, d.h. die Orientierungsfunktion, die der Leib dank des Leibschemas im Alltag implizit ausführt, gestört wäre. Eine derartige Beschreibung bestätigen die Forschungen über den *modus vivendi* der schizophrenen Person (vgl. z.B. Minkowskys Untersuchung zum *rationalisme morbide* oder die 2003 von Sass und Parnas veröffentlichte Arbeit zur *Hyperreflexivität*).

Scheler zufolge findet sich ein ähnliches Phänomen auch bei den Sprachstörungen wie Stottern und Aphasie [Scheler *GW* III, 261], bei denen das Individuum, anstatt die Aufmerksamkeit auf den Sinn des Gesagten zu lenken, auf dem Gesagten verweilt und sich beispielweise auf die Bewegungen des Stimmapparats fixiert, die die Artikulation der Wörter ermöglichen [Scheler *GW* III, 258]. Diese Thesen übten vor allem Einfluss auf Merleau-Ponty aus.

Unter den Münchner Psychiatern war es Victor von Gebattel (1883-1976), der besonders von Scheler beeinflusst wurde. Er hatte mit Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926) an der psychiatrischen Klinik der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität gearbeitet. Angeregt wurde er von Scheler sowohl bei seiner Interpretation der Melancholie im Hinblick auf die *Entpersönlichung* [Gebattel 1959] als auch bei der Erarbeitung des Konzepts der Medizinischen Anthropologie [Gebattel 1954].

Kurt Schneider (1887-1967) promovierte 1921 bei Scheler in Philosophie in Köln nach seiner Psychologiepromotion 1919 in Tübingen. Im *Formalismus* (1913/1916) hatte Scheler vier Schichtungen des emotionalen Lebens herausgestellt, die jeweils die sinnlichen, die vitalen, die psychischen und die geistig-persönlichen Gefühle betreffen. Bei seiner Klassifizierung verschiedener Depressionsformen hat Schneider Schelers Unterscheidung vor allem zwischen der vitalen und der psychischen Ebene berücksichtigt [Schneider 1920]. In der Dissertation entwickelte Schneider sein anfängliches Projekt weiter und versuchte, weitere Formen der Psychopathologie herauszusuchen, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung der vierten geistig-persönlichen Ebene des affektiven Lebens, die Scheler darstellte. Schneiders Arbeiten zu diesem The-

ma sind bekanntlich von besonderer Relevanz für die Melancholieforschung, vor allem durch seine Unterscheidung zwischen der reaktiven und der endogenen Depression [vgl. Straus 1960, 138; Cutting et al. 2016]. Ebenfalls in den 1920er Jahren ließ sich der junge Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) einerseits von dem Begriff des „Psychischen“, wie ihn Scheler in der Abhandlung *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis* (1915) darstellte, andererseits von der Theorie der Fremdwahrnehmung beeinflussen, die Scheler in *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle* (1913) aufstellte [Biswanger 1922].

Ein weiterer Vertreter ersten Ranges für die phänomenologische Psychopathologie, Eugène Minkowski (1885-1972), nennt Bergson und Scheler ausdrücklich als die Philosophen, die ihn am meisten beeinflusst haben [Spiegelberg 1972, 236; Buda 2012, 10; Weckowicz & Liebel-Weckowicz 1990]. Minkowski näherte sich der Phänomenologie nicht durch Husserls *Logische Untersuchungen*, sondern durch Schelers *Sympathiebuch*: «Dies hat meiner Meinung nach dazu geführt, dass sich meine Bemühungen nicht unmittelbar auf die von den *Logischen Untersuchungen* gestellten Fragen, sondern vielmehr auf gewisse grundlegende Phänomene unserer Existenz richteten, die eben die Gefühle der Sympathie waren» [Minkowski 1966, 457, Anm. 1, Übersetzung von mir]. Eine ähnliche Distanz wahrt Minkowski auch gegenüber Heidegger: «Im Übrigen – warum es verschweigen? – haben Heideggers Begriffe auf mich niemals besonders anziehend gewirkt. Ich bin meinen Anfängen, der phänomenologischen Methode, treu geblieben» [Minkowsky 1966, 678-679, meine Übersetzung].

Eine explizite, relevante Wirkung hinterließ Schelers *Sympathiebuch* ferner noch bei Erwin Straus (1891-1975) [Arndt 2001] sowie bei Viktor von Weizsäcker, der seinerseits für Bin Kimura besonders maßgebliche Bedeutung hat [Weizsäcker 1987, 255; Arndt 2001, 39-40].⁴ Von Weizsäcker bezeichnet Scheler und Freud als die beiden wichtigsten Geburtshelfer seiner *Medizinischen Anthropologie* [Arndt 2001, 39-40]. Unter Schelers Werken ist es das *Sympathiebuch* (1913/1923), das am meisten von Weizsäckers Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zog.⁵ Und ge-

⁴ Zum Einfluss Schelers auf von Gebattel, von Weizsäcker und Frankl vgl. auch Arndt [2001].

⁵ Zur Relevanz des *Sympathiebuchs* für die Entfaltung der medizinischen Anthro-

rade unter dem Einfluss des *Sympathiebuchs* entfaltet von Weizsäcker den Gedanken des Grundverhältnisses zum Leben.

In jüngster Zeit hat der schottische Psychiater John Cutting zahlreiche Arbeiten über Schelers Bedeutung für die Psychopathologie veröffentlicht, wobei er seine Theorie der Reduktion als Bezugspunkt nimmt [Cutting 2009, 143-159; Cutting 2016, 220-228]. Nach Cutting sei es möglich, den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie als ein In-Klammern-Setzen vitaler Werte (in Richtung der phänomenologischen Reduktion) und den *modus vivendi* der Melancholie als ein In-Klammern-Setzen geistiger Werte (in Richtung der dionysischen Reduktion) zu interpretieren.⁶

3. Minimal self und Grundverhältnis

Zahavi zufolge ist das *minimal self* dasjenige, was uns ermöglicht, unseren Erfahrungen den «Charakter der Ersten Person» (*first-personal character*) und einen «Sinn der Jemeinigkeit» (*sense of mineness*) zu verleihen [Zahavi 2014]. Das *minimal self* sei eine ursprüngliche Einheit, ein Proto-Selbst, das auf einer prä-linguistischen Ebene schon in den ersten Tagen des Lebens eines Menschen präsent sei. Zahavis Standpunkt bezüglich des Zusammenhangs des *minimal self* mit der Dynamik des Erfahrungsstroms ist allerdings vielschichtig und nicht immer eindeutig. Man kann feststellen, dass er in *Subjectivity and Selfhood* [Zahavi 2006] das *minimal self* als «*experiential dimension*» vom unveränderlichen «*transcendental self*» im Kantischen Sinne abgrenzt. Dies scheint darauf hinzudeuten, dass die Dynamik des minimalen Selbst nicht in Richtung einer „Unveränderlichkeit“ im strengen Sinne des Wortes interpretiert werden kann.

Viele Probleme der aktuellen Debatte über den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie rühren nach Zahavi daher, dass man nicht genau angibt, auf welches Selbst – *minimal self* oder *narrative self* – man sich bezieht. Um dieser Schwierigkeit abzuhelfen, haben die Psychiater Louis Sass und Josef Parnas vorgeschlagen, den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie

logie Viktor von Weizsäcker vgl. von Weizsäcker [1948/1987, 255].

⁶ Zu einer Kritik der These Cuttings vgl. Cusinato 2018b.

als eine Störung auf der Ebene des *minimal self* zu betrachten [Sass 2014; Sass & Parnas 2013], und *the ipseity-disturbance model* (IDM) [Nelson *et al.* 2014] entwickelt. Zahavi kommt gewiss ein großer Verdienst zu, insofern als er die Grundlage für dieses Modell konzipiert hat. Völlig zurecht stellt er fest, dass die Frage nach dem Subjekt und der Individualität uns dazu auffordert, über den Begriff eines narrativen Selbst hinauszugehen, das sich nur auf einer sprachlichen Ebene konstituiert.

Bekanntlich sagte Hume im Hinblick auf die Frage nach der personalen Identität, dass wir nichts anderes seien als «*a bundle or collection of different perceptions*» [Hume 1793/2007, 252]. Von dieser Affirmation ausgehend, hat sich in der analytischen Philosophie sowie der *Philosophy of Mind* des letzten Jahrhunderts die Vorstellung verbreitet, dass das Selbst eine sprachlich vermittelte narrative Konstruktion sei. Nach der „starken Version“ dieser These taucht das Selbst nur dann auf, wenn die bewussten Wesen eine volle sprachliche Kompetenz entwickeln und die reflexiven Vermögen besitzen, die für das autobiographische Verständnis von sich selbst notwendig sind. Selbst Hume ist übrigens an diesem Punkt von den meisten Vertretern der ganzen *Philosophy of Mind* des letzten Jahrhunderts gravierend missverstanden worden: In dem II. und III. Buch des *Traktats* behauptet Hume klar und deutlich, dass das gleiche Selbst, das von dem Standpunkt des Verstandes aus nur als ein Bündel der Perzeptionen erscheint, von dem Standpunkt der *passions* her gesehen sich als ein «*moral self*» erweist [vgl. Cusinato 2014, 178-181].

Zahavi ist meines Erachtens vollkommen überzeugend, wenn er die Existenz eines *minimal self* behauptet, das dem narrativen Selbst vorangeht. Ein neugeborenes Kind besitzt zum Beispiel schon in dem Moment der Geburt ein *minimal self*, bevor es imstande sein wird zu sprechen. Ferner kann man die Existenz eines *minimal self* auch bei Tieren wie z.B. Schimpansen und Bonobos annehmen. Problematischer scheint mir aber die Beschreibung, die Zahavi von diesem *minimal self* gibt. Er nimmt wahrscheinlich Husserls Begriff des transzendentalen Ich auf und vertritt eine recht starke These: «*The experiential self [...] doesn't denote an experiential item or object, but rather denotes the very first-personal mode of experiencing*» [Zahavi 2014, 21-22]. Zahavi

vertritt die These, dass das *minimal self* die transzendente Bedingung der Erfahrung sei. Darin erkenne ich drei problematische Punkte:

1) Meines Erachtens ist es keineswegs notwendig, die prä-linguistische Ebene, auf der sich das ursprüngliche Selbst konstituiert, außerhalb der empirischen Dimension zu verlegen, da sie auf der Ebene der Korrelation zwischen Leib und Umwelt zu finden ist. In anderen Worten, es scheint mir gut möglich, die Frage nach der ursprünglichen Subjektivität im Sinne einer Ur-Subjektivität (*proto-self*), die alle Lebewesen auf der biosemiotischen Ebene betrifft, in Bezug auf die Art und Weise zu stellen, wie sich ein Organismus in der Umwelt positioniert und die expressiven Dimensionen des Leibes ausbildet. Auch der Leib eines Neugeborenen besitzt, um einen Terminus von Max Scheler zu benutzen, ein «Leibschema»,⁷ dem ein «Proto-Selbst» entspricht.

2) Zahavi behauptet zurecht, dass sich das *minimal self* auf der prä-sozialen Ebene aufbaut. Daraus folgt jedoch nicht, dass das *minimal self* nicht intrinsisch relational sei. Auch hier möchte ich mich auf den Standpunkt Schelers stützen, der Husserls Perspektive umkehrt und behauptet, dass der Ausgangspunkt nicht ein transzendentales Subjekt,

⁷ Oft wird der Begriff des *body schema* auf Paul Schilder und Maurice Merleau-Ponty zurückgeführt und selten erinnert man sich in diesem Zusammenhang an Schelers Beitrag. Scheler entfaltet den Begriff des Leibschemas zwischen 1926 und 1928 [vgl. Scheler *GW* VIII, 316, 355; *GW* IX, 34, 218]. Sehr wahrscheinlich stand er dabei unter dem Einfluss der Lehre von dem *Körperschema*, die Paul Schilder kurz zuvor in seiner Schrift *Das Körperschema. Ein Beitrag zur Lehre des Bewusstseins des eigenen Körpers* [Schilder 1923] dargestellt hatte. In diesem Zusammenhang darf man allerdings nicht außer Acht lassen, dass Schilder seinerseits die Bedeutung der von Scheler im *Formalismus* dargelegten Untersuchungen für seine Forschungen ausdrücklich anerkennt. Ferner kann man feststellen, dass Scheler gemäß seiner Unterscheidung des *Leibs* vom *Körper*, die er unabhängig von Husserl bereits in den Jahren 1909 bis 1911 deutlich gemacht hatte, Schilders Konzept des *Körperschemas* mit dem des *Leibschemas* ersetzt. Mit der zentralen Relevanz des Begriffs des Leibschemas in Schelers Philosophie sowie mit der von Scheler in den genannten beiden Jahren getroffenen Unterscheidung des Leibs von dem Körper habe ich mich ausführlich beschäftigt [Cusinato 2018a, 57-97]. Ausgehend vor allem von Schilder, ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten das Thema des *body schema* in der englischsprachigen Forschungsliteratur weit erörtert worden. Insbesondere 1996 entwickelte Shaun Gallagher [1986] diese Thematik und schlug vor, einen entscheidenden Unterschied zwischen *body schema* und *body image* herauszustellen.

sondern ein Organismus sei, der mit dem Rest des Lebens auf einer Ebene der Einfühlung verbunden sei. Ich schlage vor, das *minimal self* als ein *relationales* Proto-Selbst zu verstehen, das sich zunächst auf ein «Leibschema» bezieht. Relational ist dieses Proto-Selbst schon vor der Geburt, denn der Embryo eines Kindes ist nicht isoliert, sondern steht in Verbindung mit dem Mutterleib [vgl. Ciaunica 2014; Ciaunica & Fotopoulou 2017].

3) Kann man sich mit der Frage nach der Subjektivität auseinandersetzen, ohne sich gleichzeitig der Frage nach dem Du und der materiellen Positionierung in der Welt zuzuwenden? Die Subjektivität, der Selbstsinn (*sense of self*) oder die Ipseität, die Erste-Person-Perspektive: Folgen sie nicht vielmehr aus dieser Positionierung selbst? Konstituiert sich nicht die Subjektivität in dem Maße, in dem sie innig mit einem Du in Kontakt kommt und der Welt gegenüber Stellung nimmt? René Spitz hat dargestellt, dass ein Kind ohne innige Verhältnisse zumindest mit einer personalen Singularität in den ersten zwölf Monaten seines Lebens kein psychisches und soziales Selbst entwickelt [Spitz 1965]. Wenn das stimmt, dann sollte das von Sass und Parnas aufgestellte *ipseity-disturbance model* (IDM) erweitert werden. Das bedeutet, dass die Frage eine anthropogenetische wird. Ich gebe ein konkretes Beispiel: Der Schimpanse besitzt etwas mit der Ipseität Vergleichbares. Heißt das, dass auch ein Schimpanse schizophran werden kann? Oder sollten wir den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie für eine Pathologie halten, die typisch für die in der menschlichen Subjektivität inkarnierte Ipseität ist? Wenn das letztere der Fall sein soll, so haben wir es mit einer viel breiteren Reihe von Störungen der Subjektivität zu tun, die auch die Störungen der Ordnung des Fühlens sowie diejenigen bezüglich des *emotional sharing* in sich einschließt.⁸

Im Folgenden möchte ich die These einer *anthropogenetischen* Dimension des *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie durch die Auseinandersetzung insbesondere mit dem Denken des Phänomenologen Max Scheler sowie des Psychiaters Bin Kimura entfalten. Das Neue an den Überlegungen und Untersuchungen von Scheler und Kimura besteht

⁸ Zu der emotionalen Mit-Teilung (*emotional sharing*) erlaube ich mir, auf meine Arbeit zu verweisen: *Care and birth. Emotional sharing as the foundation of care relationships* [Cusinato 2018b].

darin, dass sie beide nicht nur der Beziehung des Selbst zu dem Anderen auf der intersubjektiven Ebene, sondern auch dem Kontakt mit der sympathetischen Ebene des Lebens zentrale Bedeutung beimessen. Als Anknüpfungspunkt zwischen der Perspektive Schellers und derjenigen Kimuras stellt sich das Verständnis der Subjektivität als *Grundverhältnis* dar, ein Gedanke, den Viktor von Weizsäcker in seinem Werk *Der Gestaltkreis* [1940/1997] unter dem Einfluss des *Sympathiebuches* entwickelt hat. Ich möchte versuchen, die von Zahavi gestellte Frage nach der ursprünglichen Subjektivität unter Berücksichtigung des Grundverhältnisses als eines Gedankens von von Weizsäcker zu behandeln. Dies verlegt die Frage vom *minimal self* in der transzendentalen Dimension auf die Ebene der Beziehung des «Proto-Selbst» mit der expressiven Dimension der Natur, wie sie von Scheller im *Sympathiebuch* dargestellt worden ist.

4. In-der-Welt-Sein und In-die-Welt-sich-Positionieren

Bei der Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage nach der Subjektivität zeigt Matthew Ratcliffe [2008] in seinem Buch *Feeling of being* mehr Interesse für die entscheidende Bedeutung der affektiven Sphäre als Zahavi. Das kommt wohl daher, dass Ratcliffe Heideggers Analysen der Grundstimmung näher steht, während sich Zahavi vielmehr auf Husserls These des transzendentalen Ich bezieht. Ratcliffe bemängelt an der philosophischen Debatte der letzten Zeit, dass sie sich zu sehr auf den Begriff der *emotion* konzentriert und das ganze Feld der «*existential feelings*» vernachlässigt habe, die ihm zufolge im Sinne des «*finding ourselves in the world*» charakterisiert werden sollten.

Es ist ein großes Verdienst von Ratcliffe, die Frage nach der Subjektivität auf die Bezugsweise derselben zur Welt hin verlegt zu haben. Ratcliffe zufolge wird die Verbindung mit der Welt durch «*existential feelings*» ermöglicht, die man als «*pre-intentional*» und «*pre-conceptual*» *feeling* bezeichnen kann [Ratcliffe 2010, 368]. Ratcliffe setzt *existential feelings* mit *deep moods* gleich, zieht es dann aber vor, den Ausdruck *existential feeling* zu verwenden [Ratcliffe 2010, 310]. Auf jeden Fall stellt *mood* im Sinne der Heideggerschen *Stimmung* den Ausgangspunkt der Überlegung Ratcliffes dar [Ratcliffe 2010, 354], denn

sie konstituiert «*the experienced meaningfulness of the world*» [Ratcliffe 2010, 349].

Im Unterschied zu Ratcliffe schlage ich vor, eine Differenzierung zwischen *pre-intentional* und *pre-conceptual existential feeling* oder *deep moods* einerseits und *intentional* und *pre-conceptual feelings* andererseits vorzunehmen. Allein durch die Ersteren können wir uns nicht in die Welt positionieren. Dazu ein konkretes Beispiel: Eine allgemeine Stimmung wie die Depression oder die Apathie ist ganz anders als das bestimmte intentionale Fühlen der Traurigkeit, das ich nach einem Streit mit einem Freund haben kann. Eine allgemeine Stimmung der Euphorie ist ebenfalls anders als das bestimmte intentionale Fühlen der Freude, das ich nach dem Erhalt einer guten Nachricht fühle.

Die *existential feelings* oder *deep moods*, von denen Ratcliffe spricht, richten sich immer noch auf allgemeine Weise auf die Welt aus. Sie sind „parasitär“, da sie uns nur dann das Gefühl vermitteln, in der Welt zu sein, wenn wir schon in der Welt positioniert sind; sie ermöglichen uns aber nicht, uns *erneut* in die Welt zu positionieren. Das Problem der menschlichen Existenz betrifft nicht so sehr die *pre-intentional existential feelings* (*deep moods*) des In-der-Welt-Seins, sondern vielmehr das konkrete In-die-Welt-Sich-Positionieren dank der *intentional* und *pre-conceptual feelings*.

5. Emotionen: Metabolisierung der Stimmungen in Gefühle

Der Begriff der „Metabolisierung“ läßt sich auf Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie anwenden und kann als ein Prozess verstanden werden, in dem ein autopoietisches System gemäß seiner „operativen Geschlossenheit“ eine Information verarbeitet [Cusinato 2014, 209-225]. Oft werden Termini wie Stimmungen, Gefühle und Emotionen voneinander nicht differenziert genug verwendet. Unter dem Terminus „Emotion“ verstehe ich das, was einer Person erlaubt, ihre Erfahrungen und Stimmungen in ein intentionales «Fühlen von etwas» zu *metabolisieren* und sich in die Welt zu positionieren. Auch hier möchte ich ein konkretes Beispiel anführen. Wenn ich merke, schlechter Laune zu sein, erlebe ich diese Lage oft als einen verwirrten Gemütszustand und weiß nicht, wie ich mich zu meiner Weise zu sein und zu fühlen verhalten soll. Ich habe das

Gefühl, dass diese Stimmung etwas Unbegründetes ist, und gerade deswegen frage ich mich, was mir nun passiert. Wie oft haben wir erlebt, schlechte Laune zu haben, ohne ihren Grund zu wissen, oder sogar von dem Eindruck begleitet, dass es vielleicht keinen Grund für sie gibt? In gewissem Sinne bleibe ich dabei in einer Lage der Unbestimmtheit, als ob ich nicht imstande wäre zu verstehen, was ich tun muss, um mich in der Welt zu positionieren und meine Stellung den Anderen gegenüber zu begründen.

Die Emotionen der Person sind das, was die nicht intentionalen Stimmungen eines Individuums in eine Positionierung in die Welt *metabolisiert*. Oder anders gesagt: Sie sind das, was diesen „chaotischen“ Stimmungen eine Sinnrichtung und eine Intentionalität verleiht. Zunächst erlebe ich z.B. schlechter Laune zu sein, und bleibe verstimmt, da ich den Grund dafür nicht sehe. Nach mehreren Stunden werde ich mir dann plötzlich dessen bewusst, dass ich schlecht gelaunt war, weil ein Tag vorher ein Freund von mir auf meinen telefonischen Anruf nicht geantwortet hatte. An dieser Stelle verwandelt sich eine allgemeine Stimmung in eine konkrete Stellungnahme wie z.B. das intentionale Gefühl der Wut oder der Traurigkeit. Wenn eine Person diesen Weg nicht durchläuft und ihren Gemütszuständen und Stimmungen ausgeliefert bleibt, kann sie nur einen unbestimmten Zugang zur Welt haben und bleibt unfähig, mit der expressiven Dimension der Andersheit und letzten Endes sogar mit sich selbst in Berührung zu kommen.

Entscheidend hierbei ist meines Erachtens, dass die Emotionen die Stimmungen in intentionale Gefühle metabolisieren, *indem* sie mit dem Bildungsprozess der betroffenen Person in Wechselwirkung stehen. Wenn ich eine allgemeine schlechte Laune in eine besondere Form der Traurigkeit metabolisiere, bilde ich meine Singularität weiter. Wenn diese allgemeine Stimmung zu meinem *ordo amoris* in Verbindung gesetzt wird, wird sie „singularisiert“, d.h. es tritt das unverwechselbare Siegel meines *ordo amoris* in der Art und Weise auf, in der ich die Traurigkeit als Ergebnis der Metabolisierung von dieser Stimmung zum Ausdruck bringe.

Was geschieht eigentlich, wenn ich durch Emotionen gerührt bin? Wenn ich gerührt bin, komme ich in Berührung mit etwas nicht Vorgehenem und spüre, keine angemessenen Lösungen in dieser neuen

Lage bereit zu haben. Bei einer Emotion fühle ich mich am Anfang desorientiert und antwortlos. Anschließend treibt mich die Emotion dazu, eine neue Orientierung in der Berührung mit der Andersheit zu finden. Von diesem Standpunkt aus kann die Emotion mit einer „Werkstatt“ verglichen werden, in der ich neue affektive Antworten in einem trans-subjektiven Sinne erarbeite. Die Metabolisierung, die in der „Werkstatt“ namens Emotion erfolgt, ist etwas sehr Komplexes, das den tiefsten Kern unserer Freiheit und Persönlichkeit angeht. Dank einer neuen Metabolisierung gebe ich dabei nicht nur meinen Stimmungen eine Sinnrichtung und eine Intentionalität, sondern lenke auch meine frühere Ordnung des Fühlens in eine neue Richtung, sodass sich diese Ordnung an die neue Situation anpassen kann, in der ich nunmehr lebe. Wenn dieser Prozess mehrmals geschieht und immer wieder ähnliche affektive Antworten hervorbringt, dann sedimentiert und materialisiert er sich in eine Veranlagung, d.h. in ein intentionales Gefühl.

Eine Emotion setzt das Individuum mehr in Bewegung als ein Gefühl. Im Italienischen bringt man diese Beweglichkeit in der Emotion bildhaft zum Ausdruck: Wenn ich einer für mich neuen Situation entgegentrete, bin ich sehr bewegt (gerührt): Ich bin «*emozionato*» („emotioniert“ hieße es im Deutschen), «*mi emoziono*» (ich „emotioniere“ mich). D.h. das Wort Emotion wird im Italienischen verbal abgeleitet, so dass das Bewegliche der „*motion*“ deutlich herauskommt. In späteren ähnlichen Situationen werde ich immer weniger bewegt (gerührt), da es mir gelingt, mit meinem neuen affektiven *habitus* mit größerer Beherrschung umzugehen.

Natürlich setzt dieser Prozess verschiedene Stufen der Kreativität der Selbstbildung voraus, je nachdem ob sich die Emotionen bei der Metabolisierung der Stimmungen in Gefühle entweder auf die *Selbstverständlichkeit* des Gemeingefühls (*common feeling*) oder auf einen spezifischen *ordo amoris* der Person beziehen. Ein Kind wird zuerst das Gefühl der Wut ausdrücken, indem es das Gemeingefühl der ihm nahe stehenden Personen mit ihnen teilt. Wenn dieser Mensch aber aufwächst und allmählich erwachsen wird, wird sich sein unverkennbarer Stil entwickeln, mit dem er seine Wut äußert. Dabei verleiht er seinem *ordo amoris* Ausdruck. Offensichtlich kann bei diesem Fall die Art und Weise des Sich-Ausdrückens einer Person von der Norm als all-

gemeiner Ausdrucksform (*common sense*) bedeutend abweichen. Das geschieht z.B., wenn uns jemand von einer Person erzählt, die wir sehr gut kennen, dass er ihr Verhalten als merkwürdig empfunden hat, und wir dabei sofort denken: «Nein, ihr Verhalten ist überhaupt nicht merkwürdig. Es hätte mich überrascht, wenn sie sich nicht genauso verhalten hätte!»

6. Störungen des *ordo amoris*

Im *Sympathiebuch* entwickelt Scheler den Gedanken, dass der Ausgangspunkt der Intersubjektivität ein Grundverhältnis zur Natur auf der Ebene der Einfühlung ist. Darüber hinaus kehrt Scheler die traditionelle These um, nach der man von den eigenen Erfahrungen ausgehen muss, um die Erfahrungen des anderen zu verstehen, und stellt fest, dass der Mensch mehr in den anderen als in sich selbst lebt. Unter Bezugnahme auf die Studien von William Stern (1871-1938) über die Psychologie der frühen Kindheit [Stern 1914] erkennt Scheler die erste Form der Einfühlung in der Beziehung zwischen Säugling und Mutter. Zu Beginn hat das Neugeborene nur ein Proto-Selbst, aber schon nach den ersten Wochen ist es in der Lage, eine intensive emotionale Bindung zu seiner Mutter zu entwickeln, so dass es am Ende des zweiten Lebensmonats beginnt, in irgendeiner Weise auf das Lächeln der Mutter zu reagieren [Scheler *GW* VII, 233]. In der Folge erweitert sich das *emotional sharing* auf das familiäre und soziale Umfeld. Das Ich und das Du entstehen nur gemeinsam und nur dank bestimmter Arten der Praxis der Mit-Teilung von Gefühlen (*emotional sharing*). Erst in der Pubertät wird sich das Kind schließlich seiner Singularität und seiner Erlebnisse in vollem Maße bewusst: «Erst sehr langsam erhebt es – gleichsam – sein eigenes geistiges Haupt aus diesem über es hinbrausenden Strome und findet sich als ein Wesen vor, das auch zuweilen eigene Gefühle, Ideen und Strebungen hat» [Scheler *GW* VII, 241]. Im Mittelpunkt des Bildungsprozesses, der zur Entwicklung einer bewussten Singularität führt, steht der *ordo amoris*, ein Begriff, den Scheler von Augustinus übernimmt.

Scheler vergleicht den *ordo amoris* mit einer uns umhüllenden „Sphäre“ oder einem Gehäuse, durch dessen Fenster wir die Welt sehen

[vgl. Scheler *GW* X, 348]. Jeder *ordo amoris* bringt eine einzigartige und unverwechselbare Perspektive auf die Welt hervor. Scheler zufolge hüllt diese affektive Sphäre jede Person ein und folgt ihr in allen ihren Bewegungen. Nur dank der Perspektive aus ihrer einzigartigen affektiven Sphäre dringt jede Person in die Welt ein. Jeder *ordo amoris* drückt sich in einer *forma mentis* und in einer einzigartigen, unverwechselbaren Positionierung in die Welt aus. In diesem Sinne kann man sagen, dass der *ordo amoris* das *principium individuationis* der Person sei: Eine Person ist ihr *ordo amoris* und wer den *ordo amoris* einer Person versteht, hat den Schlüssel für den Zugang zu dieser Person. Das heißt, dass die Störungen des *ordo amoris* einer Person diese daran hindern, mit dem eigenen Selbst und mit dem Selbst der Anderen in Berührung zu kommen.⁹

Der *ordo amoris* arbeitet wie ein Motor des *élan personnel* von Eugene Minkowski. Viele Fragen bezüglich des *ordo amoris* haben mit der affektiven Reifung zu tun und ändern sich daher je nach dem Alter oder den Erfahrungen, die man macht: Jede wesentliche Erfahrung z.B. des Liebens oder Hassens wird – im Sinne der Theorie der «Funktionalisierung» bei Scheler¹⁰ – die künftige Weise des Liebens oder Hassens der Person bedingen. Der *ordo amoris* funktioniert wie eine Brille, die meine ganze Erfahrung bestimmt.

Es gibt zwei Arten der Störungen des *ordo amoris*. Bei der ersten Art treten vorläufige Verhärtungen des *ordo amoris* ein, sodass er anfängt, auf verzernte Weise zu funktionieren. Die zweite Art hat einen pathologischen Charakter. Von der ersten Art ist der Fall z.B. bei den Selbsttäuschungen oder vielen sozialen Haltungen, die sich dem Vorurteil und der Ideologie nähern [vgl. auch Jaspers 1973, 13-19]. Diese Störungen können in Formen der Vergaffung, des Götzendiensts und des Fanatismus münden, sodass es zur Gefährdung und Entstellung der Realitätswahrnehmung kommen kann [vgl. Scheler 1912; *GW* III, 213-

⁹ Es ist bedeutsam, dass der ursprüngliche Titel des Manuskripts *Ordo amoris* wie folgt lautete: *Vom Ordo amoris und seinen Verwirrungen* [siehe Scheler *GW* X, 516].

¹⁰ Als Beispiele der «Funktionalisierung» führt Scheler in seiner Schrift *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (1921) Folgendes an: «Was vorher Sache war, wird Denkform über Sachen; was Liebesobjekt war, wird Liebesform, in der nun eine unbegrenzte Zahl von Objekten geliebt werden können» [Scheler *GW* V, 198].

292]. Die Vergaffungen sind in ihrem Wesen Verherrlichungsformen des eigenen Selbst. Selbst wenn wir für den Anderen schwärmen, beten wir oft stillschweigend unser eigenes Ego an. Schopenhauer scheint mir Recht zu haben, wenn er behauptet, dass sich die ganze Ethik um das kolossale Problem des Egozentrismus dreht. In dem Maße, in dem der Selbstsüchtige das eigene Selbst verabsolutiert, bleibt er innerhalb einer Sphäre wie verfangen, die ihn von dem Rest der Welt allmählich isoliert. Er leidet, da er jedes Gute und jeden Wert außerhalb von sich selbst als Raub und gar als Drohung gegenüber dem eigenen Sein wahrnimmt. Die Vergaffung ist ein Prozess, der nicht einfach zu entlarven ist: Wer sich im Zustand der Vergaffung befindet, lebt gleichsam wie in einer Zaubersphäre und glaubt, dass es die anderen sind, die die Realität deformiert sehen. Er nimmt auch Kritik oft als Ausdruck der Böswilligkeit oder einer pädagogischen oder moralistischen Aufforderung wahr. Den Zauber brechen, in den der Selbstsüchtige versunken ist, ist gleichbedeutend damit, sein Bewusstsein zu erwecken. Sehr oft denkt man, dass der Zustand, der dem Tod am nächsten ist, der Schlaf sei. In Wahrheit aber kann ein Mensch beim Träumen extrem lebhaft sein. Es gibt Vergaffungen, die dem Tod unendlich näher kommen als der Schlaf. Die Entzauberung ähnelt mehr einer Wiedererstehung als dem Aufwachen aus dem Schlaf. Man sollte noch präzisieren, dass diese Störungen des *ordo amoris* häufig Störungen auf der Ebene des *emotional sharing* werden, sodass sie nicht nur die Intimsphäre betreffen, sondern auch auf sozialer Ebene Tragweite haben.

7. Pathologie des *ordo amoris*

In dem Fall, in dem keine vorläufige Verhärtung oder bloße Verlangsamung im Funktionieren des *ordo amoris*, sondern ein regelrechtes Versagen desselben eintritt, könnte man von der authentischen Pathologie des *ordo amoris* sprechen. In den schwereren Fällen wird die Personstruktur selbst gefährdet. Denn der *ordo amoris* ist die tragende Struktur der Person. Die Psychopathologie des *ordo amoris* ist deswegen im Wesentlichen eine Psychopathologie der Personstruktur.

Die phänomenologische Psychopathologie hat in dem *modus vivendi* der Melancholie und dem der Schizophrenie Störungen aufgedeckt,

die auf einigen Ebenen der affektiven Schichten eintreten.¹¹ Bis jetzt hat man jedoch in der Forschung die mit solchen Störungen der Affektivität verbundene axiologische Dimension weitgehend außer Acht gelassen. Das Neue an der hier vertretenen These der Psychopathologie des *ordo amoris* besteht darin, dass sie in dem *modus vivendi* der Melancholie und der Schizophrenie eine Störung der axiologischen Dimension der «Wertnehmung» (*valueception*) erkennt.¹² Meine These lautet also, dass im *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie die Wertnehmungsstörung die *enaktive* Tätigkeit des *ordo amoris* vom Rest der Welt isoliert, während im *modus vivendi* der Melancholie dieselbe Störung das *enaktive* Vermögen des *sense-making* des *ordo amoris* beeinträchtigt [Cusinato 2018a]. In beiden Fällen wird die Person aus ihrer Positionierung in die Welt entwurzelt [Cusinato 2018a, 239-261]. Der Bildungsprozess der Person wird dabei gehemmt und kann sich sogar in einen Prozess der De-Konstruktion der Personalität wenden, in dem auch die bereits aufgebauten existentiellen Positionierungen zerfallen.

Der *ordo amoris* ist keine statische, sondern eine dynamische Struktur: Angesichts eines traumatischen Erlebnisses oder eines außergewöhnlichen Ereignisses kann der *ordo amoris* sich selbst re-strukturieren und eine neue Perspektive und eine neue *forma mentis* metabolisieren, wenn dies auch lange Zeit beanspruchen kann. In den pathologischen Formen des *ordo amoris* lässt diese Fähigkeit nach. Der *ordo amoris* implodiert, er bricht in sich zusammen, und das Individuum wird des Reaktionsvermögens beraubt.

Bekannterweise ist der Zeitraum, in dem die Symptome der Schizophrenie bei Männern am häufigsten auftreten, derjenige zwischen dem 15. und dem 25. Lebensjahr [Castle, Buckley 2011, 11; Remschmidt, Theisen 2011, 30]. Diese Befunde legen nahe, dass es sich im *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie nicht um ein unveränderliches und gleichbleibendes *minimal self* handelt, sondern um die Fähigkeit des Selbst,

¹¹ Zu dieser Richtung, in der Schneider Scheler interpretiert, vgl. Schneider [1921a; 1921b].

¹² Der Begriff der Wertnehmung (*valueception*) ist ein Neologismus, den Scheler seit 1913 verwendet. Das Wort ist nach dem Muster der Wahrnehmung zusammengesetzt. Scheler zufolge setzt jede Tätigkeit der Wahrnehmung eine Wertnehmung voraus.

sich umzubilden. Wie könnten andernfalls schizophrene Individuen bis zum Zeitpunkt des Störungsausbruches ein normales Leben führen? Meiner Meinung nach kommt diese Pathologie nicht früher zum Ausbruch, da der *ordo amoris* während des Kindes- und Jugendalters noch in der Phase der Ausbildung ist; das Individuum in diesem Alter kann deswegen das eventuell vorhandene Pathologische latent halten, etwa mit Hilfe des Gemeinsinns (*common sense*) der zugehörigen Gruppe oder durch das vorläufige Kitten der Risse der eigenen Existenz mittels der Konstruktion der gestörten oder unausgeglichenen affektiven Bindungen wie z.B. einer krankhaft symbiotischen Beziehung, in der das Kind nicht zur Selbständigkeit gefördert wird. Wenn aber im Erwachsenenalter eine schwere Krise über das Individuum hereinbricht, dann bröckelt der „Kitt“, der die Risse vorübergehend zusammengeklebt hat, und das Individuum zersplittert wie ein Spiegel. Dies könnte erklären, warum die Schizophrenie bei den Männern oft in der Zeit zwischen dem 15 und dem 25 Lebensjahr ausbricht, auch bei den Individuen, die bis dahin ein scheinbar „normales“ Leben geführt haben.

8. Woher kommt die „Ordnung“ des Fühlens?

Um einem gravierenden Missverständnis vorzubeugen, ist eine Erklärung erforderlich. Es ist keineswegs meine Absicht, durch den Begriff des *ordo amoris* paternalistische oder moralistische Vorstellungen wieder einzuführen. Die Triebe, das Fühlen, die Emotionen und die Bedürfnisse wurden in der westlichen Kultur oft als ein unzuverlässiges, chaotisches Material betrachtet, das man „zurechtrücken“ soll, indem man sich etwa auf die Ideenwelt (den platonischen Idealismus) oder auf das Seinsollen (Kant) beruft.

Ich möchte hier eine andere Hypothese vorschlagen. Meines Erachtens wird eine „Ordnung“ des Fühlens dann problematisch, wenn man sie als eine „Ordnung“ denkt, die von oben herab *dem* Fühlen auferlegt wird. Sie ist aber nicht problematisch, wenn es sich um eine Ordnung handelt, die sich *aus dem* Fühlen selbst herausbildet. Der *ordo amoris* ist keine von oben herab auferlegte Ordnung. Er ist eine Ordnung, die sich durch die Praxis der Mit-Teilung der Emotionen (*emotional sharing*) und der Gefühle aus der affektiven Sphäre herausbildet. Diese

Idee mag seltsam klingen, da man daran gewöhnt ist, die „Ordnung“ als etwas zu denken, das von oben, vom Denken her kommt. Das Neue an dem Begriff des *ordo amoris* besteht meiner Meinung nach gerade darin, dass er den Gegensatz von Fühlen und Denken überwindet. Was bedeutet dabei „Denken“? Ist das Denken vielleicht nicht unter gewissen Aspekten auch ein Fühlen, und zwar ein „Fühlen des Fühlens“, ein „Meta-Fühlen“?

Wenn die Ordnung des Fühlens nicht von oben herab auf eine „autoritäre“ Weise auferlegt wird, sondern dank der Synchronisierung mit der Natur sich herausbildet, dann kann man nicht die Störungen des *ordo amoris* moralistisch als etwas „Verkrümmtes“ gegenüber der „Korrektheit“ eines idealen Modells auslegen. Sie sind vielmehr als Störungen der Kommunikation mit der expressiven Dimension des Lebens zu verstehen. Ein *ordo amoris* wird „wirksam“ nicht in dem Maße, in dem er einem idealen Modell entspricht, sondern in dem er die Kommunikation mit der Natur erweitert und bereichert: Je entwickelter der *ordo amoris* ist, desto größer wird der durch den *ordo amoris* zugänglich gewordene Grad der Weltoffenheit. *Ethisch* ist im Grunde alles, was die «Weltoffenheit» im Sinne Schelers fördert.

9. Scheler und der Begriff des Aidagara (Watsuji)

Bin Kimura hat den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie als eine Pathologie des *Aida* betrachtet und sich dabei von dem Begriff des *Aidagara* von Tetsuro Watsuji anregen lassen. Watsuji war seinerseits einer der Philosophen, die Scheler beim japanischen Publikum einführten, was bspw. zur Folge hatte, dass einer seiner Schüler, Denzaburo Yoshizawa, die japanische Werkausgabe Schelers herausgegeben hat.

In seinem Text *Ethics in Japan*, mit dem sich Watsuji als Kenner der Phänomenologie Schelers ausweist, besteht der Kern seiner Schelerkritik in der Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Individualität zur Andersheit und darin, wie man die Individualität konzipiert. Watsuji bringt folgende Einwände gegen Scheler vor:

1) Allem voran kritisiert Watsuji das Verhältnis zwischen den einzelnen Personen und der «Gesamtperson». Schelers Interesse gehe nicht auf die Solidarität, die die einzelnen Personen untereinander bilden, son-

dern auf diejenige zwischen den einzelnen Personen und der Gesamtperson, oder vielmehr sei Scheler zufolge die Solidarität zwischen den einzelnen Personen nur durch die Vermittlung der Gesamtperson möglich [Watsuji 1996, 96]. Schelers Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der Individualität gehe von einem derartigen Begriff der persönlichen Gemeinschaft aus [Watsuji 1996, 79]. In der Tat bildet der Begriff der «Gesamtperson» einen der umstrittensten Punkte in Schelers Denken. Vermutlich hätte Watsuji Schelers Begriff der «Mitverantwortlichkeit» gefallen, aus dem eine nicht individualistische Konzeption der Person entsteht – der Person, die in der Praxis des *emotional sharing* mit den anderen Personen Gestalt annimmt.

2) Scheler habe nicht an die über die Intentionalität hinausgehende Zwischenheit gedacht. Dabei meint Watsuji mit der Intentionalität wahrscheinlich diejenige von Husserl, d.h. eine von dem Bewusstsein des Subjekts ausgehende Intentionalität. An dieser Stelle kehrt jedoch Scheler Husserls Denken um und konzipiert eine «Noesis des Noema», d.h. eine Gegen-Intentionalität, die von der Welt ausgeht. Als Beispiel dieser Gegen-Intentionalität können die Erleuchtungen (*Satori*) oder die «*donation*» bei Jean-Luc Marion genannt werden [Cusinato 2018]. Scheler denkt nämlich an die Begegnung mit dem Anderen, wie sie von der Gegen-Intentionalität des Du und von dem Vermögen des Ich möglich wird, «Rezeptionszentrum» zu werden, d.h. die durch derartige Gegen-Intentionalität ermöglichte Erleuchtung vom Selbst zu empfangen. Dieser Gedanke der Gegen-Intentionalität scheint mir auch bei Kimura auffindbar:

Die ursprüngliche Tatsache ist nicht so etwas wie ein intentionaler Akt Husserls, der sich vom Hier auf das Dort richtet. Das Hier ist vielmehr das, was kommt, wenn sich das Zwischen vom Hier und Dort artikuliert, indem es vom Dort affiziert wird. Wenn man unbedingt von der Richtung sprechen möchte, ist es das Produkt, das aus der „Gegen-Intentionalität“ geboren wird, die sich vom Dort auf das Hier richtet [Kimura 1972/1991, 86].¹³

¹³ 「フッサールのというような、こちらからあちらへと向かっている志向作用のような根源的事実なのではない。こちらはむしろ、あちらの側から触発されることによって、こちらとあちらとの間が分化してきたもの、強いて方向性を言うならば、むしろあ

3) Scheler setze die Sphäre der Intimität in jede Person hinein und ver falle dadurch in die Entgegensetzung der Sphäre der Intimität zu derjenigen der Öffentlichkeit. Watsuji zufolge hingegen sollte man die Sphäre der Intimität denken, indem man von der Gemeinschaft eines Paares z.B. zwischen Mann und Frau, d.h. letztlich vom *Aidagara* ausgeht. Auch gegen diesen Einwand könnte man geltend machen, dass Scheler Husserls Vorgehensweise umkehrt und jeweilige Formen des Selbst und der sozialen Einheiten als Resultat des *emotional sharing* denkt. Mit anderen Worten: Man kann bei Scheler eine enge Verbindung zwischen dem, was Watsuji *Aidagara* nennt, und dem *emotional sharing* finden.

4) Nach Watsuji beschränke sich Schelers philosophische Anthropologie darauf, «den Menschen ausschließlich von dem Standpunkt der Einheit von Leib und Geist aus» [Watsuji 1971, 398] zu denken. Auf diese Weise jedoch abstrahiere Scheler den Menschen von seinen sozialen Bindungen, von seinem In-dem-*Aidagara*-Befindlich-Sein, und schlage abermals die Idee eines rationalen und individualistischen Menschen vor [Watsuji 1971, 398-400]. Als Alternative proponiert Watsuji, den Menschen im Sinne von „*Ningen*“, d.h. wörtlich „Zwischen“ (*gen* 間) „Menschen“ (*nin* 人), zu betrachten, wobei man dasselbe Schriftzeichen auch „*Aida*“ lesen kann. Eines der Ziele, die ich mir bei der Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Anthropologie vorgenommen habe, war es, die in der Schelerforschung recht geläufige – wie auch vermutlich bei Watsuji vorhandene – Vorstellung in Frage zu stellen, dass sich Schelers philosophische Anthropologie um den Begriff des Geistes drehe, und zu zeigen, dass der Mensch bei Scheler vor allem als ein Lebewesen zu verstehen ist, das in seiner biologischen Geburt noch nicht ganz geboren wird und die Begegnung mit der Andersheit braucht, um seine Geburt fortzusetzen. Ich versuche also nicht, zu dem sogenannten lebensphilosophischen Motiv des „irrationalen Lebens“ zurückzukehren, sondern vielmehr von dem psychopathologischen Standpunkt aus den zentralen Gedanken in Schelers Philosophie als den sympathetischen Kontakt mit dem Leben auszulegen. In dieser Perspektive wird

ちらの方からこちらの方へと向かう『逆志向』から生まれた産物なのである。」 [Kimura 1972/1991, 86] Alle Übersetzungen von den in diesem Beitrag zitierten japanischen Texten Kimuras stammen von R. Shibuya.

die Andersheit gleichsam der „Mutterleib“, in dem der Mensch, der noch nicht ganz geboren ist, seine Geburt fortsetzen kann.

10. *Sympathetisches Grundverhältnis mit der Welt und Störungen des Aida*

Im *Sympathiebuch* [1913/1923] nimmt Scheler die Existenz einer «universalen Grammatik der Expressivität» an, um das Vermögen der Lebewesen zu erläutern, sich miteinander zu interagieren, wie z.B. wenn eine Biene mit einer Blume interagiert. Dank dieser Grammatik kann jedes Lebendige mit der expressiven Dimension des kosmischen Lebens («Allebens») kommunizieren. Scheler stellt ferner vier Ebenen bei der Synchronisierung mit der expressiven Dimension fest, denen vier Formen des *emotional sharing* entsprechen: Einfühlung, Nachfühlung (im Sinne der Einfühlung bei Edith Stein), Mitfühlung und die Formen des Liebens und Hassens (typisch für die Person).

Viktor von Weizsäcker übernimmt vom *Sympathiebuch* den Gedanken, dass die Intersubjektivität ein Sich-in-Beziehung-mit-dem-Grundverhältnis-zur-Natur-Setzen voraussetzt. Besonders im Hinblick auf das Grundverhältnis des Organismus mit der Umwelt hat sich von Weizsäcker in seinem Werk *Der Gestaltkreis* mit dem Begriff der Subjektivität auseinandergesetzt.¹⁴ Bin Kimura entwickelt diesen Gedanken weiter und schlägt vor, den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie neu zu interpretieren, indem er auf ein für die japanische Kultur typisches Konzept zurückgreift: das *Aida* (あいだ), die Form einer ursprünglichen „Zwischenheit“, die der Intersubjektivität selbst zugrunde liegt. Selbst der Begriff Mensch auf japanisch hat mit der „Zwischenheit“, d.h. mit „*Aida*“, zu tun, denn *Nin-gen* heißt wörtlich Zwischen (*gen*) Menschen (*nin*), wie bereits im vorigen Abschnitt bezüglich Watsujis Schelerkritik angeführt wurde. Kimuras Gedanke leitet die Aufmerksamkeit in eine recht fruchtbare Richtung: Der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie betrifft nicht die Störungen des Urteilsvermögens oder des Intellekts, sondern solche Störungen, die mit der Fähigkeit zu tun haben, mit der expressiven Dimension des Anderen in Berührung zu kommen. Da die-

¹⁴ «Grundverhältnis ist also eigentlich die Subjektivität» [von Weizsäcker 1940/1997, 318].

se Fähigkeit, mit dem Anderen in Kontakt zu kommen, die Bedingung dafür ist, sich mit sich selbst in Verbindung zu setzen, beeinträchtigen die Störungen des *Aida* auch die Bildungsprozesse.

Kimura zufolge treten die für die Schizophrenie typischen Störungen des *principium individuationis* [Kimura 1976/2006, 189] und der Selbstkonstitution [Kimura 1976/2006, 203f.] auf, wenn das «sympathetische Grundverhältnis mit der Welt» ausfällt. Aus seinen Überlegungen tritt der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Misslingen der Beziehung zum Lebensgrund und demselben der Selbstkonstitution sehr deutlich hervor [vgl. Kimura 1988/2005, 180].

II. Drei Stufen der Positionierung

Das sympathetische Grundverhältnis mit der Welt ist der Kontext, innerhalb dessen verschiedene Formen der Positionierung in die Welt möglich werden. Die Beeinträchtigung des sympathetischen Grundverhältnisses, das im Mittelpunkt der Psychopathologie des *ordo amoris* steht, bestimmt eine Beeinträchtigung der verschiedenen Formen der Positionierung in die Welt. Meine These lautet, dass jeder Form der Positionierung eine Form der Individuation entspricht:

a) das Proto-Selbst (*proto-self*), das sich auf der genetischen Basis im Neugeborenen konstituiert und bereits in den ersten Tagen nach der Geburt als *Leibschema* auftaucht. Dieses Leibschema regelt die Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Umwelt;

b) das soziale oder narrative Selbst, das sich durch die sprachliche Vermittlung und die Reflexion in der sozialen Interaktion aufbaut;

c) das personale Nicht-Selbst, das sich als *ordo amoris* (Ordnung des Fühlens) in der Begegnung mit dem Anderen geboren wird. Die Ordnung des Fühlens setzt eine Entleerung des eigenen Egozentrismus (Epoché des Ego) – deswegen also eines «nicht-Selbst» – und die Fähigkeit voraus, dem Anderen zuzuhören.

a) Die erste Stufe der Positionierung und das Leibschema (proto-self)

Dem ursprünglichen Kern der Subjektivität entspricht meines Erach-

tens ein *minimal self*, das nicht als transzendentes Selbst, wie Zahavi denkt, sondern als relationales *proto-self* verstanden wird und sich als Triebstruktur konstituiert, die die Wechselwirkung zwischen Leib und Umwelt regeln kann. Auf dieser Ebene wirken die sinnlichen Gefühle gemäß der Logik: angenehm/unangenehm, nützlich/nicht nützlich, gefährlich/nicht gefährlich, die die Interaktion des Organismus mit der Umwelt steuert. Dieser Stufe der Positionierung entspricht das Leibschema (vgl. Scheler und Paul Schilder) als der erste Kern des Selbst.

b) Die zweite Stufe der Positionierung und der Gemeinsinn oder common sense („social self“ oder „narrative self“)

Eine darauf folgende Stufe der Positionierung kann man im Prozess finden, der durch den Kampf um die soziale Anerkennung zum Aufbau des «sozialen Selbst» führt. Diese Positionierung gründet sich auf die Praxis der Mit-Teilung der Emotionen (*emotional sharing*) und der Gefühle, die vor allem im Bereich der sozialen Anerkennung (Stolz, Scham, usw.) wirken. Sie beruft sich auf den Gemeinsinn und das Gemeingefühl, die in einer bestimmten sozialen Einheit vorherrschend sind.

c) Die dritte Stufe der Positionierung und der ordo amoris („personal non-self“)

Weder die Triebstruktur der ersten Stufe noch der Gemeinsinn und das Gemeingefühl der zweiten Stufe sind dafür ausreichend, den Menschen beim Übergang von der Umweltgeschlossenheit zur Weltoffenheit zu leiten. Auf der dritten Stufe der Positionierung folgen die Emotionen und die Gefühle nicht mehr der selbstreferentiellen, sondern der *anthropogenetischen* Logik, damit nämlich der Mensch nicht als bloß soziales Selbst, sondern als personale Singularität geboren werden kann. Dieser Stufe der Positionierung entspricht der *ordo amoris*, d.h. eine kreative und dynamische Ordnung des Fühlens, die mit einer trans-subjektiven Ordnung des Fühlens in Wechselwirkung treten kann.

Dank der Leitung des *ordo amoris* positioniert sich die Person über die Umweltgeschlossenheit sowie über die Veranlagungen des Gemein-

geföhls und des Gemeinsinns hinaus, die im sozialen Kontext, in dem diese Person lebt, vorherrschend sind.

12. Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit

Die Störungen der *zweiten Stufe der menschlichen Positionierung* kann man in dem Sinne interpretieren, in dem Blankenburg [1971] vom *Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit* spricht. Der Gebrauch des Wortes „natürlich“ kann eher irreführend sein: Diese Evidenz ist zwar „selbstverständlich“, aber keineswegs „natürlich“, denn sie ist weder das, was uns auf der biologisch-triebhaften Dimension gegeben wird, noch das, mit dem wir schon am Moment der biologischen Geburt ausgestattet werden. Die Tatsache, dass sich bei dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie der Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit ereignet, zeigt, dass diese Selbstverständlichkeit keineswegs etwas für alle Menschen Voraussehbares, sondern etwas im Sinne von Alfred Schütz [1960] sozial Aufgebautes ist.

Ein weiterer Aspekt scheint mir problematisch an Blankenburgs These, und zwar unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses, das Kimura zwischen der Zwischenheit, dem *Aida* (あいだ), und dem Abstand, dem *Ma* (間), etabliert. Anders als man es sich vorstellen würde, gibt es Kimura zufolge in der Welt des Schizophrenen kein Übermaß an Abstand zwischen dem Ich und dem Anderen, sondern im Gegenteil einen Mangel an diesem Abstand. Um dieses Abstand zu bezeichnen, benutzt Kimura den Terminus *Ma*, indem er das Intervall als Beispiel nimmt, das zwei Musiknoten voneinander trennt: Wenn kein *Ma* da ist, gibt es Gefahr, dass die beiden Musiknoten zusammen konfus klingen. Etwas Ähnliches geschieht in der Schizophrenie: Gerade weil es kein *Ma* gibt, wird der Andere als eine Bedrohung wahrgenommen, die in den *modus vivendi* der schizophrenen Subjektivität eindringen und sich dieser bemächtigen kann. Eine Patientin von Kimura beschreibt diese Situation: «So kommen die Personen in mich hinein» [Kimura 1988/2005, 165-166].¹⁵ Der «Kontaktverlust», der für die Schizophrenie typisch ist, wird somit als eine extreme Verteidigung einer von den anderen Personen gleichsam überfallenen Subjektivität interpretiert.

¹⁵ Kimura 1988/2005, 165-166: 「そして『人が [自分の中に] はいってくる [···] 』」

Diese Hypothese wirft meines Erachtens neues Licht auf Blankenburgs These des «Verlustes der Selbstverständlichkeit», die Kimura nicht gänzlich teilt. Dem Anderen gegenüber zieht sich die Person mit schizophrenen Symptomen in sich zurück, da sie keinen Zugang zum *eigenen* innerlichen *Aida* findet. Eine Patientin von Kimura sagt: Sie schaffe nicht, sich auszudrücken und mit jemandem zu kommunizieren oder das *Ma* zu bewahren, daher schaffe sie nicht mehr, von den Anderen einen Abstand zu bewahren [vgl. Kimura 1988/2005, 163-164]. An der Basis dieser Pathologie des *Aida* befinde sich deswegen eine Störung auf der *expressiven* Dimension: «ich konnte meine Gefühle nicht fließend ausdrücken, ich konnte nicht mich selbst herausholen» und «so haben die Anderen allmählich angefangen, einer nach dem anderen in mich hineinzudrängen» [Kimura 1988/2005, 163].¹⁶ Man könnte denken, dass diese Patientin sich nicht ausdrücken, nicht aus sich selbst herausgehen könne, weil ihr ein personaler Drang (*élan personnel*) und eine Ordnung des Fühlens fehlen. Denn es ist der *ordo amoris*, der das *Ma* aufrechterhält. Was eine Störung des *ordo amoris* hervorrufen kann, ist also nicht der «Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit». Es ist eher umgekehrt eine Störung des *ordo amoris* sowie eine Unfähigkeit, das *Ma* zu bewahren, die in den für den *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie typischen «Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit» mündet. Diese Überlegung leitet uns dazu, einen weiteren Aspekt besser zu berücksichtigen, nämlich das Verhältnis des *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie zur Geburt.

13. Geburt der Subjektivität als Fest (*festum*)

Von besonderer Relevanz scheint mir Kimuras Versuch, die Psychopathologie im Hinblick auf die Frage nach der Geburt der Subjektivität auszulegen. Die Pathologie des *Aida* ist zugleich auch eine Pathologie, die sich als Unvermögen manifestiert, in der Begegnung mit dem eigenen *Aida* neu geboren zu werden. In diesem Zusammenhang bestimmt

¹⁶ Kimura 1988/2005, 163: 「なめらかな感情が出せないから、自分というものが出せず」 「人が自分の中にどんどんはいってくるようになった。」

Kimura die Geburt der Subjektivität als das «Fest» (*festum*),¹⁷ das nichts anderes als Begegnung des Kindes mit dem eigenen „Vor-Zwischen“ (*Archè-Aida*) ist. In verschiedenen psychopathologischen Formen werde dieses «Fest» unterbrochen: Wenn dieses unterbrochene Fest in der Dimension des Vergangenen und des bereits Ereigneten erlebt werde, handle es sich um das «*post festum*» der Melancholie [Kimura 1976/2006, 192]; wenn das Fest als Vorwegnahme der Zukunft erlebt werde, zeige es sich als «*ante festum*» der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie [Kimura 1976/2006, 202].

Das Problem des *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie ist also nicht nur der Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit, sondern auch der Mangel der Geburt der Singularität, die die Entpersonalisierung des Individuums mit sich bringt. Sehr überzeugend scheint mir Kimuras Beschreibung über die Unfähigkeit des Schizophrenen, das *Mono* und das *Koto* voneinander zu unterscheiden [Kimura 1988/2005, 149-160]. Das *Mono* ist der Gegenstand, der sich in Raum und Zeit im quantitativ messbaren Sinne konstituiert, während das *Koto* das Ereignis betrifft, das in der «gelebten Zeit» des *Aida* auftaucht [Kimura 1988/2005, 167]. Kimura zufolge neigt der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie dazu, das *Koto* im Sinne vom *Mono* wahrzunehmen.¹⁸ Bei dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie, in der das *festum* als die dank der Begegnung mit dem *Aida* ermöglichte Geburt der Subjektivität unterbrochen wird, kann also das *Koto* nicht als das Ereignis in der «gelebten Zeit» des *Aida* wahrgenommen werden.

14. Verlust der Selbstverständlichkeit und Störungen des ordo amoris

Diese Überlegungen von Kimura regen mich dazu an, von dem philosophischen Standpunkt aus den Zusammenhang zwischen der Geburt der Subjektivität und der Selbstverständlichkeit eindringlicher zu thema-

¹⁷ Die Metapher des Festes findet sich auch bei Ludwig Binswanger und Paul Häberlin [vgl. Wendt 2019, 45].

¹⁸ In diesem Sinne sagt Kimura: «Die Psychopathologie ist nichts anderes als das, was sich als die kranke Modalität des *Aida* zeigt, wenn man das *Aida* als das *Koto* auffasst.» (「『あいだ』を『こと』として捉えるとき、ほかならぬそのような『あいだ』の病的様態として見えてくるのが精神分裂病 [...] である。」 [1988/2005, 162]).

tisieren. In gewissem Sinne setzen sich sowohl der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie als auch die westliche Philosophie außerhalb der Selbstverständlichkeit. Schon Sokrates konzipierte die Philosophie als eine Praxis der Umbildung der Lebensweise durch eine *Téchne* der Überwindung der Selbstverständlichkeit. Dieser Gedanke tritt u.a. in Platons Höhlengleichnis, im Begriff der Ekstase bei Schelling, in der phänomenologischen Reduktion bei Scheler und in den Überlegungen des späten Husserl über die Lebenswelt wieder auf.

Während in der Philosophie versucht wird, die Selbstverständlichkeit zu *überwinden*, ereignet sich in dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie ein *Verlust* der Selbstverständlichkeit. Sokrates weicht von dem Gemeinsinn ab, kann ihn aber weiterhin verstehen. Die Person mit Schizophrenie hingegen versteht ihn nicht mehr und ist gezwungen, ihn durch eine hyper-reflexive Bemühung zu kompensieren. Blankenburgs blieb von einem seiner schizophrenen Patienten tief beeindruckt, als dieser sein Unbehagen zum Ausdruck brachte: «Ich möchte die Dinge so sehen, wie sie sind... Ich kann es aber nicht». Blankenburgs Annahme war, dass das Element, dessen Mangel der Schizophrene spürte, die Kenntnis der «Spielregeln» sei [Blankenburg 1971], d.h. der Selbstverständlichkeit des Gemeinsinns, oder noch in anderen Worten: die Kenntnis jenes Wissens, das innerhalb einer bestimmten sozialen Einheit eben als selbstverständlich gegeben wird. Blankenburg erwähnt zwar auch, dass man in der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie die Probleme finden kann, die sich auf der Ebene dessen befinden, das Pascal als «*esprit de finesse*» (Feingefühl) oder «*raison du cœur*» (*Vernunft des Herzens*) bezeichnet [Blankenburg 1971].

Der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie ist von der Dimension des Gemeinsinns ausgeschlossen, die von der ganzen Soziologie von Schütz bis Niklas Luhmann behandelt wird: Der Mechanismus der «Reduktion der Komplexität», von der Luhmann [1984] spricht, gerät bei dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie in eine Krise. Der Verlust des Gemeinsinns stellt aber keinen der Faktoren dar, die dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie zugrunde liegen, sondern vielmehr ein wichtiges Merkmal dieser Pathologie. Nach Kimuras Ansicht ist der Kontaktverlust mit dem Gemeinsinn bei dem *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie die Folge einer ursprünglicheren Unfähigkeit, der dem Vor-Zwischen (*archè-Ai-*

da) zugrunde liegenden Singularität des Anderen (*Koto*) zu begegnen. Kimura zufolge kann man die Symptome der *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie auf einen Kontaktverlust mit dem Grundverhältnis, also auf die Störungen auf der Ebene des *Aida*, zurückführen. Eine ähnliche Perspektive kann man auch bei Scheler finden, der im *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie eine Beeinträchtigung des Vermögens des *emotional sharing* sowie der intersubjektiven Dimension sieht, sodass der *ordo amoris* in eine solipsistische Dimension stürzt.

Es ist die Begegnung mit dem Anderen, die es ermöglicht, dem Bildungsprozess der Person eine Perspektive im Sinne des *festum* (Kimura) oder der *Wiedergeburt* (Scheler) zu eröffnen. Sowohl die Psychopathologie des *ordo amoris* als auch die des *Aida* kommen zum Ergebnis, dass genau diese Perspektive im *modus vivendi* der Schizophrenie beeinträchtigt wird.

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Keywords

Max Scheler; Bin Kimura; Viktor von Weizsäcker; Phenomenological Psychopathology; *ordo amoris*; *Aida* (Between); Wertnehmung (Valueception); sympathetic *Grundverhältnis* (basic relationship); Minimal Self; Existential Feelings.

Abstract

In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the *world of persons with schizophrenia* from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler's indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker.

In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the *modus vivendi* of schizophrenic patients in relation to a disturbance on the level of the “minimal self”. Subsequently, the discussion has highlighted the importance of disorders on the level of intercorporeality and intersubjectivity (Thomas Fuchs) and

on the level of “existential feelings” (Matthew Ratcliffe).

This paper argues that Max Scheler and Bin Kimura allow us to focus on an aspect which has been neglected so far: that of a “relational self” that relates to the very foundation of intersubjectivity and intercorporeality and that can thus be reborn in the encounter with the other and may position itself differently in the world. In Scheler’s perspective, the *world of persons with schizophrenia* is the result of an axiological disorder (*valueception*) that impairs contact with the primordial *life impulse* (*Lebensdrang*). As a consequence, they are incapable of attuning emotionally and socially with others: this prevents the singularity from being reborn in the encounter with the other and forces them to position themselves in their own solipsistic universe. Moving in a similar direction, Bin Kimura interprets the world of *persons with schizophrenia* as the result of a disorder of *aida* (one of the central concepts of Japanese culture that indicates the space of being in between). The disorder of *aida* compromises the *basic relationship* (*Grundverhältnis* in the sense of Viktor von Weizsäcker) and hinders what Bin Kimura calls *festum*, i.e. the birth of subjectivity, so that it is experienced by *persons with schizophrenia* only as *ante festum*. Starting from these two perspectives, I argue the existence of an *axiological* and *anthropogenetic* dimension of psychopathology.

I begin with a discussion of Zahavi’s concept of *minimal self* and the thesis that reveals the disorders on this level of subjectivity as the origin of the world of *persons with schizophrenia*. I, then, analyze Max Scheler’s position and its historic importance for the emergence of phenomenological psychopathology. Thereafter, I introduce the concepts of “disorder of *aida*” (Bin Kimura) and “disorder of *ordo amoris*” (Max Scheler). Finally, I develop the concept of a “psychopathology of *ordo amoris*” by also comparing it with Ratcliffe’s thesis of “existential feelings”.

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ISSN 2284-2918