Zum Problem der Originalität der Einfühlung bei Husserl und Scheler

Abstract

There have once been great bifurcations or even contradictions between Husserl and Scheler on issues of phenomenology of ethics and religion, and the cause has been ultimately traced back to the fundamental differences between their respective philosophical stances and methods. Nonetheless, in comparative studies as regards their theories of empathy, we often see that, albeit the differences as such may be spe­cifi­cal­ly manifested in the two philosophers’ different reflections on the same issue, they may not necessarily lead to drastically different results. My comparative studies on Husserl and Scheler about their theories of intersubjectivity or of experience of others show that, apart from the differences at the level of fundamental stances on tran­scen­den­tal ideas, they are not in opposite to each other on thoughts and analyses in this respect, and their analyses and conclusions also show the typical traits of phe­nom­e­nol­o­gy. To be sure, Scheler has never completely abandoned metaphysical thinking mode and, more than that, in his published works he has tried, once and again, to discuss some metaphysical issues or to enter into some metaphysical spheres by virtue of phenomenology. Similar attempts, however, are not that rare in some unpublished manuscripts of Husserl. Howbeit Husserl is undoubtedly phenomenological in terms of fundamental issues of phenomenology and the intentional analyses in his published works, many thoughts recorded in his manuscripts during the course of his long and prolific studies are not exactly phenomenological; rather, they have metaphysical or speculative traits, as shown, among others, by his reflections on the primal single stream of mental process, his intersubjective reflections in the dimension of monadology, and his differentiation between actual and non-actual empathies. It is likely that various things’ own traits determine the modes of discussion pertinent to them. For instance, the nature of non-consciousness determines that the thinking about and grasping of it cannot be phenomenological intentional analyses in the strict sense of the word.