Essere «divorati dal pentimento». Sguardi sulla nozione di <i>metameleia</i> in Aristotele

Abstract

To be « devoured by remorse». Gazes on the notion of ‘metameleia’ in Aristotle

This paper aims at crossing that complex crossroads of emotions, desires and memories represented by the thorny question of remorse, on which Aristotle engages in some passages of his reflections. These passages prove to be of great interest for the series of implications and repercussions, in the ethical, anthropological and also juridical field. After a complete, lexicographic research on the terms of the semantic field of the notion in question (metameleia, metamelo, metameletikos, and also, e contrario, ametameletos) inside the corpus aristotelicum, I intend to read the topic of remorse by means of that paradigm (already verified in other fields), that can be said multifocal approach. This is the paradigm, typically Aristotelian (and, more in general, characteristic of the ancient thought), consisting in the constant multiplication of the explicative models of reality and in the refusal of the alternative logic aut-aut. In this conceptual horizon, this paper aims at reconstructing the multiple connections and the very different conceptual frames of the notion of remorse with other crucial notions: passion (pathos) – and, more particularly, with the passion of pain (lype) –, modesty (aidos), shame (aischyne), ignorance, choice, vice and lack of self-control (akrasia). Furthemore it is necessary to reflect on the opposite evaluations expressed by Aristotle on the remorse: in a certain sense, it represents a sign of the regret of the agent, while, in another sense, it has to be connected to error and to the awareness to have done a wrong action.