

FRANCESCA PENTASSUGLIO

SOCRATIC *EUDAIMONIA*
IN TWO *ALKIBIADES* DIALOGUES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. *Introduction*; 2. *Eudaimonìa and virtue, eudaimonìa and knowledge*; 3. *The care for others*; 4. *Concluding remarks*.

1. Introduction

Any study on Socratic eudaimonism is bound to entail an investigation of the complex relations between εὐδαιμονία and ἀρετή, ἀρετή and knowledge, knowledge and εὐδαιμονία, regarding which Socratic scholarship offers widely differing views.

Different possible relationships have been proposed, in particular, as regards the connection between virtue and happiness, mainly outlined with reference to Plato's Socratic dialogues.

The understanding of such a relationship is made all the more difficult by the semantic complexity of the terms involved. As far as the notion of εὐδαιμονία is concerned,¹ it has been noted that there is no one-to-one mapping or perfect overlap between the Greek word and the corresponding terms in modern languages [Bobonich 2011, 295-296; Reshotko 2013, 156]. The English expressions “flourishing life” and “fulfillment” have been often used, even by non-English-speaking scholars [Ferrari 2007, 42; Sassi 2015, 155], to render the meaning of the ancient term εὐδαιμονία as a *continuous* (rather than “peak”) experience, as well as its *objective* component. We shall therefore bear this semantic intricacy in mind when using terms such as “happiness” and “being happy”.

A further problem concerns the possible logical relations between these notions. Debates among scholars have focused on the necessity

¹ Reshotko 2013, 157-158 summarises the main interpretative problems raised by the notion (and the translation) of ἀρετή within the framework of Socratic eudaimonism.

and/or sufficiency of virtue for happiness, by setting – among other theses – the *identity thesis*² in contrast to the *sufficiency thesis*³ and its variants.⁴ Further interpretations include the so-called *instrumental view*,⁵ which deems virtue to be a means to achieve happiness (and a good only in so far as it is a means to happiness).⁶ This is related, in turn, to the issue of whether or not happiness is the only and ultimate human good, which has also been a matter of scholarly discussion,⁷ and

² Rudebusch 1999, 123-128 (cf. 97 ff.) has argued that Plato's Socrates considers the possession of virtue a sufficient condition for happiness by defending the validity of the argument expounded in the first book of the *Republic* (349b-354a; on the happiness of the individual in Plato's *Republic*, see Morrison 2001). The overarching thesis is that Socrates identifies «pleasant activity» with «virtuous activity» (Rudebusch 1999, 125-126), and can thus make both pleasure and virtue the chief good (cf. Reshotko 2009, 8-10). For a critical discussion of this thesis and its proponents see Bobonich 2011, 314-319.

³ See Vlastos 1991, 224-231. Against the identity thesis, he argues that «if Identity were the true relation of virtue to happiness, *we would have no rational ground for preference between alternatives which are equally consistent with virtue*» (225, emphasis in the original). Evidence of Socrates' commitment to the sufficiency thesis (on which see also Reeve 1989, 137-138, and Irwin 1995, 58-60) is mainly found in the *Gorgias* (467e1-468b4; 469b12-c2). Within this framework, an “adaptative” understanding of happiness has been ascribed to Socrates (Irwin 1986), according to which virtue is sufficient for happiness insofar as the virtuous person can adjust his or her desires in such a way as to *want* whatever the external circumstances require.

⁴ To give an example, Brickhouse & Smith 1994, 118, argue, against the sufficiency thesis, that it is virtuous activity rather than virtue itself that is sufficient for happiness.

⁵ Irwin 1977, 92-93, in particular, defended the view that virtue is only instrumentally good. He later mitigated this thesis (Irwin 1986, 90, note 9, cf. 105; 1995, 67-68) in light of some criticism (Zeyl 1982; Vlastos 1984, 207, note 54). For a discussion of this thesis see also Klosko 1987, 253, 255-256. According to Rudebusch 1999, 145, note 2, the mere *possession* of virtue is only instrumentally valuable, while the activity of virtue, as a pleasant activity (cf. 108-113), is also intrinsically valuable.

⁶ Bobonich 2011, 299, speaks of the «Identity Claim» (happiness is identical with virtue), «Part/Whole Claim» (virtue is a part of happiness) and «Instrumental Claim» (virtue is a causal means to the distinct end of happiness).

⁷ See Vlastos 1991, 230, in whose opinion happiness is «the final unconditional good»; Ferrari 2007, 39-41; Reshotko 2013, 159; cf. 165-170. On the thesis that *virtue/wisdom* is the only good, see, among others, Santas 1993, 43; Rudebusch 1999, 5; Benson 2000, 150, note 31.

which raises the problem of the role played not only by virtue, but also by other non-moral goods (such as wealth and health) in the attainment of εὐδαιμονία.⁸

Despite this large body of literature, Plato has Socrates explicitly tell us very little about the nature of εὐδαιμονία.⁹ A valuable contribution to the debate may thus come from the analysis of a further account on the issue, namely that provided by Aeschines of Sphettus in the *Alcibiades*. Given the fragmentary state of the dialogue, I will examine some of the surviving testimonies in relation to a few parallel passages from *Alcibiades* I, which show a striking consonance with Aeschines' work¹⁰ as regards the notion of εὐδαιμονία and its preconditions.

The present paper will focus on these two *Alcibiades* dialogues, whose comparative analysis may both enrich our understanding of Socratic εὐδαιμονία and shed light on some basic surrounding issues:

⁸ For a general framework see Klosko 1987, who proposes an account of Socrates' moral position which attempts to encompass both the «knowledge argument» (only wisdom is always good and knowledge accounts for both happiness and virtue) and the «absolute argument» (virtue is a necessary and sufficient condition for happiness), and to temper them through the so-called «wider view», according to which happiness is a complex state and consists of different elements (258). On this view – evidence of which may be found in the *Crito* (47d-e) and *Lysis* (220a-b) – virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness, and a plurality of things are considered «intrinsically good» by Socrates (259-260). See also Vlastos 1991, 231, and Brickhouse & Smith 2013, 196 (for further references see below, note 21).

⁹ Some fundamental accounts can be found in *Euthd.* 279a-282e; *Chrm.* 173d-174b; *Ly.* 207d-209c; see also *Grg.* 470e; 491e-497d; *Men.* 88a-c, and *R.* 349b-354a.

¹⁰ Close similarities between the two dialogues have already been noted by ancient commentators, as evidenced by a statement in Aelius Aristides' *De quattuor*. The author here compares Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Alcibiades* I, affirming the superiority of Aeschines' Socrates, who was able to bring about the transformation of Alcibiades in a different and more efficient way (*De quatt.* 577). For modern scholars the analogies between the two works raise the issue of their chronological relation, which depends, in turn, on the problem of the authenticity of *Alcibiades* I. Reconstructing the terms of the debate is not feasible within the confines of this paper. I will just recall that, according to Dittmar 1912, 174, Aeschines' *Alcibiades* was written between 394-393 and 391-390 B.C., while *Alcibiades* I was composed between 340 and 330 B.C. A different chronological relation has been proposed by Giannantoni 1997, 358. On this debate see also Clark 1955; Arrighetti 2000, 21-29; Smith 2004, 93-97, and Renaud 2007, 226-229.

- a) the role of ἀρετή in the attainment of εὐδαιμονία and its relationship to happiness as a goal;
- b) the fundamental connection between knowledge and εὐδαιμονία and the subsequent understanding of ἀμαθία as an obstacle to happiness;
- c) the problem of whether or not an “expert” is needed to evaluate one’s happiness;
- d) the role of the care for others in relation to the search for εὐδαιμονία.

2. Eudaimonìa and virtue, eudaimonìa and knowledge

The main testimony on Aeschines’ treatment of εὐδαιμονία in the *Alcibiades* is to be found in two parallel passages from Cicero and Augustine, whose accounts vividly describe the process by which Socrates leads Alcibiades to acknowledge his own ἀμαθία and the consequent need for ἀρετή.¹¹

For what shall we say – seeing that Socrates, as we are told, convinced Alcibiades that he was in no true sense a man (*eum nihil hominis esse*) and that there was no difference, despite his noble birth (*summo loco natum*), between him and any manual labourer (*quemvis baiolum*), whereupon Alcibiades was much distressed and implored Socrates with tears to teach him virtue and drive baseness away (*ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret*) – what shall we say, Cleanthes? [...] I ask you then – the grief which Alcibiades felt, did it not come from evils and flaws in the soul (*non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat*)? (Cic. *Tusc.* III 32,77-78 = *SSR* VI A 47 and 52 = 71 and 80 P.; transl. J.E. King 1927, modified).¹²

A story in point is related about Alcibiades, if I am not mistaken

¹¹ I had the opportunity to comment on these passages in the context of a comparison with *Alcibiades* I in Pentassuglio 2014, 67 ff., with special regard to the notions of virtue and self-knowledge. Some of the conclusions are resumed in the present study.

¹² The double numbering of the testimonies on Aeschines refers to the collections *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (= *SSR*) and *Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze* (= *P*).

about the man's name. For though he considered himself happy (*beatus*), he burst into tears, we are told, when Socrates in a discussion proved to him how wretched he was (*quam miser esset*) since he was foolish (*quoniam stultus*). In his case then foolishness (*stultitia*) was the cause of his useful and desirable grief (*utilis optandaeque tristitiae*), the grief of a man who regrets that he is what he ought not to be (August. *De civ. D.* XIV 8,3 = *SSR* VI A 47 = 72 P.; transl. P. Levine 1966).

According to Cicero's account, Socrates makes Alcibiades realise that, in spite of his noble birth, he did not differ from a *baiolus* and thus he was «in no true sense a man». As a consequence of this awareness the young man, in tears, begs Socrates to free him from *turpitudine* and to teach him *virtus*. The parallel passage by Augustine enriches this picture and – what is more relevant for our purposes – explicitly evokes the issue of εὐδαιμονία: Alcibiades considered himself to be happy (*beatus*) before Socrates made him aware of being wretched (*miser*) because he was *stultus*.

Both sources can be combined in order to create a unitary portrayal: Alcibiades, aware and proud of his noble birth, believes that this is a good enough reason for him to be filled with happiness. Socrates, however, at the end of an elenctic procedure that is not reported,¹³ shows Alcibiades just how wretched he actually is, because – as we may infer from the opposition *virtus/animi vitia* – true happiness is based on the possession of virtue and Alcibiades has no knowledge of this precondition (he is ἀμαθής). As a consequence, he proves to be worthless and does not differ from «any manual labourer».

This last assertion allows us to draw a first parallel with *Alcibiades* I, where the same connection between ἀμαθής and δημιουργός is outlined.¹⁴ After stating that «no physician, in so far as he is a physician,

¹³ Hints to Socratic ἔλεγχος in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* can be found – as well as in Aristid. *De quatt.* 348 (discussed below) – in *POxy.* 1608 col. I fr. A (*SSR* VI A 48 = 74 P.) and in Aristid. *De quatt.* 576 (*SSR* VI A 51 = 78 P.).

¹⁴ This and other similarities between the two dialogues were first noted by Dittmar 1912, 136 ff. and 152 ff., who interpreted them as evidence of *Alcibiades* I's dependence on Aeschines' work. According to his view, the author of *Alcibiades* I (which he considered a spurious dialogue written between 340 and 330 B.C.) draws heavily on Aeschines' text, particularly for all the themes that are not discussed in Xen. *Mem.*

knows himself, nor does any trainer, in so far as he is a trainer» (131a), Socrates continues:

And farmers, and craftsmen generally (οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί), are far from knowing themselves (γινώσκειν ἑαυτούς). For these people, it would seem, do not even know their own things, but only things still more remote than their own things, in respect of the arts which they follow; since they know but the things of the body, with which it is tended (*Alc.* I 131a-b).¹⁵

The ensuing discussion between Socrates and Alcibiades clearly shows that the kind of knowledge that the δημιουργοί utterly lack is self-knowledge and awareness of their own ignorance (whose relevance Socrates had stressed from the beginning of the conversation: 117b-118b).¹⁶ In this regard, two points are worth stressing. (a) Self-knowledge is defined as σωφροσύνη in 131b4; as a consequence, no one belonging to the δημιουργοί, who lack precisely this kind of knowledge, can be regarded as a σώφρων (131b). (b) Inasmuch as it coincides with knowledge of one's own limits, σωφροσύνη is conceived here as preparatory to the practice of «taking pains over oneself».

Further down in the dialogue Socrates sets out from the above assertion, which serves as the premise to a long chain of arguments (133c-135c): setting out from the claim that «self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance» (133c), Socrates leads Alcibiades to recognise

IV 2, the second chief source of the work. A degree of consonance between the two dialogues is also noted by Kahn 1992, esp. 584, whose hypothesis is that Plato in the *Symposium* further developed some of the themes discussed in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Aspasia*. Some scholars have also pointed to the similarities between Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Alcibiades* I, on the one hand, and Plato's *Charmides*, on the other: see Effe 1971, and Soulez-Luccioni 1974, 197-200.

¹⁵ All the English translations of *Alcibiades* I are by W.R.M. Lamb 1955.

¹⁶ I cannot address here the issue of the theoretical foundation of self-knowledge and its possible identification with the notion of self-consciousness, nor the issues pertaining to the so-called “paradigm of vision”. These raise a series of problems connected to the interpretation of the “self”, as well as to that of the structure of the soul and of the relation between that part of the soul «which is the seat of knowledge and thought» (133c) and the divine (see esp. Soulez-Luccioni 1974; Bearzi 1995; Brancacci 1997; Renaud 2007; Napolitano Valditara 2007; Palumbo 2010).

that only virtue becomes a free man, while vice becomes a slave (135c). In order to reach this conclusion, Socrates resorts to a series of arguments which are of the utmost interest for the purposes of our analysis.

The first argument is that a man who does not know will make mistakes and, in making mistakes, will «do ill both in private and in public» (134a). Once Alcibiades acknowledges that such a man will be wretched (ἄθλιος), and that «those for whom he is doing so [viz. doing ill]» will also be wretched, Socrates reaches the conclusion that «it is impossible to be happy (εὐδαίμονα εἶναι) if one is not temperate and good (σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθός)» (134a). Conversely, «it is the bad men (οἱ κακοί) who are wretched (ἄθλιοι)», because only temperance, not wealth, can free from wretchedness (134b).

Socrates, who thus far has spoken about σωφροσύνη, at this point introduces the notion of ἀρετή. He first sets his argument on the more general level of the city's welfare, by leading Alcibiades to acknowledge that what cities need if they are to be happy is not walls, warships or arsenals, but virtue. Consequently, if Alcibiades is to manage the city's affairs properly and honourably, he must impart virtue to its citizens (134b-c). As, however, one could never impart something he does not possess, he must first «acquire virtue himself (κτητέον ἀρετήν)» (134c).¹⁷

Thanks to this slight change of terms,¹⁸ Socrates formulates the same thesis again, but this time directly connects ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία, by establishing the former as the precondition for the latter:

Socr.: “And so you will act aright and well (ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εὖ)?”
 Alc.: “Yes”. Socr.: “Well now, if you act in this way, I am ready to warrant that you must be happy (εὐδαιμονήσειν)”. Alc.: “And I can rely on your warranty”. Socr.: “But if you act unjustly, with your eyes on the godless and dark, the probability is that your acts will resemble these through your ignorance of yourselves (ἀγνοοῦντες ὑμᾶς αὐτούς)”. Alc.: “That is probable”. [...] Socr.: “And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is

¹⁷ On the issue of the preliminary knowledge required of politicians, see also Pl. *Prt.* 319c-d.

¹⁸ The identity of ἀρετή and σωφροσύνη is not demonstrated and is not found in Aeschines' dialogue. Dittmar 1912, 142 suggests its derivation from the *Protagoras* (330b).

lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?”. Alc.: “It must”. Socr.: “Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy (εἰ μέλλετε εὐδαιμονεῖν), but virtue (ἀλλ’ ἀρετήν)” (134d-135b).

Switching from the state to the individual, Socrates draws the final conclusion from his reasoning: the lack of virtue becomes a slave; ἀρετή, instead, «becomes a free man» (135c). After claiming that the man who lacks virtue is not only ἄθλιος, but also δουλοπρεπής, Socrates leads Alcibiades to the conclusion that he is on the same side as slaves (135c).¹⁹

A clear consonance between the two works begins to emerge. Cicero’s and Augustine’s accounts show that, for Aeschines’ Socrates, there is no εὐδαιμονία without ἀρετή: this is why Alcibiades is actually *miser*, although he considers himself happy. His condition originates from ἀμαθία and this – we may argue – regards both his own limits and what could lead him to true εὐδαιμονία. Similarly, in *Alcibiades I* Socrates states that only the σώφρων καὶ ἀγαθός can be happy, while the one «who does not know» (the ἀμαθής) cannot (134a-b).

Moreover, we can infer from Alcibiades’ plea to be instructed about *virtus* (as reported by Cicero) that Socrates had previously encouraged the young man to pursue ἀρετή and had tried to persuade him of the need to achieve it in order to be filled with happiness. This is precisely what he does in *Alcibiades I*, where he explicitly claims that the one who wishes to be happy must ἀρετήν παρασκευάζεσθαι (135b).

From the analysis conducted so far it emerges that, in very general terms, both in Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* and in *Alcibiades I* Socrates focuses on the relationship between εὐδαιμονία and ἀρετή and establishes a direct connection between being virtuous and being happy.

The texts do not allow us to determine whether, in Aeschines, happiness «is the ultimate and inevitable goal for all human activity» [Reshotko 2013, 159; cf. 165-170],²⁰ nor to ascertain the nature of the

¹⁹ Cf. Xen. *Mem.* IV 2, 40, where Euthydemus states that he considers himself a δοῦλος.

²⁰ See also Bobonich 2011, 296-305, who in the light of this re-discusses the two principles of Rational Eudaimonism and Psychological Eudaimonism (cf. Irwin 1995,

relationship between happiness as a good and other competing moral goods (including virtue). Nonetheless, the surviving testimonies so far allow us to make at least two points: *a*) the attainment of virtue is *crucial* for the attainment of εὐδαιμονία: Socrates' exhortations to achieve ἀρετή in this context would remain unexplained if happiness turned out to be achievable without virtue; *b*) a major obstacle in the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία is represented by ἀμαθία.

Now, precisely a closer examination of the issue of ἀμαθία, starting from some fundamental references to this notion in *Alcibiades I*, allows us to investigate the role of some non-moral goods²¹ in the attainment of εὐδαιμονία.

In this regard, Socrates clearly states that ἀμαθία does not concern the knowledge of «the things of the body» (131b), because this is the kind of knowledge δημιουργοί possess. An earlier section of the dialogue shows that Alcibiades' ignorance concerns, instead, some fundamental moral notions, namely «just and unjust, noble and base, evil and good, expedient and inexpedient» (δίκαιον, ἄδικον, καλόν, αἰσχρόν, κακόν, ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον καὶ μὴ [συμφέρον], 117a-b; cf. 118a, and *Xen. Mem.* IV 2, 20-23). Ignorance of these notions is all the more serious not only because they represent «the greatest matters» (τὰ μέγιστα, 118a), but also – and especially – because, in this respect, Alcibiades is in the grip of the deepest ignorance (ἀμαθία [...] τῇ ἐσχάτῃ, 118b): he *believes* he knows what he actually does not, thereby lacking that self-knowledge advocated in the Delphic maxim (130e).

We may argue that if Socrates leads Alcibiades to acknowledge that he is not εὐδαίμων because he has no knowledge of such relevant moral notions, Alcibiades had presumably based his opinion on the possession of external goods. This is, indeed, what Socrates criticises the young

52-55).

²¹ On the role of external, non-moral goods (such as health, wealth, etc.) as regards Plato's Socrates, see Vlastos 1991, 231, who deems them to be «subordinate, non-final and conditional goods» that only make a «minuscule» difference for our happiness. Yet, in his view, they *are* goods (as it emerges from *Grg.* 467e1-468b4; 499c6-500a3; *Ly.* 218e; *Euthd.* 279a-b; *Men.* 78c; 87e-88d). By contrast, those who interpret the hedonistic position expressed in the *Protagoras* to be Socrates' ultimate view on εὐδαιμονία (Irwin 1995, 81-92) claim that only pleasure has the power to appear good to us. For a diverging interpretation see Boeri 2004, 118-121.

man for in his first speech (104a-c): Alcibiades' φρόνημα is based first of all on his beauty (104a); secondly, he was proud of his eminent γένος, as he belonged to the most distinguished family in Athens and had Pericles as his guardian (104a-b); finally, Socrates mentions Alcibiades' wealth, although this is not the good he takes greatest pride in (104b-c).

In this case too, a parallel reading of the two works clarifies certain aspects of Aeschines' *Alcibiades*: Cicero's reference to the fact that Alcibiades was *summo loco natus* suggests that, in this dialogue too, the young man may have based his high opinion of himself on the possession of external goods and especially his noble birth.

If connected to Socrates' arguments about happiness, this seems to imply that non-moral goods such as wealth or power do not contribute to the attainment of εὐδαιμονία. Although there is no explicit statement that such external goods make no difference for one's happiness, Socrates' words at the beginning of *Alcibiades I* make it clear that they brought about the harmful consequence of filling Alcibiades with pride (μεγαλαυχούμενος, 104c). This resulted in a sense of superiority, to which Socrates clearly refers when he blames Alcibiades for his overconfidence of having «no need of any man in any matter» (μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι) – a position that can be compared to the disdainful statement made by Aeschines' Alcibiades (and recorded by Aelius Aristides: *De quatt.* 575) that «no one was of any value» in his opinion. As such overconfidence cannot but contribute to Alcibiades' stalemate in a condition of ignorance, we may conclude that external goods – regardless of whether they appear good to the subject – do not enhance εὐδαιμονία.²²

The notion of ἀμαθία has turned out to be (at least) twofold so far: it can refer either to the lack of self-knowledge (and to unawareness of one's own limits) or to ignorance about key moral notions. But a third,

²² Unlike Socrates' argument in the *Euthydemus* (esp. 280b-281b), there is no reference here to the idea that such goods can be beneficial when used in accordance with wisdom (which mirrors the thesis that someone who is wealthy and powerful can suffer if he or she is ignorant: see Klosko 1987, 257-258). For a fuller account see the protreptic sections of the *Euthydemus* (278e-282d; 288c-292e) and of the *Meno* (87d-89c), where Socrates examines such supposed “goods” (health, wealth, physical beauty) or “virtues” (courage, prudence), with special regard to the conditions under which they prove beneficial (or not: *Euthd.* 280a-281e; *Men.* 87e).

more general meaning may be pointed out, one that can indirectly shed light on the role of knowledge in the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία, to which we shall now turn to.

Cicero's and Augustine's accounts on Aeschines' *Alcibiades* show that, before Socrates' elenctic questioning, Alcibiades was also mistaken as to what his happiness consisted in. With regard to Socrates' eudaimonism in Plato, it has been noted [Reshotko 2013, 165] that a person may be wrong about whether or not εὐδαιμονία is what he or she is currently experiencing,²³ because thinking that a particular action or (external) good will lead to happiness or is constitutive of happiness is no guarantee that it actually will or is. This further implies that it may take an "external expert" in order to evaluate a person's happiness [ivi, 167].

The case of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* can be regarded as a concrete example of the possibility that a person might be mistaken about whether or not he or she is εὐδαίμων (cf. Pl. *Ap.* 36d-e, and *Grg.* 470e). Indeed, according to Augustine's testimony Alcibiades considered himself happy when, in fact, he was not. In this further sense, therefore, Alcibiades is ἀμαθής. Socrates, on the other hand, is able to *recognise* happiness in others because he *knows* what can and what cannot contribute to its attainment.

The latter point marks a partial difference with Alcibiades' portrayal in *Alcibiades* I.²⁴ Socrates' words in 104e suggest that, despite Alcibiades' pride in his own beauty, wealth and noble birth, he was not happy with his condition: «for if I saw you, Alcibiades, content with the things I set forth just now, and minded to pass your life in enjoying them, I should long ago have put away my love [...]». This does not amount, however, to the possession of the required knowledge about the nature of true εὐδαιμονία.

Now, in the passages examined above the notion of ἀμαθία is dealt with in more detail than that of knowledge, whose "positive" role we can reconstruct more indirectly. Useful elements in this regard are provided by Aelius Aristides in *De quatt.* 348-349, which reports the speech on Themistocles that, according to Aeschines, Socrates made in

²³ Bobonich 2011, 296, extends this idea to all Greek philosophers.

²⁴ I owe this point to Linda Napolitano Valditara, who drew my attention to the relevant passage from *Alcibiades* I.

the presence of Alcibiades. Socrates' words at the beginning of the passage («since you have dared to attack the life of Themistocles, consider the sort of man whom you thought that you must censure») suggest that Alcibiades had gone so far as to reproach the great politician. At the end of a long praise of Themistocles' strategic skills and outstanding valour – aimed at turning Alcibiades' attention to the politician's valour on the battlefield and to his merits in the eyes of the Athenians – the moral exhortation implied in the speech becomes clear:

Then consider, Alcibiades, that even for such a man knowledge, although so great (ἡ ἐπιστήμη τοσαύτη οὔσα), was not enough to avoid expulsion or disfranchisement by his city, but was insufficient. What then do you think it would be for bad men who take no care of themselves (ἐν μηδεμιᾷ ἐπιμελείᾳ ἑαυτῶν οὔσιν)? It is not remarkable if they can even be successful in small matters? (*De quatt.* 348; transl. C.A. Behr 1986).

A couple of crucial concepts emerges from the passage, namely ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. The importance of «taking care of oneself» is clearly dealt with by Socrates in *Alcibiades I* (he asks Alcibiades τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι in 127e), where – as we have seen – it shows a close connection to the issue of (self-)knowledge. Tellingly, Socratic questioning leads to the conclusion that «if we have that knowledge, we are likely to know what pains to take over ourselves (γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχ' ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν); but if we have it not, we never can» (129a).

Equally important is the reference to ἐπιστήμη, which in the context of Socrates' praise of Themistocles suggests that also the pursuit of knowledge is a crucial factor to avoid a miserable end. However, as in the case of the victor of Salamis, it could prove insufficient as a means to attain εὐδαιμονία. Although we have no evidence of any arguments regarding the sufficiency of knowledge for happiness, and we cannot therefore draw definitive conclusions in this regard, Socrates' speech seems to imply that while anyone who wishes to be happy should pursue knowledge, this does not guarantee that he or she will indeed reach the status of εὐδαίμων.

Regarding the relationship between knowledge and virtue, one of

the most widely debated topics in studies on Plato's Socrates,²⁵ it may be noted that in both dialogues ἀρετή seems to be featured as a form of knowledge. In Aeschines' *Alcibiades* the acquisition of virtue requires μάθησις and ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ (cf. Xen. *Mem.* IV 2, 20). This is what the Themistocles example within Socrates' protreptic speech ultimately aims to highlight. A further testimony from Aelius Aristides' *De quattuor* (576-577) – to which we shall return in the next section – reports that Socrates had Alcibiades engage with Themistocles' παρασκευή. This passage can be combined with Themistocles' reference to the importance of σπουδαιότης ἐν ἀρετῇ (*De quattuor*. 348). Socrates' moral exhortations therefore convey the idea that ἀρετή is not a natural gift, but requires training and a commitment to acquire knowledge of fundamental moral notions.

Similarly, in *Alcibiades I* Socrates advises Alcibiades to resort to μάθησις and ἄσκησις τῆς ἀρετῆς as a means to counter the negative effects of popular approval (132a ff.; cf. Xen. *Mem.* I 2, 19; 23). Furthermore, the first part of the dialogue is entirely devoted to showing that Alcibiades' natural dispositions are insufficient when not combined with ἐπιμέλεια, ἄσκησις and σοφία. The last of these, in particular, is defined as ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή in 133b10, which reveals the crucial role played by knowledge in the acquisition of virtue: for only education can make gifted young men achieve knowledge about moral values and, through it, ἀρετή.

3. *The care for others*

A further issue remains to be addressed: against the backdrop of these discussions about virtue, knowledge, εὐδαιμονία, and their interconnection, what is the role ascribed to the care for others in the two dialogues?

Let us start by clarifying that Aeschines' *Alcibiades* does not di-

²⁵ The literature on Socrates' identification of virtue with knowledge is enormous and beyond the scope of this study. For some relevant accounts see Ferber 1991; Weiss 1985; Gould 1987; Nehamas 1999. A recent contribution on the topic can be found in Brickhouse & Smith 2013, who focus on «motivational intellectualism» (as distinct from «virtue intellectualism»).

rectly oppose the search for εὐδαιμονία and the welfare of others as two competing motivations in the same individual. The issues surrounding the pursuit of happiness are exemplarily applied to Alcibiades' case, whereas the highest *exemplum* of the care for others in the dialogue is to be found in Socrates' paideutic activity.

Nonetheless, it seems possible to apply to Aeschines' Socrates what has been said about Plato's Socrates, namely that in his view «how we treat others is part of the science of human happiness» [Reshotko 2013, 178], meaning that correct views about how to treat others and about how to attain happiness do not represent two separate spheres. Indeed, Socrates' exhortations to pursue what leads to true εὐδαιμονία are framed, in these two dialogues too, in «the sorts of complex loving relationships that Socrates is shown to have had with some of his associates» [ivi, 180].

Yet, while this is not always explicit in Plato's dialogues, in Aeschines' *Alcibiades* Socrates' ability to improve others – and particularly Alcibiades – is directly associated with ἔρωσ. In a fragment reported by Aelius Aristides (*De rhet.* I 74 = *SSR* VI A 53 = 82 P.), Socrates denies that he possesses any τέχνη to benefit other people, and explicitly states that he could improve the young man διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, «through love» (cf. *Plut. Vit. Alc.* IV 4). In *Alcibiades* I too the nature of the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades is quite clear from the beginning of the dialogue, where Socrates explains to Alcibiades the reason why he has sought him (103a-b). Indeed, Socrates immediately introduces himself as Alcibiades' ἐραστής at the beginning of his speech and, in a passage quoted above (104e), he mentions his love for the young man again (πάλαι ἂν ἀπηλλάγμην τοῦ ἔρωτος).²⁶

Moreover, both works give an account of the effect of Socratic exhortation on Alcibiades and of his care for the young man's welfare. As regards Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, this aspect is evidenced not only by the passages from Cicero and Augustine, but also by the testimony in *De quattuor* mentioned above (576 = *SSR* VI A 51 = 78 P.), where Aelius Aristides depicts a scene that reappears in several other sources: Socrates leads Alcibiades «to weep with his head on his knees, having

²⁶ See also 135e: «So my love (ὁ ἐμὸς ἔρωσ) will be just like a stork; for after hatching a winged love in you it is to be cherished in return by its nestling».

become disheartened because he had not even nearly prepared himself like Themistocles». ²⁷ After realising how far he was from Themistocles' παρασκευή (the need for which he had questioned in *Alcibiades* I, 119b), Alcibiades has a reaction comparable to that reported by Plutarch (*Quomodo adul.* 29, p. 69e-f): «in such manner Socrates tried to keep Alcibiades in check, and drew an honest tear from his eyes by exposing his faults (δάκρυον ἐξῆγεν ἀληθινὸν ἐξελεγχομένου), and so turned his heart» (transl. F.C. Babbitt 1927).

Despite some minor differences, all sources describe the effect of Socratic ἔλεγχος in much the same terms: first, *aporìa* and frustration on the part of Alcibiades, who then gives in to Socrates and, if we rely on Cicero, begs him to teach him virtue.

A similar display of self-awareness by Alcibiades can be found in the last section of *Alcibiades* I. After having led Alcibiades to acknowledge that his own condition is worthy of a slave, Socrates brings his refutations to an end and directly asks: «And do you now perceive how you stand? Are you on the side of the free, or not?» (135c). Alcibiades' reply («I think I perceive only too clearly») displays the results of Socratic ἔλεγχος; in the final exchanges of the conversation, Alcibiades becomes aware of his condition and declares that, from this moment onwards, he is willing to follow Socrates (135d) and to begin «to take pains over justice» (135e).

Now, if we understand the care for others as an instrument through which the “teacher”, as a guide, helped the disciple to improve himself, by shaping his character in view of εὐδαιμονία [Cardullo 2020, 8], both Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Alcibiades* I can be seen to provide a vivid and instructive example of its application.

4. Concluding remarks

The comparative reading of the two *Alcibiades* dialogues has brought a series of common traits to light. In both dialogues Alcibiades is reticent when faced with Socrates' exhortation to acquire virtue and denies the

²⁷ On Socrates' use of shame as an instrument of moral persuasion see McKim 1988; Woodruff 2000; Moss 2005; see also Rossetti 2011, 55-99 on *Mem.* IV 2.

need for ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ, proud of his noble birth (in Aeschines), and of his wealth and natural talent (in *Alcibiades I*). In Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, in particular, Alcibiades' firm belief that he is εὐδαίμων, in so far as he is endowed with external goods, is taken as the starting point of Socrates' ἔλεγχος.

Against Alcibiades' overconfidence, Socrates points out that ἀρετή is the key requirement for true εὐδαιμονία and encourages Alcibiades to acquire it, stressing the need for an everlasting ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ. Through a long chain of stringent ἔλεγχοι, reported in detail only in *Alcibiades I*, he leads Alcibiades to acknowledge his own unsuitability with respect to his ambitious political goal. The resulting awareness of this condition stirs confusion in the young man's soul and undermines his pride. Finally open to moral exhortation, Alcibiades begs Socrates to teach him ἀρετή and to free him from αἰσχροτήης (in Aeschines); he is now willing to follow Socrates and to take pains over justice (in *Alcibiades I*).

Returning to the four questions raised in the introduction, the following points can be made by way of conclusion.

a) In both dialogues ἀρετή turns out to be decisive for εὐδαιμονία, without being identical to it. While we have good reasons to argue that virtue and happiness are two non-identical goods²⁸ (in so far as one is assumed as the precondition for the other), we should not go so far as to take a clear-cut stance on the relation between the two in terms of necessity and/or sufficiency [see Bobonich 2011, 314-324]. Not only does the fragmentary state of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* not allow us to reconstruct the logical relationship between ἀρετή and εὐδαιμονία, but this was probably not the point of Socrates' treatment of happiness. Most likely, Socrates was not primarily interested in detecting the logical relationship between the two concepts of virtue and happiness [Reshotko 2013, 162];²⁹ rather, he aimed to define the role of virtue (and knowledge) in the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία in order to fulfil his wider pedagogical goals.

Likewise, the questions of whether or not εὐδαιμονία is the ultimate

²⁸ Cf. Pl. *Euthd.* 278e-281e.

²⁹ As an alternative, Reshotko 2013, 162-164, 183, proposes a *nomological approach* to Socratic eudaimonism, by arguing in favour of a law-like relationship between the pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of happiness.

goal of human activity³⁰ and of whether or not its full attainment is beyond human reach³¹ cannot be answered on the basis of the evidence provided in these two dialogues.³²

b) Both Aeschines' *Alcibiades* and *Alcibiades I* lay great emphasis on the obstacles impeding the achievement of εὐδαιμονία – the main of which is ἀμαθία – and on the means to overcome them. In both accounts the chief means to contrast ignorance, and thus unhappiness, is found in knowledge and in the care of the self. The latter, in particular, requires a form of self-knowledge that – like knowledge in general – constitutes a requisite for happiness.³³ Indeed, even though Aelius Aristides' testimony suggests that knowledge may be insufficient to attain εὐδαιμονία,³⁴ the pursuit of knowledge (paired with the acquisition of virtue) turns out to be the only controllable factor that can enhance the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία [Reshotko 2009, 15]. Non-moral goods such as wealth or power, on the contrary, would not appear to contribute to the attainment of happiness.

c) The claim that ἀρετή consists in a form of knowledge and that virtue is a key condition for happiness implies that εὐδαιμονία requires knowledge to be acquired. Socrates' protreptic speeches and his admonitions about true happiness suggest that εὐδαιμονία also requires knowledge in order to be *recognised*. This recalls an observation made about Plato's Socrates [Reshotko 2013, 177; cf. Gerson 1997, 5], namely that the question whether any particular individual is happy may be better answered by someone who is an expert on the subject of happiness rather than by the person himself; differently put, as far as Socrates is concerned, the conviction of being happy does not constitute any evi-

³⁰ See Bobonich 2011, and Reshotko 2013, 167-170, 174-175, 183.

³¹ The issue is dealt with in Reshotko 2009, 10, according to which εὐδαιμονία is inaccessible for the same reasons as knowledge and virtue are: human constrictions of space and time.

³² So does the issue of its "objective" nature as a goal (on which see Reshotko 2013, 165-167). On the assumption that happiness is objective, see *Ly.* 207d-209c; *Men.* 88a-c; *Euthd.* 279d-280a.

³³ For parallels in Plato see *Euthd.* 279e-280a; 280b-282e; *Chrm.* 173e-174a; *Hp. mi.* 376b.

³⁴ By contrast, σοφία and σωφροσύνη are said to be infallible in *Euthd.* 280a, and in *Chrm.* 171d-172a, respectively.

dence for happiness. The case of Aeschines' *Alcibiades* clearly shows that the fact that someone believes he is happy does not imply an actual *eudaimonic* state.

d) Plato's Socrates affirms on several occasions that one cannot benefit himself by harming others (*Cri.* 48a-d; *R.* I 335b-c; cf. *Ap.* 25c; *Grg.* 472c-481b). Nothing of the sort can be found in Aeschines' work (nor in *Alcibiades* I), although the portrayal of Alcibiades provided by the two dialogues is not incompatible with the hypothesis that the young man could have misled himself into thinking that things accomplished by harming others – such as the attainment of political power and wealth – constitute εὐδαιμονία. However, even though the search for happiness and the care for others are not presented as two competing motivations behind an individual's behaviour, they prove to be bound up within Socrates' teaching activity. Indeed, in both works they are connected within the paideutic relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, whose education (and welfare) is pursued – according to Aeschines – διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν.

From a wider perspective, the care for others can be understood, in Socratic terms, as dedication to the moral improvement of others. In this sense, Socrates' "mission" consisted in taking care of his disciples' souls, and in teaching them how to take care of themselves.

Bibliographic references

Primary sources

Aeschines of Sphettus, *Eschine di Sfetto. Tutte le testimonianze*, a c. di F. Pentassuglio, Turnhout, Brepols, 2017.

Augustine, *City of God*, vol. IV: *Books 12-15*, transl. P. Levine, Loeb Classical Library 414, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1966.

Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, transl. J.E. King, Loeb Classical Library 141, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1927.

Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vol. VIII: *Alcibiades 1, Alcibiades*

2, *Hipparchus, Lovers, Theages, Charmides, Laches, Lysis*, transl. W.R.M. Lamb, Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press-William Heinemann Ltd., 1955.

Platone, *Alcibiade Primo. Alcibiade Secondo*, introduzione di G. Arrighetti, traduzione e note di D. Puliga, Milano, Rizzoli, 2000.

Plutarch, *Moralia*, transl. F.C. Babbitt, Cambridge/London, Harvard University Press-William Heinemann Ltd. 1927.

Publius Aelius Aristides, *The Complete Works*, vol. 1: *Orations 1-16*, transl. C.A. Behr, Leiden, Brill, 1986.

Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae, collegit, disposuit, apparatibus notisque instruxit G. Giannantoni, 4 vols., Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1990.

Secondary Sources

Arrighetti, G. [2000], *Introduzione*, in: Platone, *Alcibiade Primo. Alcibiade Secondo*, traduzione e note di D. Puliga, Milano, Rizzoli, 5-29.

Bearzi, F. [1995], *Alcibiade I 132d-133c7: una singolare forma di auto-coscienza*, in: *Studi classici e orientali* 45, 143-162.

Benson, H.H. [2000], *Socratic Wisdom: the Model of Knowledge in Plato's Early Dialogues*, New York, Oxford University Press.

Bobonich, C. [2011], *Socrates and eudaimonia*, in: D.R. Morrison (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 293-332.

Boeri, M.D. [2004], *Socrates, Aristotle, and the Stoics on the apparent and real Good*, in: J.J. Cleary, G.M. Gurtler (eds.), *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 20, 109-141.

Brancacci, A. [1997], *Socrate e il tema semantico della coscienza*, in: G. Giannantoni, M. Narcy (a c. di), *Lezioni socratiche*, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 280-301.

Brickhouse, T.C., Smith, N.D. [1994], *Plato's Socrates*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Brickhouse, T.C., Smith, N.D. [2013], *Socratic moral psychology*, in:

- N.D. Smith, J. Bussanich (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates*, London/New York, Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 185-209.
- Cardullo, R.L. [2020], La “cura di sé” come prima tappa del progresso spirituale dell’uomo nei commentari neoplatonici all’*Alcibiade primo*, in: *Bollettino della Società Filosofica Italiana* 231, 7-28.
- Clark, P.M. [1955], *The Greater Alcibiades*, in: *Classical Quarterly* 5, 231-240.
- Dittmar, H. [1912], *Aischines von Sphettos: Studien zur Literaturgeschichte der Sokratiker*, Berlin, Weidmann.
- Effe, B. [1971], Platons *Charmides* und der *Alkibiades* des Aischines von Sphettos, in: *Hermes* 99, 198-208.
- Ferber, R. [1991], Sokrates: Tugend ist Wissen, in: *Elenchos* 12, 39-66.
- Ferrari, F. [2007], *Socrate tra personaggio e mito*, Milano, Rizzoli.
- Gerson, L.P. [1997], Socrates’ absolutist prohibition of wrongdoing, in: M.L. McPherran (ed.), *Wisdom, Ignorance, and Virtue: New Essays in Socratic Studies*, Edmonton, Academic Printing & Publishing, 1-11.
- Giannantoni, G. [1997]: L’*Alcibiade* di Eschine e la letteratura socratica su Alcibiade, in: G. Giannantoni, M. Narcy (a c. di), *Lezioni socratiche*, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 349-373.
- Gould, C.S. [1987], Socratic intellectualism and the problem of courage: an interpretation of Plato’s *Laches*, in: *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 4, 265-279.
- Grenfell, B.P. [1918], New Papyri from Oxyrhynchus, in: *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 5, 16-23.
- Irwin, T.H. [1977], *Plato’s Moral Theory: the Early and Middle Dialogues*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Irwin, T.H. [1986], Socrates the Epicurean?, in: *Illinois Classical Studies* 11, 85-112.
- Irwin, T.H. [1995], *Plato’s Ethics*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Kahn, C.H. [1992], Plato as a Socratic, in: *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* 10, 580-595.

- Klosko, G. [1987], Socrates on goods and happiness, in: *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 4, 251-264.
- McKim, R. [1988], Shame and truth in Plato's *Gorgias*, in: C.L. Griswold (ed.), *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings*, New York, Routledge, 34-48.
- Morrison, D.R. [2001], The happiness of the city and the happiness of the individual in Plato's *Republic*, in: *Ancient Philosophy* 21, 1-24.
- Moss, J. [2005], Shame, pleasure and the divided soul, in: *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29, 137-170.
- Napolitano Valditara, L.M. [2007], Il sapere dell'anima. Platone e il problema della consapevolezza di sé, in: M. Migliori, L.M. Napolitano Valditara, A. Fermani (a c. di), *Interiorità e anima. La psyche in Platone*, Milano, Vita & Pensiero, 165-200.
- Nehamas, A. [1999], Socratic intellectualism, in: Id., *Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 27-58.
- Palumbo, L. [2010], Socrate e la conoscenza di sé: per una nuova lettura di *Alc. I* 133a-c, in: L. Rossetti, A. Stavru (a c. di), *Socratica 2008. Studies in Ancient Socratic Literature*, Bari, Levante Editori, 185-209.
- Pentassuglio, F. [2014], Socrates on virtue and self-knowledge in *Alcibiades I* and Aeschines' *Alcibiades*, in: *Archai* 12, 65-75.
- Reeve, C.D.C. [1989], *Socrates in the Apology: an Essay on Plato's Apology of Socrates*, Indianapolis, Hackett.
- Renaud, F. [2007], La conoscenza di sé nell'*Alcibiade I* e nel commento di Olimpiodoro, in: M. Migliori, L.M. Napolitano Valditara, A. Fermani (a c. di), *Interiorità e anima. La psyche in Platone*, Milano, Vita & Pensiero, 225-244.
- Reshotko, N. [2009], Socrates and Plato on *sophia*, *eudaimonia* and their facsimiles, in: *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 26, 1-19.
- Reshotko, N. [2013], Socratic eudaimonism, in: J. Bussanich, N.D. Smith, (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates*, London/New York, Bloomsbury Academic Publishing, 156-184.
- Rossetti, L., Esposito, A. [1984], Socrate, Alcibiade, Temistocle e i "Do-

- dici Dèi”, in: *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 54, 27-35.
- Rossetti, L. [2011], *Le dialogue socratique*, avant-propos de F. Roustang, Paris, Les Belles Lettres/Encre Marine.
- Rudebusch, G. [1999], *Socrates, Pleasure, and Value*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Santas, G.X. [1993], Socratic goods and Socratic happiness, in: *Apeiron* 26, 37-52.
- Sassi, M.M. [2015], *Indagine su Socrate. Persona filosofo cittadino*, Torino, Einaudi.
- Smith, N.D. [2004], Did Plato write the *Alcibiades I?*, in: *Apeiron* 37, 93-108.
- Soulez-Luccioni, A. [1974], Le paradigme de la vision de soi-même dans l'*Alcibiade Majeur*, in: *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 79, 196-222.
- Vlastos, G. [1984], Happiness and virtue in Socrates' moral theory, in: *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 30, 181-213.
- Vlastos, G. [1991], *Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Weiss, R. [1985], Courage, confidence, and wisdom in the *Protagoras*, in: *Ancient Philosophy* 5, 11-24.
- Woodruff, P.B. [2000], Socrates and the irrational, in: N.D. Smith, P. Woodruff (eds.), *Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 130-150.
- Zeyl, D.J. [1982], Socratic virtue and happiness, in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 64, 225-238.

Keywords

Socratic *eudaimonia*; virtue; knowledge; Aeschines' *Alcibiades*; *Alcibiades I*

Abstract

The paper focuses on two *Alkibiades* dialogues, namely Aeschines of Sphettus' *Alcibiades* and the *Alcibiades* I, with special regard to the notion of εὐδαιμονία and its preconditions. Through their comparative analysis I aim at investigating Socrates' conception of happiness and some basic surrounding issues: *a)* the role of ἀρετή in the attainment of εὐδαιμονία and its relationship to happiness as a goal; *b)* the fundamental connection between knowledge and εὐδαιμονία and the subsequent understanding of ἀμαθία as an obstacle to happiness; *c)* the problem of whether or not an "expert" is needed to evaluate one's happiness; *d)* the role of the care for others in relation to the search for εὐδαιμονία.

Dr. Francesca Pentassuglio
Humboldt Postdoctoral Fellow Universität zu Köln –
Philosophische Fakultät (DEUTSCHLAND)
francesca.pentassuglio@gmail.com