

ORESTE TOLONE

SPORT AND PERFORMANCE ETHICS
IN HELMUTH PLESSNER

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1. *Plessner's interest in games and sport*

When in 1956 Helmuth Plessner, after some years at the chair of Sociology at the University of Göttingen (and later at the New School for Social Research in New York), tackles the topic *The function of sport in industrial society*, he seems to be confronted with a little more than occasional philosophical digression – to which in fact he will return only in a few other circumstances and never with the same amplitude [Plessner 1985a, 284-293]. However, this reflection loses the character of digression, if only one recognizes in the play dynamic the historical and anthropological root of sport, and in the game an experimental field in which the composite body structure of man comes to light.

Plessner dealt with the game, albeit indirectly, in the volumes *Lachen und Weinen* (1941) and *Conditio humana* (1961), and in a more targeted way in the 1967 essay *Der Mensch im Spiel* [Plessner 1982a; 2003a; 2003b; 1934; 1981]. From the very beginning he had grasped the «ambivalence» and the double perspective of man as the key to the game [Plessner 1982a, 286-290] – which, not by chance, can provoke hilarity – releasing the theme from prevailing pedagogical and evolutionary interpretations. The contribution of Stanley Hall's, Karl Gross's,

Édouard Claparède's and Sigmund Freud's interpretations is not ignored, as well as the evolutionary interpretation of Darwin, which recognizes in play an exercise of hunting, defence and escape behaviours, and for which notoriously «playful forms serve to learn and improve vital motor and communication skills» [Menninghaus 2014, 193-198]; however, he identifies (in the wake of Rousseau) in Wilhelm Preyer's and especially Frederik J.J. Buytendijk's attempts [Buytendijk 1933; Groos 1899; Huizinga 1956] a perspective of investigation able to free the game from a purely functional reading and «from the predominance of the adult organism» [Plessner 2003a, 308]. All these theories, in fact, had, according to Plessner, the defect of seeing the game exclusively «in the light of seriousness and opportunity» [*ibid.*]. What our author is trying to do is to grasp the anthropological value of this phenomenon – we would be tempted to say almost metaphysical, were it not for the fact that Plessner's philosophy knowingly escapes any such indulgence. What is striking, therefore, is the prevailing disinterest or inattention of sociology, anthropology and philosophy in general towards the game and even more so towards sport, which not by chance, according to Plessner, is investigated almost exclusively for its medical, psychological or physiological aspects [Plessner 1985a, 147]. In the game, on the contrary, something much more radical is at stake, which refers directly to the eccentric nature of man and to the corporeality of a being that, insofar as it is open to the world, is condemned to struggle between constraint and self-determination [See Buytendijk 1952; Plessner 2003a, 309].

2. The ambivalence of play between constraint and self-determination

Buytendijk, with whom Plessner has been actively cooperating since the 1920s [Buytendijk & Plessner 1982; Becker 2015], has dealt with animal play on more than one occasion, recognizing that there is a double tendency behind this phenomenon, namely an impulse towards autonomy (*Drang nach Selbständigkeit*) and an impulse towards constraint (*Drang nach Bindung*) [Plessner 1982a; 2003a, 309]. This ambivalence would seem to be linked to the attempt to recreate the original maternal bond without success. The outcome of this impossibility would be the

turning to the things of the world without a purpose or direction; in this phase, action would be characterised by an absence of orientation, by an erotic tension towards the world and its objects, detached from biological necessities and free from the subject's intentions [Buytendijk 1952; Plessner 2003b, 167-169; Amoroso 2019]; as in the example of the monkey that runs the sand through its fingers, playing with it. This «biological scandal of joy» allows the animal to establish a free circular relationship with the world [Buytendijk 1952; Weizsäcker 1997], a gratuitous relationship with what appears to be unimportant, but not meaningless: momentarily emancipating itself from vital needs, the animal plays with the world. Plessner summarises Buytendijk's position by asserting that in play there is a close relationship between the juvenile phase (*Jugendphase*), the excess of instincts (*Triebüberschuß*) and the capacity for play (*Spielfähigkeit*). In other words, the abundance of impulses in youth and the restlessness that follows, in the absence of mature motor and sexual apparatuses on which to discharge them, would seem to induce the diversion of these instincts to substitute actions, playful, animated by a deep erotic tension [Plessner 2003b, 168].

Plessner adopts the idea of ambivalence as a determining element of the game. In it, man finds himself continually involved in a situation in which he, at the same time, freely *runs* and necessarily *chases* (e.g. a ball). To play means first of all, as Schopenhauer had already argued, to play with something that in turn plays with the player, to play and be played, to be an active and propositional part, but at the same time to be subjected to the attractive force of the context or the object, which forces us to interact with it. This being at once slave and master of the situation, free and bound, is what Plessner, in the wake of Buytendijk, calls *ambivalence* [Plessner 1982a, 286]. In play, on the one hand we express our creativity, our ability to imagine and outline alternative worlds (e.g. that of the Indians), while on the other hand we are captured by the object and the plot; on the one hand we escape from the seriousness of the world around us, while on the other hand it is we ourselves who bind the game to rules and norms from which we cannot escape, on pain of failure of the game itself. This ambiguity creates an equivocal situation; one that tickles us, one that is potentially ridiculous and with which we *do not come to terms* [289].

This failure to come to terms is the sign of involvement with reality, which leads us to no longer be masters of our behaviour; as in laughter, we experience a borderline situation that is not unambiguous, in which the player accepts that he is at the mercy of an open world. A situation that retains a double repulsive and attractive value.

3. *Man at play between world and environment*

A being totally open to the world (*Welt*) would have no constraints; another totally bound to its environment (*Umwelt*) would have no freedom; dual belonging, on the other hand, allows human beings to be conditionally open to the world, in a relationship of ambivalence with it.

A confirmation of this co-belonging is provided by Plessner in his significant 1950 essay entitled *Über das Welt-Umweltverhältnis des Menschen* [Plessner 2003c; Rasini 2020]. The instinctual weakness of man and his lack of physical specialization – which prompts Herder to speak of invalidity – drives him to reconstitute a closed, cultural world environment; landscape, mother tongue, customs, traditions etc., represent an attempt to “find a home”, to recreate a space of familiarity, which endows one’s own cultural world with the character of an environment [Herrmann & Sieglerschmidt 2017]; an environment, however, which – unlike animals and the reading of Scheler and Jakob von Uexküll – rests on a *relative closure* (*relative Geschlossenheit*) [Plessner 2003c, 85; Uexküll 1934; Fischer 2015]. This means that on the one hand, man, in need of protection and security, aspires to the closure of culture, but on the other hand, he remains exposed to the wealth of possibilities, which emerge from his tendency to be open to the world: «his sphere is the world, an open order of hidden backgrounds, from whose latent possibilities and properties he expects something; into whose inexhaustible wealth he is always plunging anew; whose surprises he is at the mercy of in all his planning» [Plessner 2003c, 82]. Despite the fact that culture acts on him as a kind of world-environment, man is at the mercy of the world and its surplus [Portmann 1960; Tolone 2012], he moves «against the open background of a world that no longer arises from vital relations» [Plessner 2003c, 85]. He navigates on a world of possibilities, which emerge only at the moment in which the object is

grasped in itself and not for the *tonality* it possesses – tonality of danger, of usefulness, of protection, etc.: that is, only at the moment in which it is removed from vital relations. Getting out of the «functional circle» [Uexküll 1934; Köchy 2015] allows man to enter into a relationship with a world of objects that, precisely because they are detached from a vital function, challenge the human being to grasp their sense, rather than their meaning. In fact, «the environment related to life, conditioned by impulses and tendencies has tonality; the world of objects and facts has no tonality. If by “having tonality” we mean that it is endowed with meaning, then every environment presents itself to its vital centre as an order of relations of meaning; whereas in contrast to this, the world must be said to be meaningless» [Plessner 2003c, 83]. In other words, man loses the (biological) meaning of things, but acquires a sense of the world and objects, with which he is then called upon to play [Rasini 2020, 5-18]. Playing with objects allows man to discover the world and to interact with its infinite possibilities. Against the invasion of non-meaning, however, man, emancipated from performance, frees objects from their vital meaning, putting them in the condition of acquiring their authentic significance [Plessner 2003c, 51].

The ability to play with things, then, is based on the typically human intertwining of *Weltgebundenheit* and *Welthoffenheit*. Only such a being is able, not only to play in his environment, but *with* it [Plessner 2003a, 313].

4. Human corporeality: experiencing distance

Playing with the environment means not being absorbed into it. Playing with one's own body and with the roles that man personifies and embodies in society means not being one with oneself. This double belonging has its anthropological foundation in the closure-opening to the world and in the centricity-eccentricity of man [Köchy & Michelini 2015; Plessner 1975]. Man's physicality, unlike that of other living beings, rebels against its own closure, escapes the limitation understood as *Begrenzung* [Plessner 1975, 127]. From the outset, it presents the trait of plasticity, which introduces a gap between the tendential character and the real form, presenting the traits of realisation (*Erfüllung*) [Pless-

ner 1975, 125; Michelini 2012]. The difference between being-body and having-body [Plessner 1982a, 238-9] is based on the capacity to live, at the same time, *as* body, *in* the body and *outside* the body, that is, on reflexivity, on the capacity of the centre to distance itself from itself [Plessner 1975, 293]. However much he continues, in some way, to be absorbed by the here and now, and lives from the centre:

he has become conscious of the centrality of his existence. He has himself, he knows of himself, he is perceptible to himself and for this reason he is an *I*, the vanishing point, located “behind himself”, of his own interiority, which, removed from any possible realisation of life from its centre, forms the spectator who stands before the scene of this interior sphere, the subjective pole no longer objectifiable, no longer transferable to the position of the object [*ibid.*].

Man by his nature is a “difference”, a distance that separates “what” he is from what he is not. What in fact agitates us as living beings is not the finiteness from which we try to escape, nor the infiniteness to which we aspire, but the difference, which emerges emotionally and confusedly as a gap, which the three fundamental anthropological laws testify to.

He lives on both sides of the divide, as soul and as body and as the psychophysically neutral unity of these spheres. But unity does not cover the duplicity of appearance, it does not make it stand out by itself, it is not the third that reconciles opposites, that passes through opposing spheres, and it does not form an independent sphere. It is the fracture, the *hiatus*, the emptiness “that through which” of mediation, which for the living being itself is equivalent to the absolute dual character and duplicity of aspect of body and soul, in which he experiences it [Plessner 1975, 292].

In this sense we could say that man is truly human, that is, a person, since «his existence is truly placed in nothingness» [Plessner 1975, 293; Esposito 2020]. Man’s capacity to be a person presupposes a «being sunk in his own body» (*Insichversenktheit*), a finding himself inside a case (*Futteralsituation*), perceived as an original *Ur-Kleid* [Plessner

2003a, 310], from which he nevertheless distinguishes himself and distances himself. This places man in a relationship of “instrumentality”, which allows *manipulation* on the one hand, and *expressiveness* on the other. For as much as he is his own body, he is nevertheless destined to impersonate roles, to use himself as an instrument of his own realisation and thus to perceive the exteriority of himself. «Being sunk into oneself, being in custody, externality and instrumentality not only support acting, but are involved in all play (not just acting)» [Plessner 2003a, 313; Ruco 2007]. In playing (*Spiel*) and acting (*Spielen*), that personal structure of the body emerges: «personality is evidently a basic formal characteristic of our bodily existence, which has to find a balance between bodily being and the compulsion to dominate this bodily being, i.e. to have it» [Plessner 2003b, 196; Ruco 2007].

The person is thus called upon to play out his existence, to pursue a unitary relationship with himself and with the world, to seek a balance with the body and with objects, to which he is called by virtue of his being founded on nothingness, on distance: to which he is called by virtue of a *Zwei-Einheit* [Plessner 2003a, 311], which has its root in the broken naturalness that does not dispose of itself [Plessner 1982b, 416; Rasini 2020, 13]. This being simultaneously constrained and unconstrained is based on the threefold way in which human beings relate to their bodies and on the very special condition of individuals both open to the world and bound to the environment.

5. Sport as compensation for a disturbance in the natural relationship with the body

Sport, however different it may be, has its roots in play [Plessner 1985a, 148], thus sharing its anthropological premises. The fact that there is a seamless relationship is demonstrated by the etymology of the term, which from the ancient French *desport*, moves to the Italian *diporto* and to the English *disport* [Elias & Dunning 1989], from which its close derivation from ludic activity, from leisure and pastime is evident. Moreover, after the studies of Caillois, Suits etc. [Suits 1988; Caillois 1967], it is now evident that already within the concept of play a gradualness of *plays* and *games*, spontaneous games and organised games can be

distinguished, and what kind of passage allows the transformation of a «primitive play» into a «sophisticated play», into a rule-governed interplay of participants [Sorgi 2010; Suits 1988; Grion 2021].

In the wake of a well-established tradition, Plessner recognizes, however, the discontinuity of a phenomenon, which should be placed exclusively within an industrialised, urbanised and mass western society [Elias & Dunning 1989, 160; Ravaglioli 1990, 51]: sport becomes the «essential symptom» of modern society [Plessner 1985a, 147]. Being an industrialised society means, above all, being a society permeated by technology, founded on the division of labour and on urbanisation – with its exponential development of metropolises; it means, to borrow the key words used by the author: *industrialisation*, *mechanisation*, *specialisation* and *bureaucratisation* [148]. Now, this type of social organisation brings with it a dose of unhappiness, which stems largely from the fact that in modern work – which is increasingly and almost exclusively intellectual work (*Kopfarbeit*) – the body, the integral physical dimension of man, is practically no longer in play [149]. In other words, «our modern society feels irritated, not to say disturbed, in its natural relationship with the body» [148]. And it is in this alteration of the natural – albeit complex – relationship that the eccentric being establishes with his body that the question of sport comes in.

Accepting and surpassing Max Scheler's position, which attributed to sport the function of "mere relief from work" [Scheler 1975, 168; Scheler 1927, XXI], Plessner sees in it a way to *heal* (*Wiederpflege*), to re-establish the intrinsic value of bodily existence, long neglected, a *compensation* (*Ausgleich*) to the imbalance between man's spiritual and bodily possibilities: «there is no doubt that the industrialised world has seen and largely found in sport a compensation for that feeling of disturbed balance between mental possibilities and physical needs» [Plessner 1985a, 150]. In it, man is in search of a new integrity (*Integration*), a new originality (*Ursprünglichkeit*), as a response 1. to a feeling of disturbed corporeity, 2. to the anonymity of a society that makes each individual interchangeable, 3. to the alienation that arises from an excess of thought, from an exasperated intellectualisation [153]. In a certain sense, it is as if the individual had lost that unity of purpose between body and spirit, which was pursued – to the great gratification of

the person – in the craft activities of the past, in walking: the latter activity representing the full integration of the bodily dimension with the spiritual one. Increasingly sitting and projecting oneself into an almost virtual dimension, in which the exasperated exercise of the mind progressively makes the dimension of corporeality disappear [Schürmann 2020]; the excess of *comfort* and *speed* alters the triple dynamic of the body, delocalising the mind and making the person unhappy, bodiless. Such a person needs visibility, to emerge from the anonymity of the intellect: he needs to admire and be admired. In this social and epochal context, human beings find in sport a way to be protagonists (as well as spectators), to escape from working time (in recreation), to guarantee social contacts, to discharge their aggressiveness, to play, to overcome class distinctions, to be heroic and assert themselves once again.

Sport, therefore, is identified by Plessner as the way of an era – the modern and industrialised age – to recover that dialectical integrity with one's own body which is typical of the *person*; that is to say, of an ego capable at the same time of being the body, of instrumentally having its own body and realising itself as a unity in the constant interaction with itself and with others [Plessner 1975, 300, 303]. Sport is a way of continuing to be a person and of integrating human beings in their multiple structure, including in a world that induces splitting; it is a way of claiming one's own unity and uniqueness, despite the dangers due to *Ersetzbarkeit* and *Zufälligkeit* [344], typical of that animal perpetually torn between naturalness and artificiality, between mediation and immediacy, between utopian flight and reference to the self.

This activity seems to take on the appearance of *kathécon*, of an action that frees, restrains, contains and binds at the same time as it frees. This capacity for integration is the quintessence of anthropological ambivalence, already inscribed in the cornerstones of the spirit of sportsmanship, which in fact requires, according to Plessner, both «discipline» and «regulations», as well as «perfection» and «record» [Plessner 1985a, 157]. Sport, in other words, would seem to have the capacity to integrate constraint and self-determination, reference to the body (*centricity*) and overcoming the body (*eccentricity*), limitation of the environment (closure to the world) and exoneration from the environment (opening to the world). This play with the world and the body is subject

to the perennial obligation to keep together this ambivalence, the risks and potentially distorting results of which – already inscribed in the *Haltlosigkeit* of the eccentric animal [Plessner 1975, 346] – are evident in the very current phenomena of *enhancement* and doping [Persson & Savulescu 2012; Grüneberg 2012].

6. *Sport, eccentricity and self-empowerment*

Artificiality, together with mediateness and utopian tension, expose human beings to the risk of a Promethean drift, in which a «rhetoric of excess» [Hoberman 1988, 29] takes over from the rootedness to the body. The risk of juxtaposing an ideal image of oneself with bodily needs shifts freedom in the direction of a will to power, a political athleticism, which does not compromise limits to its own fulfilment [128]. In the course of the twentieth century, we witnessed the transformation of the body into a “political space”, to use Alfred Baeumler’s expression, and therefore its instrumental abuse; the narcissistic exaltation of the sportsperson, who with his «childish fever for the record» [Scheler 1927, XIII] embodies the figure of the superman, a sensationalist spirit for whom there is no limit that cannot be surpassed. Roland Barthes’s «hypertrophy of the fragile head» and the opposition to the body, the hymn to physical transcendence, which in more or less evident forms imposed itself in the political and philosophical debate of the socialist area between the 1960s and 1970s [Barthes 1974, 185; Vinai 2009], and which in Adorno, for example, took on the features of a real hostility [Hoberman 1988, 345], can be placed in the same direction. Sport increasingly falls under the banner of *performance* (*Leistung*), of performance, which in the name of the record and of human perfection, unconditionally asserts the right to shape the body, to implement, increase, improve and enhance its performance, beyond any constraint – be it physical, regulatory or institutional [Schneidereit 2012]. *Enhancement*, both physical and moral – in the version advocated, for example, by Savulescu and Persson [Persson & Savulescu 2012; Lavazza & Reichlin 2019] – is the new frontier with which sport too is called upon to come to terms. The debate on *posthumanity* itself is along these lines; artificially shaping oneself poses the problem of *how* and to what extent it is

permissible to intervene on the psycho-physical traits of human beings [Di Sapia 2015], considering that now technique, having overcome the «deficit paradigm», does not simply have a function of exoneration (*Entlastung*) and compensation of the organs, as in Gehlen, but of enhancement. Bio-conservatives and bio-liberals, sceptics and transhumanists [Woyke 2012, 109], in their various nuances, propose profoundly different ideas of the human, which ultimately revolve around the two poles of the Plessnerian natural-artificiality of human beings.

Today's absolutely dominant emphasis on record and perfection, rather than on discipline and sporting regulations – as identified by Plessner – shows the progressive unbalancing in the, so to speak, bio-liberal direction. As Michael Sandel argues in an enlightening reflection, «the deeper danger is that they represent a kind of hyperagency, a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires. The problem is not the drift to mechanism but the drive to mastery. And what the drive to mastery misses, and may even destroy, is an appreciation of the gifted character of human powers and achievements» [Sandel 2007, 26].

7. *The ethos of sport in today's society*

Plessner sees this risk as intrinsic to an era that has elevated the *ethos* of sportsmanship and performance to universal status. Since values and aims have disappeared (those that guided, for example, the moral actions of medieval or Enlightenment societies), and since we have entered what we might call a society of “moral strangers”, we have no choice but to redesign the world of work and the entire social sphere according to the *ethos* of agonal behaviour, of sport. Since there is no longer anything that the industrialised world truly recognizes as dutiful, as a source of moral obligation, as a binding root, we adhere to a neutral and indifferent ethic [Plessner 1985a, 163; Vinai 2009, 49; Gehlen 1965, 29], devoid of content, which merely guarantees a common, circumscribed and normed playing field. A field in which respect for the rules guarantees respect for the dignity of human beings, who nevertheless limit themselves to being con-current.

In societies of “pluralism”, acting with *fair play*, i.e. respecting the

opponent and the rules of the game, the limits of the field, knowing how to lose, knowing how to work as a team, etc., are the only rules that are easily universalised. A sporting ethic, or as Plessner also calls it, a “dis-engagement ethic”, enables a society to maintain a profile of morality, even where there no longer seems to be any shared action. An open and global society

has no choice but to retreat to neutral functional values of clean performance, the cultivation of fair play and all the other virtues that sport also cultivates. It therefore makes work and profession a sport. This fact does not affect the attitude and personal faith of the individual. The individual sportsman may be a devout Catholic, a Protestant, a Mohammedan, a Marxist, but the totality touches him and strengthens him in his desire for performance, his *pursuit of the record*, his *overestimation of function*, his *indifference to objectives*, his contempt for everything that is not revealed in performance and cannot be measured in terms of performance. Thus, the alliance between the industrialism of the modern world and sport has its positive and negative sides. Just as sport imprints its form on it and is dedicated to the record and surrenders to these degeneracies, in contrast industrialism adopts functionalism and formalism which, under the guise of an ethic of irreproachable disengagement, allows people to play even where their very existence is at stake [Plessner 1985a, 164].

A culture devoid of purpose can only take refuge in the functional value of performance. The price to be paid, however, is high. Indifferentism to purpose confines ethics to a procedural ethic, which risks making the “quest for the record” and “performance” for its own sake, the guiding star of public and private action. This does not lead Plessner to moralise, but this *ethos* guides action along the lines of competition and contest. Not only can this lead to an ideal justification of warlike tendencies, but above all it «makes individuals immune to deeper reflection on the *purpose* of their actions and the *limits* of their capacity for improvement. It deprives them of a sense of calm and measure, of leisure and play» [Plessner 1985a, 165]. In other words, it directs towards performancism, recordism, enhancement as a procedure, laying the foundations for a performance, anti-ecological ethic of excess. A measure that has a limit

in the health of the environment and of the protagonist, and that although it is not static – as Canguilhem has shown [Canguilhem 1966; Bisol 2012; Tolone 2014] – it has in the sustainability of the process of health enlargement, a fundamental constraint. Performance must be anchored to health, which, however, is continually searching for the range within which it can be exercised; empowerment is proper to an eccentric being, who in a utopian way expands himself and his well-being towards yet unexplored limits. As Plessner reminds us, however, life is a spiral [Plessner 1975, 148], a static circle that repeats itself at higher and higher levels, making it dynamic, at heights that must be experienced each time. The sustainability of this spiral is linked to the game capable of holding together the utopia of oneself with the constraint of one's own body and centre, the ambivalence of the constraint and self-determination, where the constraint is not only an obstacle, a passive resistance to the exercise of freedom, but the condition of its possibility: the gift, unexpected, with which we come to terms and thanks to which man is at stake, in the world. This helps to recover, in sport as in life, the value of chance and the solidarity that comes with it; the recognition of passivity, which in dialogue with the eccentric identifies a range of values that can be practised by man in his entirety. We could say that «Good health, like good character, is a constitutive element of human flourishing. Although more health is better than less, at least within a certain range, it is not the kind of good that can be maximized» [Sandel 2007, 48].

8. *Constraint as bond*

The person, as an integral unity, escapes the temptation of both physical closure and its indiscriminate overcoming and guarantees, under the sign of bodily health, a sporting competitive spirit that does not give in to the exclusive dominion of the record. Maintaining the constraint-self-determination dialectic, typical of the game and sport, protects the eccentric animal from the lure of performance and maximization. On the other hand, it ensures that the *ethos* of sport, elevated to universal rank, to the ethics of competition, maintains the measure of the constraint as a bond, which has its root in the erotic attraction ex-

exercised by the world in its original indefiniteness [Accarino 2001, 153], and in the health of the body and the environment its internal limit.

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Keywords

Plessner; sport; play; performance ethics; *Weltoffenheit*; eccentricity

Abstract

Plessner's interest in sport and play has anthropological roots. In the wake of Buytendijk, he identifies the ambivalence between the impulse towards constraint and autonomy, which characterizes the playful attitude towards the world. This ambivalence is based on the relative closure to the world, on the intertwining of *Weltgebundenheit* and *Weltoffenheit*. This "relative closure" is characteristic of an eccentric being, who on the one hand has sunk into a body and on the other hand instrumentally distances himself from it. Sport, which is also etymologically rooted in play, is a symptom of an industrialised society with a disturbed relationship to the body. In fact, it guarantees bodily unity, moving dialectically between the tendency towards records and respect for rules. Today, this balance is at risk because of a tendency towards record-breaking, which is intrinsic to the ethos of sporting performance. The recovery of the passive dimension, of the bond as a link, which is proper to the game, and the parameter of health, can be a corrective, proper to the person.

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